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ARTICLES
ROCK, PAPER, SCISSORS: CHOOSING THE RIGHT
VEHICLE FOR FEDERAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES
Joan MacLeod Hem inway *

RPS is a decision making game of wits, speed, dexterity and strategy
between players who are unable to reach a decision using other
means. The result of a game is considered a binding agreement
between the players. RPS is a game played by honorable people and
therefore every effort should be made to commit to the
outcome ....

I.

INTRODUCTION

Many legal scholars-and others-are quick to propose the
enactment or adoption of specific legal rules without articulating, on any
*

Associate Professor, The University of Tennessee College of Law; A.B. 1982,

Brown University; J.D. 1985, New York University School of Law. The author
presented the idea for this article at the annual meeting of the Law and Society
Association in June 2003. Dwight Aarons deserves thanks for his unbridled interest in
and encouragement of my work on this article (as well as his thoughtful comments on
an earlier draft), and Ben Barton also deserves thanks for his pointed questions and
meaningful help with resources. In addition, I am grateful for the support and
assistance of Jayne Barnard, Dana Brakman Reiser, Marty Carcieri, Tom Davies, Carol
Parker, Maggie Sachs, Larry Soderquist, and Greg Stein, each of whom read and
commented on all or part of this article. I also thank my research assistants, Jeff Fuller
and Chris Whittaker, for their valuable work on this project. Finally, I must express my
gratitude to The University of Tennessee College of Law, which supported work on this
article with summer research grant funding.
1.

WORLD

RPS

SOCIETY,

THE

OFFICIAL

RULES

OF

RPS

PLAY,

at

http://www.worldrps.com/gbasics.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005) [hereinafter
"WORLD RPS"]. The quoted text briefly describes the game known to many as "Rock,
Paper, Scissors" (referred to in the description as "RPS").
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reasoned basis, the appropriate institutional vehicle by which the rule
should be enacted or adopted.2 Some rulemaking proposals ignore
issues of institutional choice altogether. Others seemingly suggest a
path for enactment or adoption of the proposed rule based on an overly
simplistic or, in some cases, nonexistent analysis. Despite this relative
lack of attention to issues of institutional choice in proposals for legal
change, the institutional vehicle chosen for enactment or adoption of a
legal rule may be important. Among other things, institutional choice
may impact the probability of enactment, as well as the form, content,
efficacy, or cost of the rule.3
With these and other related issues in mind, this article focuses on
decision making in federal jurisprudence; 4 more specifically, it focuses
on identifying and analyzing important considerations involved in
determining whether a desired federal rule of corporate governance 5
optimally should be legislated by the U.S. Congress, adopted by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), or instituted by the
federal judiciary. The schoolyard game of RPS, a game that is designed
to be used by the players to make decisions,6 is an analog to this
2. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 5-6 (1994) (chastising law
and public policy analysts for failing to comparatively assess institutional choice,
claiming that they "treat it as intuitively obvious, or deal with it as an afterthought").
See also Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who
Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA L.
REV. 1167, 1172 n. 16 (2003) (describing and offering citations to recent scholarship on
institutional analysis and noting its roots in the legal process movement). The author
admits that she has struggled in the past with unresolved questions of institutional
choice. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider
Trading:A Callfor Action, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 1131, 1192 n.219 (2003).
3. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 125-27 (1994) (describing
differences between enacted law and decisional law).
4. The references to jurisprudence here and elsewhere in this article are to a
system of legal rules rather than a body of decisional law. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 871 (8th ed. 1999) (defining jurisprudence as, among other things, "[a]
system, body, or division of law"); see also Philip Soper, Making Sense of Modern
Jurisprudence: The Paradox of Positivism and the Challenge for Natural Law, 22
CREIGHTON L. REv. 67, 69-70 (1988) (referencing three meanings of jurisprudence:
"the study of law," "the science of law," and "the nature of law").
5. See infra notes 41-43 (defining "corporate governance").
6. See WORLD RPS, supra note 1. In fact, The World RPS Player's Responsibility
Code not only recommends that players "[a]lways establish what is to be decided or
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determinative process in a number of respects. Reflecting on the brief
quote at the beginning of this article, for example, one might observe
that the process of choosing and implementing the right vehicle for
federal corporate governance initiatives, like RPS, often requires wit, 7
speed,8 dexterity,9 and strategy and is characterized, in many cases, by
honorable players1" who are willing commit to the outcome of that
whether the match is to be played for honour," but also cautions that players should
"[t]hink twice before using RPS for life-threatening decisions." Id.
7. See Editorial, Pressing the Attack on Corporate Greed, THE POST STANDARD
(Syracuse, NY), Feb. 7, 2003, at A1O (contending that the SEC must find "wit and
courage to restore a measure of integrity to the financial markets").
8. See infra note 19 and accompanying text (noting, among other things, the speed
with which Congress acted in drafting and enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
9. See Stephen F. Williams, Public Choice Theory and the Judiciary:A Review of
Jerry L. Mashaw's Greed, Chaos, and Governance, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1599,
1615 (1998) (book review) ("As the public appetite for regulation waxes and wanes, or
as new circumstances and evidence undermine the case for old regulatory strategies,
agencies under Presidential direction can respond more nimbly than can Congress.").
10. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in
State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 625, 671 (1994) (noting that
legislatures may act strategically); Donald C. Langevoort, Corporate Accountability:
Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's Shadow: The SEC's Pursuit of Managerial
Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2001) (focusing on strategic behavior by the
SEC in corporate governance reform through disclosure and antifraud regulation);
Michael H. LeRoy, Institutional Signals and Implicit Bargains in the ULP Strike
Doctrine: Empirical Evidence of Law as Equilibrium, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 218
(1991) (noting the "idea that the Court acts strategically because of its interdependence
with Congress and agencies flows naturally from the checks-and-balances structure that
the constitutional framers intended"); Joseph L. Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The
Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 81
(2002) (noting that the results of their work "support the strategic instrument
perspective, which asserts that judges strategically select reversal instruments so as to
protect decisions that advance their policy goals").
11.
See Michael H. LeRoy & John H. Johnson IV, Death by Lethal Injunction:
National Emergency Strikes Under the Taft-Hartley Act and the Moribund Right to
Strike, 43 ARIz. L. REV. 63, 132 (2001) (referencing "the federal judiciary's honorable
reputation"); Albert Yoon, Love's Labor's Lost? Judicial Tenure Among FederalCourt
Judges: 1945-2000, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1029, 1041 (2003) (mentioning "integrity" as a
quality of the federal judiciary). But see Joseph N. Cappella & Kathleen Hall Jamieson,
News Frames, Political Cynicism, and Media Cynicism, 546 ANNALS 71, 72 (1996)
(noting the results of a news poll in which "37 percent [of respondents] give very
negative evaluations of the work habits, honesty, and integrity of Congress").
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process. 12
However, unlike RPS, this article offers a rigorous, reasoned model
for decision making, based on foundational principles drawn from
(among other disciplines) constitutional law, administrative law,
legislative process, political science, and economics. 13 The primary
objective of this article is the encouragement of an analytical,
comparative approach to institutional choice 4 in the establishment of
federal rules of corporate governance. Toward that end, the article
proposes a construct for making institutional choice decisions-a group

12. This is true to the extent that Congress, the SEC, and the federal judiciary all
are bound to comply with the resulting rule of law. This willingness may, however, be
short-lived. For example, Congress may enact legislation that preempts an SEC rule or
interpretation or corrects a judicial misunderstanding. Sometimes, this intrusion is
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Communicating and
contemplated or welcomed.
Commenting on the Court's Work, 83 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2125 (1995) ("When Congress is
not clear, courts often invite, and are glad to receive, legislative correction .... When
Congress has been Delphic or dense, or simply imprecise, legislative clarification can
ward off further confusion.").
13. One can but hope that the construct proposed in this article proves to be a more
sophisticated and substantive basis for jurisprudential decision making than RPS. Of
course, even simpler, democratic decisionmaking processes, including those used in
federal lawmaking, raise questions on some level about fairness and legitimacy. In
commenting on this phenomenon in the context of legislative voting mechanics, one
scholar made the following salient observations:
In various activities, we settle things by tossing a coin: we toss a coin to determine
which side is to defend which goal at the beginning of a soccer game. No one would
think that an appropriate basis for determining which propositions should be accorded
authority as sources of law. But counting votes seems much more like coin-tossing
than like the exercises of reason and intellect that characterize the consecration of
other sources of law-for example, the development of a new doctrine, principle, or
exception in the deliberations of a court. How, then, can we be expected to take
legislation seriously when it is determined in this apparently arbitrary way?
JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 127 (1999).
14. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 3-7 (setting forth various reasons why
institutional choice and comparative institutional analysis are important). The author is
indebted to Professor Neil Komesar. This article presents a different type of
institutional choice inquiry than that pursued by Professor Komesar and therefore
employs an alternative analytical model to that suggested by Professor Komesar, but
many of the premises underlying the model suggested here are similar to those on
which the Komesar model rests. Importantly, Professor Komesar's model itself relies
on earlier work on interest-group theory done by, among others, George Stigler,
Richard Posner, and Sam Peltzman. See Barton, supra note 2, at 1179 n.43 (describing
and citing to this body of work).
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of four elements that a rule proponent 5 should consider in deciding
whether a particular rule of corporate governance at the federal level
should be enacted by Congress, promulgated by the SEC, or ordered by
a federal court. 6 Because this article is foundational in its approach,
most of the article is spent identifying, defining, and otherwise
explaining these component elements of the suggested decisionmaking
model. The article also, however, instructs the reader in how to employ
the proposed model in determining institutional choice in federal
corporate governance rulemaking.
The immediate catalyst for the federal corporate governance focus
of this article is the congressional proposal and enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley") 7 in the wake of public
revelations of a series of corporate scandals.' 8 Much already has been
written (and, doubtless, more will continue to be written) about
Sarbanes-Oxley, broad-based legislation that institutes a number of new
corporate governance initiatives at the federal level. Many scholars and
other commentators have questioned, for example, the haste with which

15.
Proponents may include politicians, legislators, regulators, judges, and their
respective staff members or clerks, as well as practicing lawyers, lobbyists, scholars,
interest groups and their participants, and members of the public at large.
16. Some readers familiar with the RPS game may perceive the three elements of
an RPS game as analogous to these three vehicles for (ways of bringing into effect)
federal corporate governance initiatives, with legislation winning against regulation and
losing to decisional law, regulation winning against decisional law and losing to
legislation, and decisional law winning against legislation and losing to regulation. See
WORLD RPS, supra note 1, THROWS, RULE 6.0. This analogy, although interesting, is
not perfect and will not be pursued in this article.
17. See Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 at 403 (2002) (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
18. See R. William Ide, Post-Enron Corporate Governance Opportunities:
Creating a Culture of GreaterBoard Collaborationand Oversight, 54 MERCER L. REV.
829, 830-31 (2003); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Sarbanes-Oxley, Jurisprudence, Game
Theory, Insurance, and Kant: Toward a Moral Theory of Good Governance, at 4, at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=576761 (August 2004); Mark J.
Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 590, 633 (2003) (noting that
Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted "in reaction to the corporate governance failures at Enron
and WorldCom" and "[i]n reaction to the Enron-era scandals"); Roberta Romano, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, at 1, at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract.id=5961 01 (September 2004).
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Congress moved in enacting Sarbanes-Oxley,' 9 the potential
effectiveness of the various provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley in achieving
the law's intended objectives, 20 the drafting of the statute,2 and whether
19. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and
Corporate Governance Reform, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 855, 874 (2004) (indicating
that Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley "at break-neck speed"); Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth
M. Rosen, Lessons From Enron, How Did Corporate and Securities Law Fail?Is There
a Role ForLawyers in PreventingFuture Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1097, 1098 (2003)
(noting rapid congressional agreement on Sarbanes-Oxley); Ide, supra note 18, at 83031 (noting and critiquing the speed with which Congress acted in enacting SarbanesOxley); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. REV. 77, 88-89 (2003)
(referencing "the consequent rush to the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley" and
characterizing the legislative process leading to the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley as
"regulating in a panic"); Romano, supra note 18, at 1, 3 (noting that "SOX was enacted
in a flurry of congressional activity" and that it was "hurriedly enacted"); Susan J.
Stabile, Enron, Global Crossing,and Beyond: ImplicationsFor Workers, 76 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 815, 832 (2002) (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley "moved through Congress with
record speed in an effort to bolster the confidence of investors"); Matthew M. Benov,
Comment, The Equivalence Test and Sarbanes-Oxley: Accommodating Foreign Private
Issuers and Maintaining the Vitality of U.S. Markets, 16 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 439, 445
(2003) ("Anticipating the political fallout from the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the
SEC quickly formulated a set of proposed rules reflecting the President's goal to hold
corporate executives accountable."); R. Max Crane & Jeffrey J. Fessler, Just When You
Thought It Was Safe To Go Back into The Water. More SEC Rules And Regulations For
Counsel To Implement - Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 - Part I, THE METROPOLITAN
CORPORATE COUNSEL,

(N.E. Ed.), Apr. 2003, at 5 (noting that "Congress moved

quickly" and that "the SEC has been extraordinarily busy over the past several months
attempting to follow up on Congress' legislation with detailed rules and guidelines");
Tamara Loomis, Scandals Spur Increase in Governance Officers, Law Firm Practice
Groups, N.Y. LAW J. Apr. 24, 2003, at 1 ("Congress quickly responded with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the most sweeping set of revisions to securities laws in decades;
the Securities and Exchange Commission doubled enforcement efforts; and plaintiffs
lawyers began flooding the courts with lawsuits."); U.S. Chamber of Commerce Press
Release, U.S. Chamber Cautious on Swift Conference Action, Corporate Reform
Impacts
Not
Well
Understood
(July
24,
2002),
available
at
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2002/uly/02-120.htm (last visited Mar. 14,
2005) ("A rush to legislate is rarely in the best interests of consumers, investors,
workers, or the economy.").
20. The express purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley is to "protect investors by improving
the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities
laws, and for other purposes." Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 at 403 (2002); see
Andrew B. Cripe, Employee and Director Accountability to Shareholders: Doing
Business for Business Owners, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 153, 156-57 (2003) ("A
company that simply sets out to ensure compliance with the Act, therefore, will not
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any federal action addressing these objectives was necessary, or even
desirable.22 This article only touches on that existing and growing body
of commentaries on the substantive provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and
their perceived failings. 23 Importantly, however, Sarbanes-Oxley has

necessarily ensure that the problems of the recent past are not repeated."); Lipshaw,
supra note 18, at 11-12 (raising the same point).
21.
See Ide, supra note 18, at 831 ("[T]he resulting legislation is in parts
disjunctive, duplicative, and lacking in regard for federalism considerations and
distinctions between policy and administration.").
22. See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to CorporateFraud:A
Critique of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1 (2002).
23. The enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley constitutes a forceful, preemptive use of
institutional choice on the part of Congress. The SEC (and the stock exchanges under
its watch) had been working on initiatives in some of the areas covered by SarbanesOxley, but Congress chose to act first, derailing, preempting, or co-opting these
initiatives. See Ide, supra note 18, at 846 ("Before the SEC or SROs could take any
action on their respective proposals, however, the WorldCom scandal erupted and
Congress stepped into the fray. . . Congress passed and, on July 30, 2002, the President
signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002."); Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The
Board, CorporateGovernance, and Some Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in NANCY
B. RAPOPORT & BALA G. DHARAN, ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS 495, 515 n.85 (2004) ("A number of the SEC's early proposals found
their way, in one form or another, into the final legislation."). Cf Joseph A. Franco,
Why Antifraud ProhibitionsAre Not Enough: The Significance of Opportunism, Candor
and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 223, 295 n.149, 302 n.163 (describing early SEC rulemaking and
proposals in the post-Enron period, including a loan disclosure provision that was
superseded by Sarbanes-Oxley). Several SEC rulemaking proposals responding to
securities fraud issues in the post-Enron pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era have not resulted in
final SEC rules. See, e.g., Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management Transactions,
SEC Release No. 33-8090 (Apr. 12, 2002) (proposing enhanced disclosures of, among
other things, loans to executives); Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis
about the Application of Critical Accounting Policies, SEC Release No. 33-8098 (May
10, 2002) (proposing certain disclosures relating to accounting policies used by issuers
in financial statement reporting and related disclosures); Framework for Enhancing the
Quality of Financial Information Through Improvement of Oversight of the Auditing
Process, SEC Release No. 33-8109 (June 26, 2002) (proposing measures to enhance
investor confidence in financial disclosures). One SEC rulemaking proposal was coopted by Congress in enacting Sarbanes-Oxley. See Certification of Disclosure in
Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, SEC Release No. 33-8214 (Aug. 29, 2002)
(adopting the SEC final disclosure certification rule required by Sarbanes-Oxley
Section 302(a) originally proposed by the SEC prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-
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awakened many of us to the reality that corporate governance initiatives
now are a potentially growing part of the federal rulemaking agenda.
That phenomenon deserves scholarly attention in all its aspects,
including institutional choice.24 Accordingly, this article primarily
outlines and illustrates a method for determining which federal
rulemaking institution should establish federal corporate governance
rules like those enacted in Sarbanes-Oxley 25 and uses an ex post analysis
Oxley); Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, SEC
Release No. 34-46079 (June 17, 2002) (SEC proposal regarding certification of the
contents of issuer quarterly and annual reports).
24. In reviewing a recent book authored by Mark Roe, a political science scholar
notes:
Roe correctly directs our attention toward politics in order to understand SarbanesOxley and these debates. Solutions cannot abstract from the political issues of
institutional design. Norms without enforcement, enforcement without quality law and
regulations, law enforcement without political support, politics without a structure of
preferences and institutional mechanisms-these elements are all pieces of an
interacting system. Each piece can be analyzed separately, but they don't operate
separately. Roe's argument compels more research on interactions and comparisons
among these elements.
Peter A. Gourevitch, The Politics of Corporate Governance Regulation: Political
Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, CorporateImpact, by Mark
J. Roe, 112 YALE L.J. 1829, 1874 (2003) (book review).
25. That Sarbanes-Oxley is an example of corporate governance rulemaking is
beyond question. See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking CorporateFederalism in the Era of
Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 624, 642 (2004) ("[T]he Act directly regulates
corporate governance."); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Reinvention of Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1189 (2003) (examining the
potential effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on corporate law); Lessons From Enron: A
Symposium on Corporate Governance: Transcript-Afternoon Session, 54 MERCER L.
REv. 731, 733 (2003) (comments of Michael Rosenzweig) ("Sarbanes-Oxley is, among
other things, an attempt really to codify, to a certain extent, standards of good
governance; that is, an effort to adopt specific requirements, specific, concrete
requirements that give detailed content to what would otherwise necessarily be, and is
as a matter of state law, a broad concept that we call 'fiduciary responsibility."');
Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief BehavioralAutopsy, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 417, 440 (2003)
("Sarbanes-Oxley addresses the incentive structure of virtually all the important actors
in what experts have called the 'corporate reporting supply chain' - officers, directors,
auditors, attorneys, and securities analysts."); Roe, supra note 18, at 633 ("SarbanesOxley digs deep into corporate governance, regulating the nitty-gritty."). The law is
complex and consists of numerous, distinct corporate governance and other rules. If the
model proposed in this article were to have been used by members of Congress or
others in their deliberations over Sarbanes-Oxley, each distinct rule would be analyzed
separately under the model. See infra Part VII.
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of Sarbanes-Oxley to provide examples at various points along the way.
To serve these purposes, this article proceeds in six additional parts.
Part II lays the groundwork for the analysis that forms the core of the
article by establishing the scope of that analysis. In essence, Part II
more specifically identifies and examines the premises on which the
article is based, including the assumption that well defined rules of
corporate governance at the federal level are or will be necessary or
desirable.. Part III analyzes the important threshold issue of institutional
power, authority, or jurisdiction2 6 for corporate governance initiatives
undertaken through each of the three described vehicles (congressional
legislation, SEC rulemaking, and federal court decisionmaking). In Part
IV, this article explores issues relating to the comparative competence of
the principal federal institutions (Congress, the SEC, and the federal
courts), focusing on the institution's relative structural and substantive
abilities to perform the necessary rulemaking. Part V of the article
assesses influence and the potential for resulting bias 2 7 -the ability of

26.

Definitions of the terms "jurisdiction," "power," and "authority" may be

derived from a number of sources. See

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

867 (8th ed. 1999)

(defining "jurisdiction" as, among other things, "[a] government's general power to
exercise authority over all persons and things within its territory"); id. at 1207-08
(defining "power" as, among other things, "[t]he legal right or authorization to act or
not act," "congressional power" as the authority vested in the U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives to enact laws and take other constitutionally permitted actions," and
"quasi-legislative power" as [a]n administrative agency's power to engage in
rulemaking"); id. at 142 (defining "authority" as "[gjovemmental power or
jurisdiction"); WILLIAM LYONS & JOHN M. SCHEB II, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:
POLITICS AND POLITICAL CULTURE

474 (3rd ed. 2003) ("Jurisdiction is, quite simply, the

authority of a court of law to hear and decide a case."); Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious
Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1615-17 (2003) (defining
"jurisdiction" by exploring definitions of "power" and "authority," among other terms).
The overlapping, intertwined denotations of these three terms result in confused
meanings. Accordingly, the three terms are used interchangeably in this article to
reference the nature and scope of a rulemaking body's legal right to act. However,
preference is given to the use of the word "power" in the congressional context, the
word "authority" in the SEC context, and the word "jurisdiction" in the federal court
context. Moreover, the aggregation of these concepts is referred to in this article as
"institutional capacity."
27. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 76 ("Influence is a positive or descriptive issue.
By contrast, bias is a normative or prescriptive issue. As always, it depends on the
social goal in question.").
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each of these federal institutions to act in an impartial manner in
instituting or changing rules relating to corporate governance, and Part
VI discusses the relative transition costs of each vehicle in instituting
and carrying forward corporate governance rules. Part VII offers a
summary and conclusion in which the use of the proposed analytical
framework is explained and illustrated through the analysis of two
specific rules of corporate governance.

II.

REFINING THE SCOPE OF ANALYSIS

This article assumes a regulatory-rather than market-based-approach to corporate governance. 28 Further, it is predicated on a clearly
identified and established need for a well conceptualized corporate
governance rule. Finally, the article assumes a federal actor or actorsCongress, the SEC, the federal courts, or a combination of these

rulemaking bodies-ordains the desired corporate governance initiative.
Each premise requires further explication.
A.

The Choice of Regulato!y Action Over Market Regulation

Corporate governance rules may be dictated by positive regulation
or by market transactions. 29 This article assumes that the market has

been supervened in the rulemaking process by some form of positive
regulation. This assumption (of a regulatory, rather than market-based,
rulemaking solution) is based on both historical fact30 and recent
experience (in particular, in the form of Sarbanes-Oxley). 31 Apparently,
fear and anxiety about the state of the U.S. capital markets have served
28. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 98-122.
29. The market often is seen as an alternative to a governmental or political
solution. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 98 ("The market process... can serve as an
alternative to government action in the achievement of social goals or interests.").
30. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of
Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997) (contending that market crises often result
in regulation and noting that "most of the major instances of new securities regulation
in the past three hundred years of English and American history have come right after
crashes"); Troy A. Paredes, The Future of the Mandatory Disclosure System:
Foreward, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 242 n.10 (2003) ("A strong regulatory response to
the wave of scandal, however, appears to be consistent with historical practice.").
31.
For an excellent discussion of both the regulatory response represented by
Sarbanes-Oxley and alternative market responses, see Ribstein, supra note 22, at 1.
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as the most recent and immediate catalysts for a strong regulatory
response.3 2 This fear and anxiety reached a critical and influential level
after WorldCom announced its need for a financial overhaul in or about
June 2002." 3 At that time, Congress determined that it could no longer
rely on the market to correct perceived corporate governance
deficiencies and responded by enacting legislative regulation.34 There
was perceived societal pressure to "do something" rather than leave the
situation to correction through market transactions, and Sarbanes-Oxley
(together with related SEC rules and targeted litigation) represents the
government's response to this public outcry.35
32. See id. at 47 ("Public perceptions of risk may have played a particularly potent
role in the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The political arguments for regulation
in Congress apparently echoed in the precipitous July 2002 twenty percent drop in stock
prices on record-setting volume prior to enactment."). Professor Larry Ribstein sees
these emotions as part of a larger socioeconomic environment that encouraged faulty
decisionmaking.
Revelations of corporate fraud coincided with public anxiety over the economy and
populist sentiments condemning the insiders who took great wealth out of now-fallen
companies. More importantly, just as judgment biases supposedly can make investors
tend to underestimate risks in a rising or bubble market, so too can they lead investors
and the public generally to overestimate risks and the need for regulation in a falling
market .... Also, public opinion about the need for regulation might be shaped by
"cascade effects" in which others are observed expressing the same opinion, by
"reputation effects" in which people are reluctant to express minority opinions, and by
an emotional response to risk.
Id. at 46.
33. See Ide, supra note 18, at 830; see also Paredes, supra note 23, at 508;
Romano, supra note 18, at 3 n.9 and accompanying text & 130; Robert B. Thompson,
Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal
Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 961, 965 (2003).
34. See Paredes, supra note 30, at 232 ("[A] strong regulatory response was
needed, at least in the short run, to boost investor confidence."); Ribstein, supra note
22, at 2-3 (describing the corporate fraud incidents of 2001 and early 2002 and
observing that "[s]ome argue ...,because of the unreliability of corporate managers,
monitors, and the market in these cases, government regulators need to restore
confidence in the securities markets").
35. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, Corporate Governance and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Sarbanes-OxleyAct and FiduciaryDuties, 30 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 1149, 1153 (2004); Jones, supra note 25, at 638, 640; Joseph F. Morrissey,
Catching the Culprits: Is Sarbanes-Oxley Enough?, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 801,
837 (2003); Paredes, supra note 23, at 519; Ribstein, supra note 22, at 3; Romano,
supra note 18, at 3-4.
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Accordingly, the analytical model proposed in this article operates
in the more limited realm of governmental rulemaking alternatives.3 6
The institutions compared in this article are all governmental actors,
separated into three broad categories: the legislature, the key operative
governmental agency, and the applicable courts. These categories
aggregate various subsets of institutional players, 7each of which has its
own individualized attributes, in accordance with their overall
They operate both as rulemaking
functionality in rulemaking. 38
competitors and as rulemaking collaborators. There is no element of
mystery in the categorization; these rulemaking bodies constitute a well
known regulatory triad frequently referenced in legal scholarship.39
36. This is not to say that the model could not be expanded to include a market
alternative, but that alternative will not be explored here.
37. See generally KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 9 ("Institutions can be defined and
aggregated in any number of ways depending on the focus for study.").
38. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (relating to the treatment of
SROs in this article).
39. See Roe, supra note 18, at 598-99 (noting these as the "three fundamental
federal authorities [that] can make corporate law."); Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism
and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 571 (1984) ("Federal influence on
corporate governance could be enhanced either through action by Congress, the
regulatory agencies, or the courts."); see also Erica Beecher-Monas, Enron,
Epistemology, and Accountability. Regulating in a Global Economy, 37 IND. L. REV.
141, 142 (2003) ("Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission... and the
courts have whittled away investor protections under the federal securities regulations
using a combination of regulatory reforms and enactment of legislative and judicial
barriers to enforcement mechanisms."); Roberta S. Karmel, The Relationship Between
Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibitions Against Insider Trading: Why a Property
Rights Theory of Inside Information is Untenable, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 149, 173 (1993)

(book review) ("A re-examination of policies and principles by the SEC, the courts and
Congress would therefore be salutary."); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice
in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 29 (1999) ("[T]he SEC, the
courts, and Congress have whittled away the Securities Act regime."); Andrew K.
Glenn, Note, Disclosure of Executive Illnesses Under FederalSecurities Law and The
Americans With DisabilitiesAct Of 1990: Hobson's Choice or Business Necessity?, 16

CARDozo L. REv. 537, 537 (1994) ("Since the enactment of the Securities Act of
1933... and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934..., the Securities and Exchange
Commission .... Congress, and federal courts have increased both the scope and
quantity of information to be disclosed to the investing public."); Timothy M. Wong,
Note, United States v. O'Hagan: SEC Prevails on Misappropriation Theory, Yet May
Now Face Heightened Standard of Prooffor Securities Insider Trading, 32 U.S.F. L.

REv. 841, 842 (1998) ("Trading securities based on material nonpublic information for
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B. The Need for a Well Defined CorporateGovernance Rule
The model proposed in this article focuses on a decisionmaking
process-a decisionmaking process to be used by the proponent of a
specific, predetermined corporate governance rule to be adopted at the
federal level. The proposed framework therefore may be described as
"rule-centered." 4
Only with a clear conception of the proposed
corporate governance rule can a rule proponent most effectively employ
the mode of analysis suggested in this article. With a clearly defined
corporate governance rule, a proponent can (1) assess capacity, (2)
appraise competence, (3) determine impartiality, and (4) evaluate
transition legal costs.
What is a well defined corporate governance rule? What does it
look like? The answers to these questions first require an understanding
of what is meant by the term "corporate governance." The term is used
by different people to mean different things.4 ' One scholar notes that:

personal, pecuniary gain continues to occur in our financial markets in spite of the
efforts of Congress, the Securities Exchange Commission... and the Judiciary.").
40. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 4 (defining Professor Komesar's model for
institutional choice as a "participation-centered approach").
41.
See Michael Bradley, et al., Challenges to Corporate Governance: The
Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in ContemporarySociety: Corporate
Governance at a Crossroads,62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 9, 10-11 ("Traditionally, the
phrase 'corporate governance' invokes a narrow consideration of the relationships
between the firm's capital providers and top managers, as mediated by its board of
directors."); John W. Cioffi, State of the Art: A Review Essay on Comparative
Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research, 48 AM. J. COMP.
L. 501, 506 (2000) ("[Tjhe very definition of corporate governance varies according to
the theoretical and normative perspectives taken, and these definitional differences have
significant implications for an emergent and rapidly evolving policy area."); John H.
Matheson, Corporate Governance at the Millennium: The Decline of the Poison Pill
Antitakeover Defense, 22 HAMLINE L. REv. 703, 703 n.4 (1999) ("'[C]orporate
governance' defines the process by which the balance of power between a corporation's
shareholders and nonshareholders is allocated."); Schwartz, supra note 39, at 545
("Corporate governance ... relates to the rules that define the organization of the
governing structure of the corporation"); Gustavo Visentini, Compatibility and
Competition Between European andAmerican CorporateGovernance: Which Model of
Capitalism?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 833, 833-35 (1998); Cheryl L. Wade, How Do
Norms and Empathy Affect Corporation Law and Corporate Behavior?: Corporate
Governance as Corporate Social Responsibility: Empathy and Race Discrimination,76
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[t]here is a schism between definitions which are restricted to the
relationship between shareholders and managers, and those which
expand corporate governance to include a wider range of persons and
This
structural roles associated with the corporate enterprise.
divergence is a modem reflection of the42traditional debate on the
itself.
theoretical nature of the corporation

In this article, "corporate governance" is used in a general,
descriptive manner and is broadly defined to include references to any
and all of the structural attributes and processes that determine the
These
nature of, and relationships among, corporate constituents.
attributes and processes determine, for example, how corporations are
managed and controlled, by whom and to whom legal duties are owed,
and against whom related liabilities may be assessed. Under this broad
definition, for example, insider trading regulation is a matter of
corporate governance, since it affects the relationship between corporate
directors and officers (among other insiders), on the one hand, and the
corporation's stockholders, on the other. 3
This article assumes that a rule proponent has conceived of a rule of
corporate governance at a reasonably high level of precision. The
proponent has determined that a rule change is required to resolve a
specific issue44 and has identified both the objective of that rule change

TUL. L. REv. 1461, 1466 (2002) (citing two other definitions of "corporate
governance").
Jennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder,48 AM. J. COMP. L. 39,
42.
40 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
43.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Modern Market for Corporate Charters:
Competition, Collusion, and the Future, included in The Direction of CorporateLaw:
The Scholars 'Perspective, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 95 (2000) (terming insider trading as
one of the "most controversial topics in corporate governance over the last thirty
years"); Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Adapting Corporate Governance for
Sustainable Peace, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 377, 403 (2003) ("The ban on insider
trading also highlights the importance U.S. corporate governance regimes place on
transparency and disclosure."); William S. Lerach, Achieving Corporate Governance
Enhancements Through Litigation, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 1, 15 (2001) (indicating
that insider trading controls provide corporate governance); Amir N. Licht,
International Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to
Convergence, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 227, 270 (1998) (describing a view of insider
trading as corporate governance); Schwartz, supra note 39, at 562 (setting forth insider
trading restrictions among a list of corporate governance measures).
44. See supra Part II.A.
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and the desired means of achieving it, consistent with applicable or
desired policy. To do this, the proponent ideally will have evaluated the
relative equities, costs, and benefits of a variety of substantive cures for
the identified social ill. The analytical model proposed in this article
assumes that the rule proponent has conducted a fairness assessment4 5
and cost-benefit analysis 46 of the substance of the proposed rule and that
45. See Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare Depends on Fairness:A Reply to Kaplow
and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847, 856 (2002) ("Most readers likely understand the
term "fairness" to encompass notions of distributive justice, morality, and perhaps
retributive justice. They likely have in mind scholars such as Kant, Rawls, and Fried,
who believe in moral principles, in rules of behavior that cannot generally be trumped
by a consideration of the consequences."); Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New
Executive Orderfor Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1525-27 (2002) (arguing for the consideration of
distributive effects in rulemaking); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus
Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REV. 961, 969 (2001) ("Such evaluation characteristically
involves the examination of particular features of situations to determine what legal rule
is most fitting according to a given principle of fairness."); Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking
Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1646 (1985)
("Fairness is the fundamental concept that guides our thinking about substantive and
procedural law. Fairness provides the measure by which we gauge the virtues of
familiar arrangements and the risks of innovation.").
46.
Cost-benefit analysis has become the norm in legal rulemaking.
The movement for cost-benefit analysis of regulatory problems has proved stunningly
successful. By Executive Order, Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton have all
required cost-benefit analysis of major regulations. Partly as a result, agencies
routinely attempt to calculate the costs and benefits of their activities. Congress has
also shown considerable interest in cost-benefit analysis, requiring both the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB") and the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") to produce monetized accounts of the consequences of regulation. Courts
themselves have been highly receptive to efforts to mandate cost-benefit analysis,
asking agencies to monetize costs, benefits, or both.
Robert H.Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV.323, 323-324 (2001); see also Peter Gabel, What it Really Means to Say
"Law is Politics": Political History and Legal Argument in Bush v. Gore, 67
BROoKLYN L. REV. 1141, 1151 (2002) ("[T]he Law and Economics movement.., has
provided the ideological foundation for near-universal pre-eminence of cost-benefit
analysis in... legislative decision making."); David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O'Shea,
Can Law and Economics Be Both PracticalandPrincipled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 358
(2002) ("[M]ost commentators have regarded cost-benefit analysis as the primary
economic method for comparing legal rules."). Though prudent and (in this author's
view) desirable, the assumption that a cost-benefit analysis has been completed before a
rule is proposed may not be valid in specific cases. See Cary Coglianese, Empirical
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the assessment and analysis have been resolved in favor of adoption of
the proposed rule.
The conception of the rule should include precise statements or
descriptions of: the objective of the rule; any actions required, limited,
or proscribed by the rule; the identity of any actor required to take, limit,
or refrain from taking action under the rule; relevant timing
considerations (for effectiveness of the rule and for specific actions
required to be taken under the rule); and where action is required to be
taken under the rule, the manner in which that action is to be taken.
Moreover, the conception should include a clear, detailed articulation of
any otherwise unmentioned policies or principles underlying the rule,
including any fundamental or significant policy or policies to be served
by (and other reasoning supporting) the rule. For example, a well
might be described in term
conceptualized rule of corporate governance
47
below.
A
Table
in
forth
set
sheet form as

Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 1111, 1121 (2002) ("Although
agencies are directed to compare different regulatory options, and wherever possible to
choose the one that maximizes net benefits .... in only about a quarter of the rules...
examined did agencies even quantify the costs and benefits of different regulatory
options."); Ribstein, supra note 22, at 47 ("[T]he hasty adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act in the midst of a stock market crash was even less conducive to careful weighing of
costs and benefits than the circumstances surrounding typical legislation. By contrast,
the law Sarbanes-Oxley amends.., was enacted years after the 1929 Crash, following
extensive hearings.").
47. This example is drawn from Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley, codified in
Section 13(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "1934 Act"). 15
U.S.C. § 78m(k) (Supp. 2002). Several legal scholars argue that this corporate
governance provision may be ill-advised. See Roe, supra note 18, at 633; Romano,
supra note 18, at 92.
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Table A-Detailed Description of Proposed Corporate Governance
Rule-Executive Loan Prohibitions
Rule Concept
Rule Objective
Required or Proscribed

Prohibit public company loans to executive
officers and directors
Prevent recurrence of high dollar-value and
other abusive, undisclosed corporate funding
of insider investments in public companies
Render it unlawful for a public company to
extend, maintain, arrange, or renew a personal
loan to a corporate officer or director
Public company issuers, directly or indirectly,
specified
certain
(under
than
other
circumstances) insured depository institutions

Timing

How Action is Taken

48
and consumer credit firms
Effective for transactions completed after
effectiveness (i.e., rule of prospective
application); pre-existing personal loans by
the public company are grandfathered in
unless and until they are renewed or the terms
are materially modified
N/A (rule constitutes a conduct proscription)

48. The exceptions specifically include: (i) any loan made or maintained by an
insured depository institution (as defined in Section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act), if the loan is subject to the insider lending restrictions of Section 22(h) of the
Federal Reserve Act; and (ii) any home improvement or manufactured home loan (as
that term is defined in Section 5 of the Home Owners' Loan Act), any consumer credit
(as defined in Section 103 of the Truth in Lending Act), any extension of credit under
an open-end credit plan (as defined in Section 103 of the Truth in Lending Act), any
charge card (as defined in Section 127(c)(4)(e) of the Truth in Lending Act), or any
extension of credit by a broker or dealer registered under Section 15 of the 1934 Act, to
an employee of that broker or dealer to buy, trade, or carry securities, that is permitted
under rules or regulations of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
pursuant to Section 7 of the 1934 Act (other than an extension of credit that would be
used to purchase the stock of that issuer), that is (A) made or provided in the ordinary
course of the consumer credit business of the issuer; (B) of a type that is generally made
available by the issuer to the public; and (C) made by the issuer on market terms, or
terms that are no more favorable than those offered by the issuer to the general public
for those types of extensions of credit.
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Employ a rules-based (rather than a standardsbased) approach to protecting investors from
insider opportunism; promote the integrity of
U.S. capital markets by increasing corporate
responsibility for insider transactions that
impact the subject corporation or the market
for its securities; assume the risk of preventing
efficient transactions in order to achieve the
rule objective

The level of clarity and detail with which a proposed rule is
expressed may directly impact the quality and results of the analysis of
the elements in the proposed analytical model. Moreover, a less detailed
rule conception makes an assessment as to the appropriate trade-offs and
counterbalances among the model's elements more difficult.4 9
C. Only FederalInitiatives Need Apply
The analytical framework proposed in this article assumes federal
rulemaking-a legal directive adopted by a federal legislative,
regulatory, or judicial body. The assumption of a federal corporate
governance rule is both pragmatic and reasonable.50 The federal
49. See infra Part VII. Viewing institutional choice through the lens of a specific
proposed corporate governance rule allows for a slight simplification of a complex
comparative analytical process.
Institutional choice is difficult as well as essential. The choice is always a choice
among highly imperfect alternatives. The strengths and weaknesses of one institution
versus another vary from one set of circumstances to another. For example, whether
the adjudicative process is the best protector of property rights or the worst determiner
of safety is by no means obvious. Sometimes the courts will be the best protectors of
private property, and sometimes that task will be better assigned to the political
process. Sometimes the courts will be the best determiners of safety, and sometimes
that task will be better assigned to the political process ....
KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 5. Of course, the contents of the proposed corporate
governance rule may well change during (and as a result of) the rulemaking process.
Starting with a well described rule along the lines suggested here also will assist the rule
proponent and institutional actors in evaluating the need for, and efficacy of, any
suggested changes in the rule.
50. Cf Paredes, supra note 23, at 534 ("I am... troubled that Sarbanes-Oxley
portends an even greater role for Congress in regulating corporate governance in the
future.").
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regulation of corporate governance has been a strong force in the overall
development of corporate governance initiatives. 51 Sarbanes-Oxley is
but the most recent example of a long line of federal corporate
governance initiatives enacted by Congress and promulgated and
implemented by the SEC under the 1934 Act. 52 These include elements
of the federal regulation of proxies under Section 14 of the 1934 Act and
the federal regulation of corporate takeovers under the Williams Act as
well as other legislative reforms. 3 Moreover, the federal judiciary has
set its own corporate governance rules by, among other things,
adjudicating claims made under Rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act and
imposing limits on state corporate governance rules, perhaps notably in
51.
See Roe, supra note 18, at 607-20 (detailing four examples of federal corporate
governance regulation); Schwartz, supra note 39, at 547-49, 558-71 (tracing the history
of federal corporate governance reforms during the 2 0 1h century and describing the
overlay of federal initiatives on the then existing corporate governance scheme); Joel
Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 1 (1993) ("In the twentieth
century state corporate law norms for the large publicly held corporation have been
progressively supplanted by federal standards, particularly those originating in federal
securities law."); Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing
Standards, State Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 961, 968
(2003) ("federal law now defines more of the governance structure of corporations.").
See generally Langevoort, supra note 10, at 450-51 (assuming and describing a
continuing role for corporate governance through federal securities regulation). But cf
Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 565 (1990) ("In sum, federal rules are an important source of
nontrivial corporate law. However, political forces limit the federal role in corporate
governance. Inertia, in particular, limits Congress' role as a source of nontrivial rules.").
52.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000).
53. See Id. §§ 78m-n (covering corporate governance principles in proxy
regulation and under the Williams Act); Roe, supra note 18, at 625 (noting the federal
intervention in state corporate takeover law through the Williams Act). In addition to
these federal legislative initiatives regulating corporate governance, the SEC has
adopted a long series of corporate governance rules under these and other provisions in
the 1934 Act. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (defining what it means for an insider
to trade "on the basis of" material nonpublic information for purposes of insider trading
cases); id. § 240.13e-3 (regulating "going private" transactions); id. § 240.14a-8
(providing a process for the inclusion of stockholder proposals in issuer proxy
materials); id. § 240.14e-2 (mandating that issuers subject to tender offers inform their
stockholders of one of three defined responses to the tender offer); Roe, supra note 18,
at 616-17 (describing the SEC's promulgation of its "going private" rules in Rule 13e-
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Professor Mark Roe
the area of state takeover legislation. 4
convincingly summarizes the basis for and breadth of the assumption
that federal rulemaking is important to corporate governance in his
recent, seminal piece, Delaware's Competition.
[N]otwithstanding the internal affairs doctrine, the federal
government can displace state corporate law, and rather easily.
Legislation can preempt state corporate law, and it has. Judicial
interpretation of open-ended legislation can leave little or no room
for state corporate law, and it has. And the securities laws
issues away from the
themselves can directly pull corporate law
55
states, and they have for voting and more.

In assuming that the proposed rule will be effectuated through a

federal initiative, this article necessarily calls upon certain analytical
frameworks and excludes certain elements of analysis and rulemaking
vehicles. For example, the thesis of this article clearly invokes concepts

associated with the separation and balance of powers in our federal
government. If Supreme Court action on a corporate governance rule
would restrict the scope of perceived or actual congressional or SEC

power, for instance, then separation of powers concerns are implicated
and deserve examination. These issues will be explored in greater detail
in Parts III and IV below.
Conversely, because of the assumption that a federal corporate
governance rule is needed, this article will not rehash or enhance the
debate on the wisdom of federalizing corporate governance or corporate
law as a whole. A wealth of scholarship and other commentary has been
focused on this debate.5 6 Although this article necessarily will touch on
54. See Alan E. Garfield, State Competence to Regulate Corporate Takeovers:
Lessons from State Takeover Statutes, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 535, 567-77 (1989); Roe,
supra note 18, at 628-29 (describing the Supreme Court's preemption of state takeover
law in Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982)); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A.
Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56
VAND. L. REV. 859, 860 (2003) (noting that "federal securities law and enforcement via
securities fraud class actions today have become the most visible means of regulating
corporate governance").
55. Roe, supra note 18, at 600.
56. See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and
Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 110-14 (2004); Jones, supra note 25, at
633-636; Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheersfor CorporateLaw Federalism,30 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 99, 103-09 (2004); Roe, supra note 18, at 588-646; Schwartz, supra note 39,
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this commentary, the full analysis and resolution of these issues are
outside the scope of the article.
Moreover, as a result of the focus on federal government initiatives,
rulemaking by self-regulatory organizations, known as SROs (e.g., the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., or "NASD," and the
stock exchanges),57 is not identified or examined as a distinct corporate
at 545-89. In summary, one scholar has written:
One of the more enduring issues in corporate law scholarship is the question of
federalization. Put simply, the question is whether Congress, exercising its broad
authority to regulate interstate commerce, should replace the current system of state
corporate regulation with a uniform federal system.
Advocates of federalism think such federal intervention necessary because, to their
minds, the state law system has produced laws which favor management interests, and
not, as it should, the interests of shareholders ...
Opponents of federalization, by contrast, believe just the opposite: that the state
chartering system has produced laws which maximize shareholder welfare.
Garfield, supra note 54, at 535-36 (footnotes omitted); see also CONG. GLOBE, 26th
Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 461 (1840), app. at 848 (remarks of Sen. Henry Clay) ("[Tlhe
States themselves are much more competent than Congress is to exercise all necessary
and proper jurisdiction over corporations .... "). Predictably, scholars and other
commentators have questioned-and criticized-Sarbanes-Oxley because it encroaches
on state authority to enact corporate laws. J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of
State CorporateLaw in the Governance ofPublic Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317,
319 (2004); William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the
American Corporate Governance System: PreliminaryReflections of Two Residents of
a Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 971-73 (2003); Ide, supra note 18, at 834;
Roberta S. Karmel, Appropriateness of Regulation at the Federal or State Level.
Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United States
and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495, 547 (2003); A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J.
841, 844 n.10 (2003); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Governance After Enron; 40
HOUS. L. REV. 99, 103 (2003); E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics
in the Post-Enron Worldcom Environment, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 848 (2003).
But see E. Norman Veasey, Musings on the Dynamics of Corporate Governance Issues,
DirectorLiability Concerns, Corporate Control Transactions, Ethics, and Federalism,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1018-19 (2003).
57.
SROs are defined by statute to include the NASD and the stock exchanges. See
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (2000); Thompson, supra note 51, at 982 n.44 (2003) (citing to
this definition and noting that "NASDAQ has sought SEC approval to be recognized as
an exchange but no action has yet been taken so that NASDAQ's governance listing
requirements have a hybrid status that derives from NASDAQ's prior association with
the National Association of Securities Dealers . . ., which is a registered securities
association under the definition.").
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governance vehicle, since SROs are not a formal part of the federal
The SROs are, however, "conduit[s] for federal
government. 58
5
9
The SEC has been and is intricately involved with the
authority.
adoption and approval of corporate governance rules promulgated by the
SROs through its power to register and regulate the SROs. 60 Moreover,

58. SROs enjoy a quasi-governmental status. See Roe, supra note 18, at 599;
Richard L. Stone & Michael A. Perino, Not Just a Private Club: Self Regulatory
Organizations as State Actors When Enforcing Federal Law, 1995 COLuM. Bus. L.
REV. 453, 464, 470 (1995); Thompson, supra note 51, at 970. Stock exchanges
historically have been organized as private, nonprofit corporations owned by their
members. See Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and Implications
of Demutualizationof Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 403 (2002).
Yet, SROs cannot be ignored in this analysis. They have been among the key
organizations suggesting and implementing corporate governance change in the 20th
and 21st centuries. See Roe, supra note 18, at 592; Schwartz, supra note 39, at 555. A
number of commentators have stated that they believe SRO action in the area of
corporate governance (which, in the United States, recently has focused around
independent director and committee requirements), may be a better targeted, more
effective approach. Kerry Shannon Burke, Regulating Corporate Governance Through
the Market: Comparing the Approaches of the United States, Canada and the United
Kingdom, 27 IOWA J.CORP.L. 341, 345-55 (2002); Ide, supra note 18, at 833; Paul G.
Mahoney, The Allocation of Government Authority: The Exchange as Regulator, 83
VA. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (1997); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to
Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities FraudEnforcers, 85 VA. L. REV.
925, 964-65 (1999); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2399 (1998); Helen S. Scott, The SEC, the
Audit Committee Rules, and the Marketplaces: Corporate Governance and the Future,
79 WASH. U. L.Q. 549, 557 (2001). This idea is borne out by language in The Business
Roundtable v. SEC, a case that struck down the SEC's attempt to regulate stockholder
voting structures through the adoption of Rule 19c-4. 905 F.2d 406, 414 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
59. Roe, supra note 18, at 599; see also Schwartz, supra note 39, at 575. Nowhere
is this plainer than in Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley. 15 U.S.C. 78j-l(m)(1) (Supp.
2002) (requiring the SEC to direct the SROs to proscribe listing of securities of an
issuer that is not in compliance with certain express audit committee standards); see
Standards Related to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release No.
47654, [2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,902 at 87,402 (Apr. 9,
2003) (implementing Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley). SRO rulemaking has not always
been a vehicle for federal regulation, however. The New York Stock Exchange
predates the federal securities laws by more than a century, and its governance listing
standards also significantly predate those laws. See Thompson, supra note 51, at 96970.
60.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78s, 78w(a)(3) (2000); see also Paul G. Mahoney,

2005]

CHOOSING THE RIGHT VEHICLE FOR
FEDERAL CORPORATE GO VERNANCE INITIATIVES

247

the stock exchanges, as SROs, have authority over only a subset (albeit a
significant one) of publicly traded corporations governed by the SECthose issuers whose shares are listed on or otherwise trade over the
exchanges. Finally, some have asserted that stock exchange rules, for

example, carry less force than rules made by other rulemaking bodies.61
For these reasons, this article treats SRO rulemaking as part of SEC
rulemaking, while acknowledging that SROs could be separately
62
evaluated as rulemaking bodies in a more detailed comparative model.
D. The Resulting Analytical Model
The scope of analysis undertaken in this article is necessarily
somewhat limited by the assumptions described in this Part II. The
article proceeds by identifying elements of decision making for use in
assessing how corporate governance rules may best be made at the
federal level.6 3
Commentary, Is There a Cure for "Excessive" Trading?, 81 VA. L. REV. 713, 745
(1995); Roe, supra note 18, at 599-600; Schwartz, supra note 39, at 573-74, 555; Scott,
supra note 58, at 554-55; Stone & Perino, supra note 58, at 460-63; Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion under the Federal Arbitration
Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 998. In a recent article, Professor Robert Thompson
described four recent examples of SEC involvement in corporate governance listing
standards and noted, in sum, that
[R]ecent experience shows.., that the SEC has had an important role in each change
in the listing standards as an initiator and as a driving force as to their substance, such
that in some respects the listing standards appear a thinly veiled substitute for federal
government regulation rather than an alternative to it.
Thompson, supra note 51, at 977.
61. See Douglas M. Branson, Teaching Comparative CorporateGovernance: The
Significance of "Soft Law" and InternationalInstitutions, 34 GA. L. REV. 669, 696
(2000) ("[S]tock exchange rules, including those in the governance area, are not made
of firm stuff. If any number of listed firms resists, or breaks rank, stock exchange
requirements can meld away. Although seemingly indurate on the surface, stock
exchange rules are soft law."); Burke, supra note 58, at 364 (noting the uncertainties
about whether listed companies can bring suit for breaches of stock exchange rules);
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Our CorporateFederalismand the Shape of Corporate
Law, at 7 n.17, at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=564685 (June
2004) (describing the limited role of stock exchanges in corporate governance reform).
62.
Professor Robert Thompson provides a basis for this separate analysis in a
recent corporate governance article. See Thompson, supra note 51, at 972-74.
63.
This model is susceptible of enhancement at a later date to incorporate, for
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III. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY-LEGISLATIVE POWER,
REGULATORY AUTHORITY, AND JUDICIAL JURISDICTION

In constructing an analytical model for determining the appropriate
vehicle for federal corporate governance initiatives, it is important to
review, as a threshold matter, the capacity of Congress, SEC, and the
federal courts as potential corporate governance rulemakers. Because
the power of Congress, the authority of the SEC, and the jurisdiction of
the federal courts are not coextensive, a rule proponent's choice of
rulemaking body for a particular rule may be limited. Accordingly, this
inquiry is a necessary, but insufficient, basis for deciding whether a
corporate governance initiative should be legislative, regulatory, or
judicial in nature. 64
A. The Power of Congress Over Corporate Governance
Congressional rulemaking power is circumscribed by functional
and substantive limitations. The limits of the federal legislative function
are relatively simple to understand and have been well explored. 65 As a
general matter, "[t]he essentials of the legislative function are the
determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and

example, market alternatives, state-based rulemaking, or SRO initiatives.
64. See Symposium, Current Issues in Corporate Governance: Federalism and
Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 584 (1984) [hereinafter Current Issues]
(remarks of Donald E. Schwartz) ("Determining the proper role for federal law in
corporate governance is not simply, or primarily, an analysis of the power of the
Congress, federal agencies, and federal courts, but rather is mainly a consideration of
whether and how those bodies should act.").
65. Congress was created under the U.S. Constitution to serve as the legislative
branch of the federal government. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See Anthony Ciccone,
The Right to Vote Is Not A Duty, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 325, 333 (2002) ("In
the United States, the duty of federal legislation is assigned to Senators and
Representatives who are referred to as members of Congress which is the American
legislative branch of government."). Its principal job is to legislate, or make statutory
laws. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 918 (8th ed. 1999) (defining "legislate" as "[tlo
make or enact laws"). See also Laura Suzanne Farris, Comment, Private Jails in
Oklahoma: An UnconstitutionalDelegationof LegislativeAuthority, 33 TULSA L.J. 959,
962 (1998) ("The legislative powers are defined as 'the lawmaking powers of a
legislative body, whose functions include the power to make, alter, amend and repeal
laws.'").
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promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct ....
,,66 For
example, the definition of crimes and related punishments is a legislative
function. 67 The formulation and enactment of the corporate governance
and other rules included in Sarbanes-Oxley may represent an additional
example of authorized legislative activity.
Congress also has certain oversight powers attendant to its mainstay
lawmaking authority, including the power to conduct related public and
private investigations. 6' This power was exercised, for example, in the
Moreover, Congress may
post-Enron/pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era.69
delegate some of its power to federal agencies and other branches of
government.7 0 Congress has delegated significant authority under the
66. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944); see Peter H. Aranson, et al.,
A Theory ofLegislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11 n.44 (1982).
67. See Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 641 (1915) (stating that the legislature,
rather than the court, "define[s] a crime and ordain[s] its punishment"); see also Farris,
supra note 65, at 962 (noting that legislative power "also includes the authority to
define criminal offenses and to prescribe the punishments to be imposed").
68. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187-95 (1957); McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-74 (1927). Specifically, the Watkins Court stated:
The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative
process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration
of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of
defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the
Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal
Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But, broad as is this power of
inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs
of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of the Congress... Nor is
the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive
and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself, it must be
related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress. Investigations
conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish"
those investigated are indefensible.
(8th
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187 (footnote omitted). See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 919
ed. 1999) (defining "legislative investigation" as "[a] formal inquiry conducted by a
legislative body incident to its legislative authority" and noting that "[a] legislature has
many of the same powers as a court to support a legislative inquiry, including the power
to subpoena and cross-examine a witness and to hold a witness in contempt"); Richard
D. Batchelder, Jr., Note, Chastain v. Sundquist: A Narrow Reading of the Doctrine of
Legislative Immunity, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 384, 399-400 (1990).
69. See S. Rep. No. 107-205, at 4-6 (2002) (describing Senate hearings relating to
proposed S.2673 in the months before the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley).
70. As a technical matter, these congressional delegations are subject to the
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federal securities laws to the SEC, and that delegation continues to be
evident in Sarbanes-Oxley's corporate governance provisions.7'
constitutional nondelegation doctrine, which stands for the principle that Congress
cannot delegate its legislative powers to federal agencies. See Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) ("The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate,
or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.");
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("That Congress cannot delegate legislative
power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."). The
nondelegation doctrine is based on conceptions of government that predate the
Constitution. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 87 (Richard Cox
ed., 1982) ("The Legislature cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other
hands, for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it, cannot pass
it over to others."). Yet, despite this strong pedigree, not much of substance is left of
the nondelegation doctrine (the last activity in this area having been prohibited in the
1930s). See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-76 (2001); Loving v.
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996); Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and
the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second
Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31 (1994) ("Supreme Court precedent recognizes the
principle of nondelegation, although it is honored mostly in the breach."). The dormant
status of the nondelegation doctrine has been the subject of scholarly debate. See, e.g.,
Gary Lawson, Changing Images of the State: The Rise and Rise of the Administrative
State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994) (describing and discussing the unconstitutionality
of the post-New Deal U.S. administrative state); David Schoenbrod, Separation of
Powers and Powers That Be: The ConstitutionalPurposes of the Delegation Doctrine,
36 AM. U. L. REV. 355 (1987) (addressing critiques of the author's test for improper
delegation).
71.
See infra notes 100-107 (regarding various areas in which Congress has
delegated authority to the SEC under Sarbanes-Oxley); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7242
(Supp. 2002) (delegating positive authority to define actions constituting fraudulent
influences, coercion, manipulation, or misdirection of auditors); Joseph A. Grundfest,
Disimplying Private Rights of Action under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1018-19 (1994) (regarding the
general breadth of Congress's delegation of rulemaking authority to the SEC). The
most classic delegation of congressional authority over corporate governance in the
years before Sarbanes-Oxley occurs in Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, which makes it
"unlawful for any person ... in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or
consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security)
registered pursuant to section 12 of this title." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2000). In Section
14(a) of the 1934 Act, Congress articulated a broad legislative concept, allowing
virtually all the contours of the law to be shaped by SEC action. The delegation of
authority by Congress to the SEC has once been held valid by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Congressional power also is substantively limited. The limits are
set forth in the Constitution itself, in Article 1.72 Congressional power to
make corporate governance rules derives from Congress's Article I
power to make laws that "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."7 3 The existence of
this power is widely acknowledged, but prior to the enactment of
Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, its use had been sparing.74 Given the current
expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause with respect to
legislation regulating the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, 75 congressional power to enact substantive rules of corporate
governance is virtually unquestioned.76 This authority also is supported
See Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105-13 (1946) (finding constitutional
the congressional delegation of authority to the SEC to oversee and modify holding
company governance systems).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1-18.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Schwartz, supra note 39, at 571 ("No specific
constitutional provisions authorize Congress to enact corporate legislation, but
proposals for a general federal corporation law have been advanced from time to time.
Such legislation probably would be sustained under the commerce clause.").
74. See Jones, supra note 25, at 638 ("Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, the federal
government eschewed dictating corporate governance standards and instead sought to
regulate corporate conduct through an awkward amalgamation of tax policy and
securities law disclosure requirements."); infra note 94 (regarding the traditional
disclosure-orientation of the federal securities laws).
75. See Karen Cordry, Of State Sovereign Immunity and Prospective Remedies:
The Bankruptcy Discharge As Statutory Ex Parte Young Relief: A Response, 77 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 23, 29 (2003) ("[T]he notion that the federal government has only limited
powers has lost much of its meaning in recent times"); Kahan & Rock, supra note 61, at
7 n.19 (describing the expansive nature of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause). But see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down a
federal legislative initiative because it exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause powers
to enact legislation that has substantial effects on interstate commerce); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
76. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws at Proxy
Contests, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1071, 1142 (1992) ("No one seriously disputes Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause to preempt the entirety of corporate law."); Current
Issues, supra note 64, at 605 (remarks of Jesse H. Choper); Carol Goforth, Proxy
Reform as a Means of IncreasingShareholderParticipationin Corporate Governance:
Too Little, But Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 458 n.474 (1994); Kahan & Rock,
supra note 61, at 3; Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate
Governance, 45 ALA. L. REv. 783, 801 (1994); Paredes, supra note 23, at 533;
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by the more broad-based, "catch-all" constitutional power given to
Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
Although not expressly
any Department or Officer thereof."77
referenced in Sarbanes-Oxley, the Commerce Clause ostensibly is the
source of power for Congress's enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. 8
Sarbanes-Oxley represents a broad exercise of Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause to enact, instigate, delegate, and promote
corporate governance reform at the federal level.79
Thompson & Sale, supra note 54, at 861 n.6. But see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84

(1975) ("Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to
corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly
requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will
govern the internal affairs of the corporation."). In most cases, congressional power
over corporate governance matters will be a nonissue, since federal courts determining
the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause generally afford
deference to a rationally based congressional finding that conduct affects interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 26162 (1964).
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 18. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 283-86
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Penguin Books 1961) (describing and
explaining the "necessary and proper" clause). The constitutionality of Sarbanes-Oxley
has not been challenged on Commerce Clause grounds, although one litigant
unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the officer certification provisions of
Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. 2002), on vagueness grounds.
See U.S. v. Scrushy, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23820 (N.D. Ala. 2004).
78. See generally Thompson & Sale, supra note 54, at 860-61 (mentioning the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in the context of federal regulation of corporate governance
under the Commerce Clause).
79. See Roe, supra note 18, at 633-34 (summarizing Sarbanes-Oxley's extensive
incursion into corporate governance terrain historically inhabited by the states);
Romano, supra note 18, at 1 (noting the same). In explication of this enhanced federal
role in corporate governance, Professors Hillary Sale and Robert Thompson note:
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, passed by Congress in the wake of numerous
corporate accountability scandals, provides new evidence of the expanded role of
federal law. The move to federal corporate governance, however, is broader than that
law and has a longer history than the current scandals. The ascendancy of federal law
in corporate governance reflects at least three factors. First, disclosure has become the
most important method to regulate corporate managers, and disclosure has been
predominantly a federal, rather than a state, methodology. Second, state law has
focused largely on the duties and liabilities of directors, and not those of officers. Yet,
officers have become the fulcrum of governance in today's corporations, and federal
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B. The Authorit of the SEC Over CorporateGovernance
As a general matter, agency rulemaking is substantively and
procedurally subsidiary to legislative rulemaking.80 In a real sense, it
represents a delegation of lawmaking authority by the legislature to the
regulatory authority, with the process resulting in regulations having the
force of law. 8' This is deemed by some to be (at best) problematic, due
to the unrepresentative nature of federal agencies.8 2 Generally, the

law has increasingly occupied the space defining the duties and liabilities of officers.
Third, federal shareholder litigation based on securities fraud has several practical
advantages over state shareholder litigation based on fiduciary duty that have
contributed to the greater use of the federal forum. As a result of these trends, federal
law now occupies the largest part of the legal corporate governance infrastructure in
the twenty-first century. The outpouring of suggested reforms that have followed in
the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals have focused on federal law and on
the conduct of officers and directors, rather than on state law, which in practice
focuses mainly on directors. Indeed, the discussions about reforms have excluded
state law almost entirely.
Thompson & Sale, supra note 54, at 861-62 (footnotes omitted).
80. See Roe, supra note 18, at 592 ("[T]he SEC's power is incomplete."); Roberta
Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate
Governance?, at 38, at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=693484
(March 2005) ("Congress has, and indeed exercises, actual and direct control over
Professor Peter Strauss has cogently described regulatory
federal agencies.").
rulemaking in the following way:
At the third level, beneath constitutions and legislation, is the practice of adopting
regulations. We can describe this rulemaking in idealized terms as the more-or-less
expert filling in of details in the specification of rules for private conduct, for which
the legislative process is poorly suited or has insufficient time. A given jurisdiction
will have many rulemakers, and only one legislature. If that one legislature can
annually produce a book's worth of politically ratified work, all the jurisdiction's
rulemakers taken together are capable of generating several library shelves worth of
rules. These regulations have the force and effect of statutes (although as we shall see
their legitimacy is differently established).
Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American
Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 748 (1996).
81.
See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 516-17 ("Through a series of broad
delegations of legislative power, Congress has transferred to the federal bureaucracy
much of its responsibility for making and enforcing the rules and regulations deemed
necessary for a technological society."); Strauss, supra note 80, at 748 (concluding that
agency-adopted "rules may be subordinate legislation, but are unmistakably legislative
in their impact").
82.
See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 517; STEFFEN W. SCHMIDT ET AL.,
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rulemaking authority of a federal regulatory agency is only one of its
functions.8 3
Within the U.S. federal government, the SEC is an independent
regulatory agency. 84 As such, its authority does not derive from the U.S.
Constitution.8" Rather, the nature and scope of the SEC's authorized
activities are determined by statute 86 and are subject to subsequent

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS TODAY 272 (2004-2005 Brief Edition) (terming

the agency "an unelected policymaker"). At worst, as earlier noted, the delegation of
legislative authority by Congress to a federal agency may be determined to be
unconstitutional, although this is unlikely based on recent history. See supra note 70
(regarding the moribund nondelegation doctrine).
83.
See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 515 (noting that the functions of federal
bureaucracy also include program administration and dispute adjudication); sources
cited infra note 168 (regarding the SEC's principal rulemaking functions).
84. See infra Part IV.B. 1.
85.
See Celia R. Taylor, Capital Market Development in the Emerging Markets:
Time to Teach an Old Dog Some New Tricks, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 71, 73 (1997); Estelle
M. Sohne, Note, The Impact of Post-Enron Information Disclosure Requirements
Imposed Under US. Law on Foreign Investors, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 217, 220
n.16 (2003). The authority of federal agencies is not without a constitutional overlay,
however. For example, congressional allocations of authority to federal agencies
theoretically are subject to constitutional challenge as impermissible delegations of
congressional power and authority. See supra note 70 (discussing the nondelegation
doctrine that governs judicial review of congressional delegations of authority).
Moreover, the authority for constituting an independent federal regulatory agency rests
on somewhat shaky constitutional ground. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism
After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 497-98 (1987) ("[T]he independent
agency is in considerable tension with principles traceable to the original constitutional
framework.").
86. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 61, at 7 n. 17; Bradford C. Mank, Using § 1983
to Enforce Title VIs Section 602 Regulations, 49 KAN. L. REV. 321, 339 (2001). A
student commentator perceptively observes the essence of the relationship between
Congress and regulatory agencies as follows:
To utilize administrative agencies, Congress enacts broad legislation that sets the
parameters inside which congressional purposes shall be achieved, and authorizes
federal agencies to carry out the intent of Congress by making specific rules by which
the American public must abide. In this way, Congress retains its constitutionally
mandated role as legislator, while federal agencies do the regulatory dirty work. Of
course, this process also allows politicians to shirk political accountability by leaving
agencies with the onus of enforcing unpopular regulations ....
Winford R. McGowan III, Comment, Is it Time to Give Congressional Delegation a
New Filter?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 485, 485 (2002).
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congressional override and judicial review.8 7 Accordingly, when the
SEC acts outside the scope of its statutorily defined mandate, it is acting
SEC action and interpretations have been
without authority.88
89
challenged on this basis.
The SEC was established in the 1934 Act90 as the regulatory body
charged with administering, interpreting, and enforcing the 1934 Act
and various other federal securities laws. 9' Although there is no statute
92
giving the SEC comprehensive authority over corporate governance,
87. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 61, at 7 n. 17 ("[T]he SEC ... can be overridden
by Congress or the courts if it steps out of line.").
88. The Supreme Court has stated:
The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal statute and to
prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not the power to make law-for no such
power can be delegated by Congress-but the power to adopt regulations to carry into
effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute. A regulation which does not do
this, but operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity.
Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 297 U.S. 129,
134 (1936). Cf Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976) (indicating
that the scope of an SEC regulation "cannot exceed the power granted the
Commission by Congress").
89. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 666-77 (1997) (analyzing the
SEC's authority to adopt Rule 14e-3(a) under the 1934 Act); Business Roundtable v.
S.E.C., 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (striking down the SEC's authority to adopt Rule
19c-4 under the 1934 Act); American Banker's Ass'n v. S.E.C., 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir.
1986); see also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 738 (3 rd ed.
2003); Joel Seligman, Financial Services Regulation: A Mid-Decade Review:
Colloquium: The SEC's Unfinished Soft Information Revolution, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
1953, 1988-89 (1995); David Jonathan White, Recent Development, Rulemaking
Under Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act: The SEC Exceeds Its Reach in Attempting to
Pull The Plug on Multiple ProrationPools, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (1983).
90.
15 U.S.C. § 78d (2000).
See id.; City Capital Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 860 F.2d 60,
91.
64 (3rd Cir. 1988) ("[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission has been entrusted by
Congress with the interpretation, administration, and enforcement of the Securities
Acts."); 1-1 FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 § 1.02; David S. Ruder, The
Development of Legal Doctrine Through Amicus Participation:The SEC Experience,
1989 WIS. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (1989) ("The Securities and Exchange Commission is
one of the oldest independent federal agencies, combining under one roof rule making,
administration, enforcement, and judicial functions.").
92. See Homer Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36
Bus. LAW. 173, 173-74 (1981). There had been plans for a federal corporate
governance statute as early as the 1930s, but the related proposals were never enacted
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there are a number of long-standing statutory provisions that allow for
the SEC to exercise its authority to make corporate governance rules or
regulations.9 3 Historically, the SEC has exercised its statutory authority
in the area of corporate governance somewhat sparingly. Its focus
predictably has been on disclosure regulation 94 -- especially proxy
regulation 9 5-- directly related to statutory provisions included in one of
into legislation. See SELIGMAN, supra note 89, at 205-10. Proposals for a federal
incorporation statute were forwarded in the 1970s, but these also failed. See id. at 54551.
For example, the SEC has express statutory authority to regulate the solicitation
93.
of proxies in connection with stockholder voting. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2000); see
also SELIGMAN, supra note 89, at 87 (noting that the proxy rules introduced in the
Fletcher-Rayburn bill-the precursor bill to the 1934 Act--"represented the Roosevelt
Administration's first efforts directly to regulate corporate governance"). This authority
over proxies has been used to adopt a significant body of regulation that impacts the
state-ordained stockholder voting process and the conduct of business at stockholder
meetings. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2004) (requiring that a proxy statement and
annual report to security holders be furnished to a security holder before or at the time a
proxy is solicited); id § 240.14a-8 ("address[ing] when a company must include a
stockholder's proposal in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in its form of
proxy when the company holds an annual or special meeting of shareholders," including
in paragraph (h) a requirement that the proponent or a representative appear at the
meeting to present the proposal); id. § 240.14a-12 (allowing the solicitation of a proxy
before a proxy statement has been furnished, under certain circumstances). Other
statutory provisions that give the SEC authority to regulate in the area of corporate
governance include: (a) certain provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,
as amended, Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. I, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified in scattered sections of
the 1934 Act); (b) tender offer provisions in the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d), (e); and
(c) Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, id. §§ 78j(b). These and other specific examples are
supplemented by an omnibus rulemaking provision in the 1934 Act that empowers the
SEC to "make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate" to
implement the provisions of or execute its functions under that Act. Id. § 78w(a).
94. See Paredes, supra note 23, at 531; Troy A. Paredes, Symposium, Blinded by
the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 423 n.17 (2003); Marc I. Steinberg, The Securities and Exchange
Commission 's Administrative, Enforcement, and Legislative Programs and PoliciesTheir Influence on CorporateInternal Affairs, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173, 190-202
(1982); Thompson, supra note 51, at 968.
95. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Commentary, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 987, 987 (1987);
Bevis Longstreth, A Look at the SEC's Adaptation to Global Market Pressures, 33
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319, 320-22 (1995); Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders as
Grown-Ups: Voting, Selling, and Limits on the Board's Power to "JustSay No," 67 U.
CIN. L. REV. 999, 1004-05 (1999).
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the federal securities laws. Yet, the scope of the SEC's authority to
make corporate governance rules under its various statutory mandates,
especially where the rules are disclosure-oriented, generally is
acknowledged to be quite broad.96 The SEC uses this authority both to
regulate and influence corporate governance.9 7
Sarbanes-Oxley adds to the breadth of the statutory scheme by
supplementing the SEC's corporate governance authority in the 1934
Act. 98 Among other things, 99 Sarbanes-Oxley: directs the SEC to adopt

96. Professor Faith Stevelman Kahn notes:
In section 14(a) of the '34 Act, and elsewhere in the Securities Laws, Congress has
given the SEC authority to promulgate disclosure provisions (and other rules) "in the
public interest or for the protection of investors" - a mandate plainly broad enough to
encompass disclosure of matters beyond corporate financial performance. The SEC
itself has expressed the view that its "discretion to determine what disclosure is
appropriate to fulfill its responsibilities under the federal securities laws is extremely
broad."
Faith Stevelman Kahn, Legislatures, Courts and the SEC: Reflections on Silence and
Power in Corporateand Securities Law, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1107, 1133-34 (1997)
(footnotes omitted); see also Coffee, supra note 43, at 95; Current Issues, supra note
64, at 606 (remarks of Jesse H. Choper); Ribstein, supra note 22, at 11; Schwartz, supra
note 39, at 572-76; Joel Seligman, supra note 51. at 1; Cynthia A. Williams, The
Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV.

L. REV. 1197, 1269-71 (1999). But see Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479
(1977) (declining to federalize, through Rule lob-5 under the 1934 Act, state law
fiduciary duties); George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A
Study in Federal Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REV. 865, 922, 960 (1983) (noting that the

SEC has "[o]n occasion.., conceded its lack of authority to interfere in corporate
governance" and asserting that "the SEC lacks the congressional mandate and the
expertise to perform" corporate governance regulation); Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy
to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1197 (1993)
("[T]he SEC has not been empowered to adopt a general theory of corporate
governance."); Kripke, supra note 92, at 198-202 (questioning the SEC's authority
under Rule 2(e) of its Rules of Practice); Loewenstein, supra note 76, at 783 (asserting
that the SEC "lacks the authority to promulgate rules or regulations directly affecting
corporate governance").
97. See Steinberg, supra note 94, at 174 ("By pursuing its various and sometimes
changing policies, the Commission exerts a very significant influence on corporate
internal affairs.").
98. See Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of
Private Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 64 (2004); John Paul Lucci, Enron
- The Bankruptcy HeardAround the World and the InternationalRicochet of SarbanesOxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 231 (2003); Ali M.M. Mojdehi, Appraising
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rules requiring the consolidated reporting of off-balance sheet
transactions and other entries; 00 requires SEC rulemaking in connection
with issuer obligations to disclose whether audit committee members are
financial experts;"" requires the SEC to formulate rules relating to
required disclosure as to whether the reporting entity has adopted a code
of ethics for its financial officers; 112 requires the SEC to adopt rules
relating to new issuer obligations to provide a statement of responsibility
of the issuer's management as to the establishment of an adequate
internal control structure; 10 3 requires the SEC to adopt rules requiring
corporate counsel to engage in "up-the-ladder" reporting of fiduciary
duty breaches; 1 4 allows the SEC exemptive authority under a provision
requiring the reimbursement to the issuer by the issuer's chief executive
officer and chief financial officer of bonuses and related compensation
or profits in stock sales if the issuer is required to restate its earnings as a
result of misconduct;'0 5 and requires the SEC, in consultation with the
Secretary of Labor, to issue rules clarifying the application of a
provision prohibiting insider trades during a pension fund blackout
period (during which time the beneficiaries of the issuer's pension fund
cannot trade).10 6 The SEC already has adopted rules under many of these
07
and other related provisions.1
Postconfirmation Leaders: The Underutilized Confirmation Requirement, 77 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 199, 225 (2003); Paredes, supra note 23, at 531; Romano, supra note 18, at
1; Thompson, supra note 56, at 106.
99. See Brown, supra note 56, at 359-71 (describing generally corporate
governance reforms enacted in Sarbanes-Oxley); Thompson, supra note 56, at 106 n.37
(citing to corporate governance rulemaking provisions under Sarbanes-Oxley).
100.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(i)-Oj) (Supp. 2002).
101.
Id. § 7265.
102. Id. § 7264.
103.
Id. § 7262.
104. Id. § 7245.
105. Id. § 7243.
106. Id. § 7244.
107.
17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(4) (2004) (regarding disclosure of off-balance sheet
arrangements); id. § 229.401 (requiring disclosure regarding audit committee financial
experts); id. § 229.406 (requiring disclosure of the existence of any code of ethics that
applies to the registrant's principal executive officer, principal financial officer,
principal accounting officer or controller, or persons performing similar functions); id. §
240.25d-15 (regarding disclosure controls and procedures and internal financial
reporting controls); id. § 205.1-205.7 (regarding standards of professional
responsibility for corporate counsel); id. § 245.100-104 (regarding trading prohibitions
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Finally, no discussion of SEC authority would be complete without
a reference to the significant deference accorded to SEC rulemaking by
courts under the Chevron °8 case and other decisional law applying its
form of deference.' 0 9 Effectively, under Chevron, "unless an agency's
statutory interpretation is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise
unreasonable, a court must accord that interpretation 'controlling
weight,' even if the court believes that other, and potentially better,
interpretations exist."" This high level of judicial deference enhances
the strength (but not the substantive scope) of the SEC's authority in the
area of corporate governance rulemaking.
C. The Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts Over CorporateGovernance
The rule-making authority of the federal courts over corporate
governance matters derives from the general constitutional powers of the
Specifically, the federal courts make or affect
federal courts."'

during pension fund blackout periods).
108. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
109. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997) (according Chevron
deference to the SEC's adoption of Rule 14e-3 under the 1934 Act); United States v.
Crop Growers Corp., 954 F. Supp. 335, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The SEC's
interpretation is entitled to deference under Chevron so long as it is reasonable.");
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (assuming Chevron
deference even where the case involves a limit on the SEC's jurisdiction); United States
SEC v. Blackwell, 291 F. Supp. 2d 673, 694 (S.D. Ohio 2003) ("The SEC's
interpretation is entitled to deference as long as it provides a permissible interpretation
of the statute and rules."); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on
Confidential Information - A Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 97
(1998); Donna M. Nagy, JudicialReliance on Regulatory Interpretationsin SEC NoAction Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
921,967-96.
110. See Nagy, supra note 109, at 969.
111.
The overall jurisdiction of the federal courts is grounded in Article III of the
U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. III. Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits
the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts in significant respects. See, e.g., Ins.
Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982);
Communications, Inc. v. Paradigm Co., 336 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 2003); United
States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Group, 318 F.3d 1199, 1215 (10thCir. 2003);
Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court is afforded
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corporate governance rules in the context of actual cases and
controversies'1 2 arising under the Constitution or federal law (generally,
the federal securities laws)" 3 or by interpreting state law in cases
involving diversity jurisdiction." 4

appellate jurisdiction over these cases, subject to exceptions and regulations determined
by Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
112. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 37
(1976); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-21 (1960); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937); Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously.
Introduction to a Strategy for ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 371-72
(1984); Roe, supra note 18, at 592. Federal courts do not render advisory opinions and
do not hear hypothetical cases and controversies. See JAMES EISENSTEIN, POLITICS AND
THE LEGAL PROCESS 179 (1973); LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 474. State courts
may not be so restricted. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 16.061(1) (2003).
113. The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is defined in Section 2 of
Article III and extends to, among other things, "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority." U.S. CONST. art. III, 2, cl. 1. See also
EISENSTEIN, supra note 112, at 143-44; LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 470-71;
WALTER F. MURPHY & ET AL., COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

80 (5th ed. 2002);

CHRISTOPHER

E.

SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS,

(1993).
114. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) (holding
that an Indiana antitakeover statute is not preempted by the Williams Act); Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (finding an Illinois takeover statute
unconstitutional as a violation of the Commerce Clause); Granada Invs., Inc. v. DWG
Corp., 962 F.2d 1203, 1205 (1992) (describing corporate governance aspects of a
settlement of claims under Rule lob-5 and state law); Jeffery M. Fuller & Robert C.
Rasmussen, FloridaTakeover Law: Affiliated Transactions, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 801,
806 n.35 (1990) (listing takeover laws invalidated under the Commerce Clause or the
Supremacy Clause); Arthur R. Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce
Clause and State Corporate Law, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 473, 475 (1987) (noting that
federal court invalidation of state takeover statutes on Commerce Clause grounds
"may ... federalize some state laws by allowing federal courts to eliminate significant
state corporate law provisions."); Roe, supra note 18, at 628 ("federal courts for most of
the 1980s were knocking down state anti-takeover laws as conflicting with the dormant
commerce clause."). Under limited circumstances, a federal court may, however,
decline to exercise its jurisdiction over a matter of corporate governance. See Feiwus v.
Genpar, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296-300 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing the possibility
of a Burford abstention for a claim relating to a corporate dissolution). It also should be
noted, however, that many actions in which disclosure claims are made under both state
and federal law are required by statute to be brought in federal court. Richard W.
Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud

AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 25
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One might think that the limited nature of the federal judiciary's
rulemaking jurisdiction, when combined with the leading role that state
statutory and decisional law has played in corporate governance over the
years, would have hampered the ability of the federal courts to effectuate
corporate governance rulemaking and otherwise impact the law of
Indeed, the federal judiciary has exercised
corporate governance.
restraint in adjudicating certain corporate governance issues." 5
However, the federal courts have played a leading role in corporate
governance rulemaking for many years through, among other things,
adjudications under Rule 1Ob-5 under the 1934 Act."16
Because the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to (among
other things) cases and controversies arising under federal legislation,
each new congressional enactment expands, contracts, or clarifies the
jurisdictional reach of the federal courts. Sarbanes-Oxley enhances the
role of the federal judiciary in federal governance rulemaking through its
various new substantive law requirements, through its requirement that

Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1998); A.C. Pritchard, Constitutional
Federalism,Individual Liberty, and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 435, 484 (2000); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware'sCorporate-Law
System: Is CorporateAmerica Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough?
A Response to Kahan & Kamar's Price Discriminationin the Market for Corporate
Law, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1257, 1273 (2001).

115. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) ("Absent a clear
indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion
of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where
established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden."); Barnett v.
Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("[T]his does not mean that the
Securities Acts have swallowed the whole body of state statutory and common law
covering the internal administration of the affairs of corporations and the fiduciary
obligations of those who manage and control them."); see also John Ferejohn, The Law
of Politics: JudicializingPolitics, PoliticizingLaw, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 49
(2002) ("Judicial legislation is, therefore-at least in principle-limited in its reach.");
Schwartz, supra note 39, at 577 ("The question, then, is whether the courts overreach
the congressional intent when their orders extend into the corporate governance
arrangement. When the SEC and federal courts assert some control over the
membership of the board, a conflict, or at least a potential conflict, with state
corporation law is created.").
116. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2004); see also Current Issues, supra note 64, at 606
(remarks of Jesse H. Choper); Schwartz, supra note 39, at 576-82; Thompson & Sale,
supranote 54, at 860.
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officer and director bars be sought in federal court, and through its
expansion of the statute of limitations applicable to federal securities
fraud actions.117 Corporate governance cases have been brought based
on Sarbanes-Oxley, but few final decisions yet have been reached. 18
Accordingly, the ultimate effects of Sarbanes-Oxley on judicial
corporate governance rulemaking largely remain to be seen.
IV. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE-STRUCTURE AND
SUBSTANCE

An understanding of the power, authority, and jurisdiction of
Congress, the SEC, and the federal courts in the area of corporate
governance rulemaking represents the essential first step in the analysis
is suggested in this article. A second significant component of that
analysis is a comparative assessment of the competence of each

institution in making corporate governance rules. 1 9 In examining the
relative rulemaking capabilities of Congress, the SEC, and the federal
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (Supp. 2002) (requiring that officer and director bars
be sought by the SEC in federal court); 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (Supp. 2002) (lengthening
the statute of limitations applicable to federal securities fraud actions); supra notes 100106 (citing to various corporate governance provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley). Professor
Richard Painter effectively predicted the statute of limitations provision in SarbanesOxley when he stated:
If the federal regime-much of which is based on judicial interpretation of private
rights of action that Congress never expressly bestowed-becomes too hostile to
defrauded investors, Congress either will have to rewrite the federal cause of action or
will have to reevaluate the flawed logic behind federal preemption.
Painter, supra note 114, at 13; see also Michael Dailey, Officer and DirectorBars: Who
is Substantially Unfit to Serve After Sarbanes-Oxley?, 40 Hous. L. REv. 837, 850-51
(2003) (describing the legislative process relating to the officer and director bar
provision in Sarbanes-Oxley).
118.
See, e.g., SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 367 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir.,
2004) (vacating and remanding a trial court decision regarding "extraordinary
payments" under Section 1103 of Sarbanes-Oxley); In re AFC Enter., 224 F.R.D. 515,
521 (D. Ga. 2004) (refusing to rule on the retroactive application of the bonus forfeiture
provision of Sarbanes-Oxley).
119. See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the
Judicial Branch, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REv. 75, 90 (1999) (using "competence" as
synonymous with "power"). In point of fact, many scholars use the term "competence"
in a manner that makes it synonymous with institutional capacity, the subject matter of
Part III of this article. This article distinguishes competence from capacity on the bases
described in this Part.
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courts, this article references two separate attributes of competence:
structural and substantive.12 0
The analyses of relative structural
competence consist of examinations of the configuration and
composition of each rulemaking body as a source of corporate
governance rules. One institution may be built better than another to
handle specific tasks. 121 At its roots, structural competence is tied to the
In essence,
separation of powers in our federal government. 122
"separation of powers... divides the labor of governing ....[T]he way
a branch of government is designed to work profoundly affects the kinds
of governing jobs it ought to do."'' 23 Assessments of substantive
12 4
competence are made principally on the basis of institutional expertise

120. There is no one method for conducting a comparative analysis of institutional
competence. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon each scholar to explain the method
used in his or her analysis in some detail. See Komesar, supra note 112, at 367-68
(outlining three "fundamental features" of a comparative institutional analysis of courts
and legislatures); Deborah Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial
Courts, and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REv. 471, 523 (1986) (setting forth
"[flour assumptions ...implicit in institutional competence analysis").
121.
Cf Ferejohn, supra note 115, at 45 ("There are good reasons why some kinds
of legislation should be debated and formulated in a legislature, while others should be
made in courtrooms or administrative agencies.").
122. In this regard, one scholar writes that
An analysis based on separation of powers concerns need not be limited to a brief
reference to Marbury v. Madison. The analysis can move from a general concern with
separation of powers to an attempt to delineate the particular functions best performed
by a given institution. Such a move characterizes the institutional competence analysis
favored by advocates of the 'legal process' approach to legal problems.
Maranville, supra note 120, at 522.
123.
See The Goldwater Institute and the Federalist Society: Federalism and
Judicial Mandates, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17, 171 (1996) (remarks of Professor Lillian R.
BeVier as part of the panel discussion entitled "Judicial Engineering of Social PolicyCosts and Benefits") [hereinafter JudicialEngineering Panel].
124.
The Random House College Dictionary defines "expertise" as "expert skill or
knowledge; expertness," where the adjective "expert" means "possessing special skill or
knowledge; trained by practice; skillful or skilled." THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 465-66 (Rev'd ed. 1984). This article treats institutional expertise on an
aggregate basis and as a matter of degree, rather than as an absolute. See Kathleen
Bawn, Political Control vs. Expertise: Congressional Choices About Administrative
Procedures, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 62, 66 (1995) (treating the agency as a unified
whole and "the agency's level of expertise as a continuous variable" rather than as an
"all-or-nothing variable").
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in corporate governance rulemaking. An institution that has a history of
rulemaking in a particular subject matter area naturally develops more
specialized substantive knowledge in that area. The assessment of
substantive competence recommended in this article relies on the
identification of the nature and extent of that specialized knowledge. 125
Neither structural competence nor substantive competence allows
for an objective analysis, but important anecdotal observations may be
made about each rulemaking body. A significant body of literature
exists that includes observations about each component of institutional
competence analyzed in this article. These observations permit certain
conclusions to be drawn about the relative competence of Congress, the
SEC, and the federal courts as corporate governance rulemakers in
specific contexts. Accordingly, this Part proceeds to (x) describe how
rulemaking in Congress, the SEC, and the federal courts is designed and
carried out and (y) isolate the source and scope of expertise of each of
these rulemaking bodies.
A. The Competence of Congress in Corporate Governance Rulemakig

1. The Structural Competence of Congress
The structural competence-or legitimacy--of U.S. legislatures,
including Congress, derives from their representative nature and the
manner in which they operate. Professor Eric Lane and Judge Abner
Mikva describe "the legitimacy of the American legislative process" as
deriving "from its three salient characteristics: deliberativeness,
representativeness, and accessibility."' 2 6 This Part highlights certain of
One scholar takes a rather dim view of this process, based on her view that
125.
expertise is self-determined:
We lack a method for resolving conflicting claims of competence because our limits
on such claims operate in a circular fashion. As Professor Frug has noted, each
institution defines its area of competence as limited only by standards of expertise that
experts must define, that is, those experts identified with the institution itself. Thus,
just as only the agency and its personnel properly can define the limits of agency
expertise, only judges and lawyers properly can define the limits of judicial expertise.
Maranville, supra note 120, at 527-28 (footnotes omitted).
126. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 69 (1997). These characteristics are
used as basic organizing principles for the comparative analysis suggested in this Part.
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the features associated with these characteristics.
Although Congress and other U.S. legislatures control to a great
extent their agenda and workloads,1 7 the legislative rulemaking process
generally is predictably deliberative.1 28 A legislature has a fixed
operational structure and generally engages in its lawmaking tasks
through a prescribed, routinized decisionmaking process. 129 Legislative
127. Legislators typically decide the proposed matters on which they will take
action, and they determine the scheduling of the prerequisite hearings and votes. See
Komesar, supra note 112, at 371 (1984) ("[P]olitical branches, for example, have
significantly greater flexibility in determining the agenda of social issues they will
address."); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration,

94 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 52 (1994) ("We consider a grant of legislative power to
Congress, within the boundaries of constitutional limitation, to be a grant of a
prerogative to select or not to select topics for legislation, or to enact or not to enact
bills, all subject to the sanction of the political process only."). But see Ferejohn, supra
note 115, at 45 ("[T]he President has assumed at least informal control over much of the
regular legislative agenda .. ").In fact, legislatures can ignore matters properly before
them. See Komesar, supra note 112, at 372. Catalysts for proposed legislation and
other inputs to the legislative process come from a wide variety of sources internal and
external to these representative legislative bodies. See Judicial Engineering Panel,
supra note 123, at 171-72. That input may include hearing testimony from regulators
and representatives of the other branches of government. See Jeffrey J. Connaughton,
Judicial Accountability and the CJRA, 49 ALA. L. REv. 251, 256 (1997) (regarding
judicial input in the legislative process leading to enactment of the Civil Justice Reform
Act).
128. In this context, "deliberative" means more than merely "thoughtful" or
"introspective." Rather, the legislature's deliberative nature is characterized by a
process that involves purposeful, institutional interaction with, and input from,
individuals, groups, and entities with varied perspectives and objectives. See MIKVA &
LANE, supra note 126, at 69; see also Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers:
Representative Government, Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public
Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421, 435-36 (1998). Cf Mildred Wigfall Robinson,
Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and Local Fiscal Policy at the Intersection of
Direct Democracy and Republicanism: The Property Tax as a Case in Point, 35 U.

J.L. REF. 511, 546 (2002). The deliberative nature of congressional legislative
activity initially slowed the process of federal corporate governance reform in the portMICH.

Enron era. See Lessons from Enron: A Symposium on Corporate Governance:
Transcript-MorningSession, 54 MERCER L. REv. 683, 686 (2003) (comments of

William Ide) [hereinafter Lessons from Enron]; see also Jennifer S. Recine, Note,
Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, 39 AM. CRM. L. REv. 1535, 1545-49 (2002).
129. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
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rulemaking begins with the introduction of a bill and consists of a
laborious, sequenced series of steps 30 that may be engaged on a
Legislation provides for potentially
somewhat random basis.13'
comprehensive rulemaking-rulemaking that solves the problems of the
many in multiple, related circumstances, not merely the problems of the
few in specific circumstances.1 32 Typically, legislative output is
prospective in nature, affecting future conduct and calling for future
compliance. 33 Structurally, Congress and the overwhelming majority of
state legislatures are bicameral, meaning that they consist of two
having different formalized structural
chambers of elected legislators
34
and functional attributes.
Legislatures as a whole also have a support structure that includes
various resources and tools. This system generally includes, but extends
beyond, specialized committees and staff. 1"' Congress, for example, has
126, at 69; see also Kahan &
Rock, supra note 61, at 9.
130. See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 408-11; SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 82,
at 227.
See Roe, supra note 18, at 592 ("Congress moves sporadically.").
131.
132. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 519
(2000) (noting, in the equal protection rulemaking context, that "Congress possessed the
authority to create comprehensive and detailed legislative frameworks, as the Court did
not").
133. See Harvard Electricity Policy Group: Regulatory Decisionmaking Reform, 8
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 789, 817 (1995) ("Regulators and legislators make decisions that
may be based on some judgments about historic facts, but the effect of those decisions
is. . . to provide or deny some prospective relief to whomever may be seeking it.")
[hereinafter Regulatory Decisionmaking].
134. See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 94. Congress is a bicameral
representative body consisting of a Senate made up of two senators from each state and
a House of Representatives with representation determined on the basis of state
population, as enumerated by Congress from time to time. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3,
cl. 1; id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.; id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (regarding the terms of representatives); id.
art. 1, 3, cl. 1 (regarding the terms for senators); see also Komesar, supra note 112, at
371 ("Legislators ... serve for ... terms ... ranging from two to six years at the federal
level. Legislators ... interested in retaining office must be attuned to the desires of at
least the politically active voters in their districts.").
135. See, e.g., LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 95 (describing the role of staff in
the work of state legislators); id. at 418 (noting that members of Congress enjoy "a staff
and support system that rival those of a corporate executive."); id. at 526-27 (describing
mechanisms used "to retain control over agency discretion"); Louis Fisher,
INTERPRETATION 101 (2000); MIKVA & LANE, supra note
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a number of specialized committees and subcommittees' 36 that may
focus on, among other things, corporate governance issues. In the 1 0 8th
Congress, these include (among others) (a) the House Committees on (i)
Energy and Commerce and (ii) Financial Services and (b) the Senate
Committees on (i) Commerce, Science, and Transportation, (ii) Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, and (iii) Finance.137 A number of these
committees and their subcommittees need hearings on the corporate
scandals of the new millennium and, more specifically, Sarbanes38
Oxley.'
In its most ideal form, "[L]egislation is developed by elected
representatives whose full-time jobs are to become thoroughly informed.
Legislation is the product of hearings, debates, and calm, deliberate
decision-making.' ' 39 The deliberative nature of the legislature is
inextricably intertwined with its representational character. 4 °
CongressionalAccess to Information: Using Legislative Will and Leverage, 52 DUKE
L.J. 323, 339-45 (2002) (describing Congress's subpoena power in committee
investigations); Komesar, supra note 112, at 372 ("The political branches ... have more
flexibility and resources to investigate the social issues they address.").
See ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J.OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS
136.
193-227 ( 9 th ed. 2004) (detailing the committee system); SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note
82, at 220-21. Most standing committees have subcommittees, also organized to act
within specific subject matter areas, and these subcommittees carry on the groundwork
of the committee. See id. at 220. Both the legislators and the committees employ staff
to support them in their work. See id. at 218.
137. See generally DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 136, at 198 (listing the
standing committees of the House and Senate for the 108 th Congress). Westlaw has a
database (Corporate Scandals - Congressional Hearings, known as CORPSCANCONG) that includes transcripts of testimony before congressional committees and
other related information relating to the corporate scandals of the new millennium. See
http://lawschool.westlaw.com (available to subscribers only) for additional information
about this database.
138. See supranote 69 (regarding Senate hearings on a predecessor bill to SarbanesOxley). See generally DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 136, at 214.
139.
K.K. DuVivier, By Going Wrong All Things Come Right: Using Alternate
Initiatives to Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1185, 1205 (1995); see
WALDRON, supra note 13, at 156 ("The first thing to say is that the dignity of
legislation, the ground of its authority, and its claim to be respected by us, have a lot to
do with the sort of achievement it is. Our respect for legislation is in part the tribute we
should pay to the achievement of concerted, cooperative, coordinated or collective
action in the circumstances of modem life.").
140. See Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due
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The representative nature of U.S. legislatures gives them legitimacy
based on a quasi-agency or quasi-trust theory.' 4 ' The public elects
legislators to whom law-making authority is entrusted, and those
to
legislators then, at least in theory, act in a manner that is responsive 142
the needs of the public electorate (to whom they are accountable).
"Legislation is not just deliberate, administrative, or political: it is,
above all, in the modem world, the product of an assembly-the many,
This
the multitude, the rabble (or their representatives).' ' 143
representative quality of legislatures has both benefits and detriments.
Those whose interests are well represented reap the benefits in the form
of legislation that serves their interests. 144 Representation that reflects
Process Clause, 94 MICH. L. REv. 982, 1005 n. 112 (1996) ("It is, of course, open to
debate how well legislatures function in their deliberative capacity: whether they
actually reflect the preferences of their various constituencies or whether they have
been captured by special interests and lobbyists.").
141.
See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 129, at 24-25; LYONS & SCHEB, supra note
26, at 386; SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 82, at 210; Edmund Burke, On Election to
Parliament,in THE DEMOCRACY READER 50-51 (Diane Ravitch & Abigail Thernstrom
eds., 1992).
142. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 126, at 70-72. It often is observed that
legislators are accountable to the electorate, at least at election time. See EISENSTEIN,
supra note 112, at 15; ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 129, at 19; Judicial Engineering
Panel,supra note 123, at 173; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 127, at 52.
143.
WALDRON, supra note 13, at 33.
144.
Sharona Hoffman, AIDS Caps, Contraceptive Coverage, and the Law: An
Analysis of the FederalAnti-discriminationStatutes'Applicabilityto Health Insurance,
23 CARDOZO L. REv. 1315, 1359-60 (2002) ("[B]ecause legislation is often a response
to public pressure and political concern, it does not necessarily assist all those in need.
Groups with strong lobbyists or prominent representatives might succeed in
promulgating legislation that benefits their special interest, while equally deserving
groups may fail because of much weaker lobbying abilities and less prominence.").
Many theorists and other scholars have commented on this aspect of legislatures. From
an economic perspective, for example, Professor Jonathan Macey notes:
The economic theory of legislation predicts that laws are likely to benefit the few at
the expense of the many, because no one has an incentive to enact laws that benefit
the people in general. This is the classic "free-rider" problem that inevitably plagues
public interest legislation in a representative democracy. Because the benefits of such
legislation are spread among everyone in the population, individual members of the
public lack sufficient incentives to promote public interest laws since all the costs of
such promotion must be absorbed by the promoters themselves. Hence, the laws that
are enacted will tend to benefit whichever small, cohesive special interest groups
lobby most effectively. To use a familiar illustration, everyone who buys milk is
harmed by milk price supports, but the small cohesive lobby of milk producers
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the needs and desires of the populace served may create the benefit of
Among the detriments associated with
societal goodwill. 145
representative legislatures is the failure of the legislative body to
completely and accurately reflect the judgment of the citizenry subject to
146
its control.
Accordingly, the legislative process is inherently political and often
partisan, characterized by debate, force of will, hard-fought compromise,
and deal-making.147 For example, the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley was
Sarbanes-Oxley shows that
a political, albeit nonpartisan, act.' 48
nonetheless is able to obtain these subsidies.
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 231-32 (1986)
(footnotes omitted).
See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 136, at 132-33.
145.
146. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-87 (1969). A legislator's determination to vote in a manner that does not reflect
the views of his constituents may be based on a balancing of national, state, and local
interests, personal conscience, political or partisan allegiance, or other factors. See
DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 136, at 133-34. Moreover, the size of the legislative
body may impact its ability to be widely representative of the electorate.
The apprehension about oligarchy reflects, in part, a concern about the difficulty of
large numbers of representatives coordinating sufficiently to produce laws that are
coherent. The more members there are, the more likely they will need a facilitator or
coordinator; and by a kind of iron law of oligarchy, it is to the latter's hands that
power eventually will devolve.
WALDRON, supra note 13, at 33.
147. See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 456-57; WALDRON, supra note 13, at 25
("Everyone knows that argument in Congress ... is explicitly and unashamedly
political. There's no controversy in jurisprudence about that; you can.., watch it on CSPAN. It is either the interplay of interests, or the direct clash of policy proposals and
ideologies."); Judicial Engineering Panel, supra note 123, at 172; Lessig & Sunstein,
supra note 127, at 52; infra Part V.A. (regarding influences on congressional
decisionmaking).
148. See William J. Carney, The Impact of Competition on Regulation:Introduction,
52 EMORY L.J. 1285, 1289 (2003); The Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the
Corporate Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Panel 2: The Evolution of
Corporate Governance (Nov. 22, 2002), 52 AM. U. L. REV. 613, 635 (2003) (comments
of Roberta S. Karmel); Henry G. Manne, A Free Market Model of a Large Corporation
System, 52 EMORY L.J. 1381 (2003); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Revenue Recognition
and CorporateCounsel, 56 SMU L. REV. 885, 923 (2003). With respect to the criminal
initiatives in Sarbanes-Oxley, one scholar notes:
One view of the criminal provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is that they resulted
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congressional deliberation may be limited where politics drives the
process. 49 The political and partisan character of congressional debate
and the nature of the legislative process encourage compromise from the
initial text of a bill introduced to either chamber of Congress. 5
Moreover, legislators acting in a partisan manner may both support bills
for particular positions or
that promote a specific cause and advocate
51
ideologies in their general lawmaking.
The accessibility of U.S. legislatures is legend.' 52 Legislative

from a political process which sought to blame the wave of corporate scandal on a few
miscreant corporate chieftains and to dissipate the momentum for reform of failing
structures of corporate governance and the incestuous relationships between corporate
management and those, such as boards of directors and outside auditors, whose job it
is to protect employees, shareholders, corporate treasuries, and the integrity of
markets.
Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour encourager les autres? The Curious History and
DistressingImplications of the CriminalProvisionsof the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 375
(2004); see also id.at 435.
149. See Kourtney T. Cowart, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: How A Current Model in the
Law of Unintended Consequences May Affect Securities Litigation, 42 DUQ. L. REV.
293, 314 (2004) ("[M]eaningful debate, especially as voiced by opponents, and the
usual resulting compromises over legislative measures, are nearly absent from the Act's
history."); Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN.
J.L. Bus. & FIN. 9, 12 (2002) (noting that accounting reform and professional
responsibility components of Sarbanes-Oxley "aroused little public debate or
controversy and passed unanimously"). A lack of deliberativeness may have limited or
otherwise negatively impacted the substance of Sarbanes-Oxley. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor Protection: The SEC and
the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1143 (2003) (describing the
political landscape in which Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted, concluding that "SarbanesOxley did some very good things, especially in the accounting and auditing area, but in
the end-and notwithstanding the Sturm und Drang rhetoric-it is still fairly moderate
legislation."); Paredes, supra note 30, at 233 ("Although portions of Sarbanes-Oxley...
received careful attention in their crafting, much of the legislation was drafted hastily,
in some cases at the eleventh hour.").
150. See Bowman, supra note 148, at 376 (describing the political compromise
involved in arriving at criminal provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley); Lessons from Enron,
supra note 128, at 686 ("Congress's rush to claim solutions is an example of policy
giving way to politics.").
151. See Regulatory Decisionmaking,supra note 133, at 817 ("Legislators may very
well be advocates, and certainly on many issues, we expect that they will be.").
152. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 126, at 77-84 (focusing on the importance of
lobbying in the United States).
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actions are generally public in nature, characterized by an open process
in which all are deemed to have a right to know about and influence
decisionmaking' 5 3 The accessible, public nature of legislatures helps to
ensure the accountability ascribed to them as representative rulemaking
in
bodies. 54 Accessibility may also add to the expertise of Congress
1 55
discourse.
public
intelligent
fosters
lawmaking
circumstances where
2. The Substantive Competence of Congress
To assess the substantive competence of Congress, one must
determine its institutional expertise. The only well defined areas of
expertise that a U.S. legislature categorically can claim are: an
understanding of lawmaking;' 56 an ability (based on, among other things,
its investigative power, its committee structure, and its staff) to access
153. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 126, at 77-78.
154. See id. The accessibility of legislatures also allows for lobbying, which may
cut against the broadly representative nature of the legislature, because of the
minoritarian influence of lobbyist over legislative decisionmaking. See infra Part V.A.;
MIKVA & LANE, supra note 126, at 78-84. Lobbyists may have a significant amount of
influence over the legislative process. See Stacie L. Fatka & Jason Miles Levien, Note,
Protectingthe Right to Petition: Why a Lobbying Contingency Fee ProhibitionViolates
the Constitution,35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 559, 568 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
155. Cf Regulatory Decisionmaking,supra note 133, at 789, 817 ("Legislators are
entitled to, and do get if they are doing their job right, a wide input of facts and opinions
in their decisionmaking."); JudicialEngineeringPanel,supra note 123, at 171.
156. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 412 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Legislation is the business of the
Congress, and it has the facilities and competence for that task-as we do not.");
Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221,
230-31 (1993) ("Congress is the greatest expert on the legislative process; it knows the
practical realities of interest group politics."); David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers
and the Powers That Be: The ConstitutionalPurposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 355, 388 ("Congress, it might be argued, is the expert on ways of
legislating so that the Court should defer."). One scholar notes that
[s]tatutes often are enacted for the purpose of transforming the surrounding landscape
by creating a new structure of relationships that significantly alters the preexisting mix
of legal rights and duties. Legislatures are in general more competent than courts to
address such complex structural matters, and in exercising that competence they
frequently challenge or reject prior judicially fashioned solutions.
James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the
Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 1030-31 (1996).
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information; 5 7 and knowledge (gained from, among other things, its
representative nature) of the populace served. 5 8 Because of these areas
of expertise, the legislature, as compared to the other two branches of
government, may be deemed most able to resolve contentious issues that
are political in nature. 5 9 Indeed, courts defer to a legislature's fact-

157. See Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the ForcedReconsideration
of ConstitutionalDecisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 819, 837 (1986); Ruth Colker & James
J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80, 117 (2001); Sidney A. Shapiro &
Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in
Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 841-42 (1998).
158. See THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 330, 333 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., Penguin Books 1961) ("Knowledge... will be brought by the representatives of
every part of the empire."); THE FEDERALIST No. 56, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., Penguin Books 1961) (addressing the challenge that the House is "too
small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents"). One scholar
more recently noted this area of expertise in the context of criminal legislation.
The metaphor of human sacrifice captures the basic unfairness of punishing an
innocent person for the benefit of the entire community. John Rawls develops this
insight in his critique of utilitarianism. The aggregate amount of happiness is of
course important, and democratic legislatures are institutionally competent to measure
it. But the distribution of happiness matters too, and at some point it becomes unfair to
impose great hardship on an individual for a very slight gain for collective community
security.
Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public
Choice; or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1079, 1094-95 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
159. See Ariel L. Bendor, Are There Any Limits to Justiciability? The
Jurisprudentialand Constitutional Controversy in Light of the Israeli and American
Experience, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 311, 333 (1997); Howard T. Markey,
Jurisprudence or "Juriscience"?,25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 525, 535 (1984); Gary
Peller, Neutral Principlesin the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 614-15 (1988);
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm M. Feeley, Velazquez and Beyond: Judicial Policy
Making and Litigation Against the Government, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 617, 620 (2003).
The jurisprudential rule calling for judicial noninterference with legislatures on political
matters often is referred to as the political question doctrine. City of Rome v. U.S., 446
U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1973); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-17 (1962); Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 140-51 (1912); LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 474-76.
Under the political question doctrine, the legislative stronghold over political issues is
less a matter of expertise, however, than capacity. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 112, at
179-80. The strength-and even the existence-of this doctrine is a matter of debate,
however. See Louis Henkin, Is there a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J.
597, 600 (1976).
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60
finding expertise in determining matters of public policy.
Certain scholars have attributed substantive expertise to
Congress.' 6' The basis for this judgment is, however, unclear in many
cases. Commentators also note that congressional committees and their
members, as critical players in the federal legislative process, may have
a greater degree of specific, fact-based expertise than Congress as 62
a
whole based on their experience over time with substantive matters.

Representatives and Senators may defer to this deemed expertise in floor
debates and votes. 63 Also, the expertise of individual legislators in
160. One scholar notes:
A common justification for judicial deference to the legislature is the latter's unique
expertise in performing the factfinding function essential to determinations of policy.
To the extent that factfinding and fact evaluation informs a constitutional inquiry as
well, legislatures are often considered superior to courts in educating themselves on
and calculating the relative weight of the necessary background data. Legislatures,
unlike courts, have substantial staff, funds, time and procedures to devote to effective
information gathering and sorting. Additionally, deference with regard to some
legislative matters reduces what would otherwise be an unmanageable burden on
limited judicial resources.
Robin Charlow, JudicialReview, Equal Protectionand the Problem with Plebiscites, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 527, 578-79 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
161.
See, e.g., George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag ConstitutionalDogsHave the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263, 272 (1989); Louis Fisher,
Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REv. 707, 747
(1985); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a
ConstitutionalSolution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365, 442 (1999); Sidney A. Shapiro
& Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in
Administrative Law, 1988 DuKE L.J. 819, 841-42 (1988); James Miller, Note, The
Disabled, the ADA, & Strict Scrutiny, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 393, 401 (1994). See
generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting);
David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 104 (1994); Johanna Pirko,
Note, The Erosion of Separation of Powers Under the "Congruence and
Proportionality"Test: From Religious Freedom to the ADA, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 519, 546
(2002).
162. See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 136, at 132; ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra
note 129, at 205; LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 409; SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note
82, at 220; Barbara Sinclair, An Effective Congress and Effective Members: What Does
It Take?, PS: POL. SCI. & POLITICS 435, 438 (September 1996); United States Congress,
The Committee Process, WIKIPEDIA, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilUSCongress (last
visited Feb. 28, 2005).
163.
See SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 82, at 220 ("Legislators normally defer to the
expertise of the chairperson and other members of the committee who speak on the
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specialized substantive areas, whether gained through or apart from their
legislative work, contributes to the legislature's overall institutional

competence. 164
Yet, commentators acknowledge that expertise on highly
specialized matters of substantive law and regulation (including
corporate and securities law) generally are outside the actual and
potential expertise of legislatures, because of the significant experience,
time, and other resources needed to develop that expertise. 165 Congress
is not given high marks for its level of knowledge in specific substantive
areas. 166 Relevant to the analysis presented in this article, scholars and
other commentators have noted Congress's lack of specific subject
matter expertise in corporate law and corporate governance. 167 Based on
floor in defense of the committee decision.").
164. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 129, at 205-06 (describing various ways in
which members of Congress develop knowledge and expertise); Elizabeth Garrett &
Adrian Vermeule, InstitutionalDesign of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277,
1313 (2001) ("Some members of Congress will arrive in Washington with substantial
legal knowledge, and some will become experts on constitutional matters during the
terms of office .... Moreover, Congress occasionally establishes an internal body of
experts to counterbalance expertise in the other branches of government."); Barbara S.
Romzek & Jennifer A. Utter, Congressi6nalLegislative Staff: PoliticalProfessionalsor
Clerks?, 41 AM. J. POL. ScI. 1251, 1252 (1997) ("Congressional legislative staff, those
individuals who work directly for elected members of Congress, oftentimes represent a
thread of continuity, institutional memory, and expertise within the institution.").
165. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the
Role of the States, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 491, 509 n.70 (1988) ("[R]esource constraints
typically preclude state legislatures from maintaining permanent staff expertise in areas
as specialized as corporate and securities law.").
166. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem of
Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1309 (1999); Grundfest, supra note
71, at 1019; Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-opening of the
Environmental Mind?, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 463, 505 n.196 (1989); Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L.REV. 479, 521 (1997); Mary Buffington,
Comment, Separation of Powers and the Independent Governmental Entity After
Mistretta v. United States, 50 LA. L. REV. 117, 119 (1989); Marc L. Sherman, Note, We
Can Share the Women, We Can Share the Wine: The Regulation of Alcohol Advertising
on Television, 58 S.CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1108 n.13 (1985). Congress has admitted its
own lack of expertise on at least one occasion. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright,
Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 880 (1987).
167. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric,
Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN.L. REV. 915, 986 (2003) ("Congress
may know almost nothing about corporate law."); Wells M. Engledow, Handicapping
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the foregoing, we may presume that Congress, as a rulemaking body
generally comprised of legislators without specific corporate governance
expertise, does not have and exercise significant expertise in matters of
corporate governance, but we must understand that this presumption
may be rebutted based on a particularized factual inquiry and a
comparative analysis of the corporate governance expertise of other
potential corporate governmental rulemakers.
B. The Competence of the SEC in CorporateGovernanceRulemaking

1.

The Structural Competence of the SEC

The SEC, like Congress, can be said to be deliberative,
representative, and accessible, and enjoy bounded substantive expertise.
Moreover, SEC rulemaking, like that of Congress, is potentially
These
comprehensive in nature and almost always prospective.
and
to
varying
ways
in
different
themselves
characteristics manifest
degrees in the context of federal agency rulemaking, however, than they
do in the legislative context.
The
SEC rulemaking168 is designed to be deliberative. 69
the Corporate Law Race, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 143, 170 (2002) ("Congress may not
understand efficient regulation of corporate matters."); Kurt Hartmann, Comment, The
Market for Corporate Confusion: Federal Attempts to Regulate the Market for
CorporateControl Through the FederalTax Code, 6 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 159, 178 (1994)
("The ultimate provisions adopted by Congress ... reflect a deficient understanding of
the American system of corporate structuring, particularly, the separation of corporate
ownership and control.").
168. The SEC makes rules in a number of different ways. See Nagy, supra note
109, at 929-35 (describing the different rulemaking outputs of the SEC); sources cited
infra note 174 (regarding informal agency guidance and rulemaking by adjudication).
The Commission exercises its regulatory authority by adopting rules and regulations
necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of the statutes that it
administers; by the issuance of interpretations and "no action" letters to inform the
public of the Commission's position regarding the applicability of such statutes and to
guide prospective registrants and others in complying with those laws; by
investigating possible violations of the federal securities laws; and by instituting
enforcement proceedings either an administrative law judge or federal district court.
1-1 FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 § 1.02. This article focuses its
attention on the adoption of formal, legislative rulemaking under the Administrative
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Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, as amended (the "APA") 170 and
the SEC's Rules of Practice 17 together formalize the deliberative
process by which SEC rules are made. 172 The APA requires, perhaps
most significantly, notice of proposed legislative rulemaking and the
173
opportunity for the public to comment on the proposed rule.
Nonlegislative rules are exempt from this process, however. 7 4 The
Procedures Act, unless otherwise noted. See infra notes 170-173 and accompanying
text.
169.
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 61, at 4 ("Promulgating detailed fine-grained
rules requires a certain level of institutional infrastructure that an administrative agency,
like the Securities and Exchange Commission may possess, but a legislature is likely to
lack.").
170.
Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (currently codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,
701-706 and other scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (2000)); see also Strauss, supra note
80, at 750-72 (tracing the historical impact of the APA on federal rulemaking); Ryan D.
Adams, Comment, "Where There is a Will, There is a Way": The Securities and
Exchange Commission's Adoption of Rule l0b-5,47 Loy. L. REv. 1133, 1133 (2001)
(noting that the SEC adopted two new rules "[f]ollowing the guidelines of the
Administrative Procedure Act."); Robert Douglas Brownstone, Note, The National
Labor Relations Board at 50: PoliticizationCreates Crisis, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 229,
280 n.231 (1986) ("The Securities and Exchange Commission... is the prime example
of a federal administrative agency that enacts rules through the procedures of 5 U.S.C. §
553.").
171.
See 17 C.F.R. § 201.192 (2004).
172.
The formalized nature of SEC deliberations does not, however, mean that
agencies have no control over their operational destinies. Like Congress, the SEC and
other federal agencies often are able to control their own rulemaking agendas (within
the constraints of their legislative mandates). See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 127, at
105-106 (referencing the "parochial agendas" of independent agencies). Congress may
constrain that freedom, however, by directing the SEC to take certain actions and, in
some cases, by setting deadlines for the completion of those actions. See supra notes
100-106 and accompanying text (describing provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley that have
this constraining effect). Moreover, Congress, the President, and others who may
propound rulemaking proposals may distract the SEC from its agenda (or reshape that
agenda) by raising important questions that require timely responses.
173. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); Strauss, supra note 80, at 752 ("The APA
established three basic procedural requirements ... : first, the publication of general
public notice of proposed rulemaking; second, an opportunity for any concerned
individual to file written commentary about the proposal with the proposing agency;
and, finally, a concise, general explanation by the agency of its basis for adopting of a
rule.").
174. For example, the SEC issues interpretive releases, policy statements, and other
non-legislative and informal guidance that are not subject to the APA "notice and
comment" process applicable to legislative rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b); see also
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nature of permitted congressional and judicial review also is defined in
the APA.175 Under the SEC's Rules of Practice, members of the public
can petition the SEC for a rule adoption, amendment, or repeal. 76 The
Rules of Practice also specify forms of notice for rulemaking
activities. 77
'
Although there are significant procedural steps involved in
promulgating and amending federal agency rules,17 8 the process
generally is acknowledged to be relatively simple-less varied,
cumbersome, and involved than the federal legislative process. 79 The

Nagy, supra note 109; Strauss, supranote 80, at 749. The SEC also effectively engages
in rulemaking through adjudication. See Roberta Karmel, Creating Law at the
Securities and Exchange Commission: The Lawyer as Prosecutor,61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 33, 33-34 (1998) (describing the regulatory activities of the SEC and noting that
"[f]requently, the SEC makes new law through enforcement cases rather than through
rulemaking."); cf Steinberg, supra note 94, at 214-20 (describing ways in which the
SEC brought about changes in internal corporate affairs through ancillary and equitable
relief in administrative proceedings). Generally, rulemaking and adjudication are seen
as two separate regulatory methods.

See WILLIAM L.

CARY,

POLITICS AND

THE

REGULATORY AGENCIES 127 (1967); Steinberg, supra note 94, at 174. The SEC has
(albeit inftequently) used rulemaking and adjudication together to resolve certain issues,
however. See Steinberg, supra note 94, at 177-79.
175. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, 801-804; see also Strauss, supra note 80, at 752.
176. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.192(a).
177. See id.
§ 201.192(b).
178. For a brief description of the steps involved in SEC rulemaking, see How the
SEC Rulemaking Process Works, at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.

179. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 333 (Del. Ch. 1997) (indicating that the
SEC can "easily amend rules that do not work well in practice"); HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 12 (3d ed. 1996) ("In spite of the SEC's broad range of
authority and general criticism of governmental overregulation, the Commission has
been recognized as one of the more efficient federal agencies."); Harvey L. Pitt &
Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation By Enforcement: A Look Ahead At the Next
Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 164-65 (1990) ("Because Congress acts slowly at best,
and lacks the necessary expertise to craft narrow specifications of normative conduct,
administrative agencies were intended to fill a legislative gap."); Aulana L. Peters,
Independent Agencies: Government's Scourge or Salvation?, 1988 DUKE L.J. 286, 288-

89 (1988) ("[W]hen independent agencies disagree, there may be no simple means of
reconciling their differences; this increases the probability of unseemly interagency
squabbles. Even when agencies negotiate and resolve their disputes through negotiation,
legislation or judicial action may be necessary to effect the agencies' compromise
agreements."); Schwartz, supra note 39, at 587 (describing SEC rulemaking as a
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rigor associated with this process, however, may result in rulemaking
that is no more consistent than legislation, yet perhaps more consistent
80
than judicial rulemaking.
The SEC, as an independent federal agency,' 8' is only indirectly
"flexible form of legislation"). Dean Joel Seligman writes:
In Landis's view, only the administrative agencies could "provide for the efficient
functioning of the economic processes of the state." Legislation was "forced to
represent compromise," and often "does so by the use of vague phraseology." The
Judiciary had a broad general jurisdiction, depriving it of the ability "to maintain a
long-time uninterrupted interest in a relatively narrow and carefully defined area of
economic and social activity." Neither branch could regulate industry as effectively
as the administrators of an agency with a specific function.
Joel Seligman, Self-Fundingfor the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA L.
REV. 233, 235 (2004) (footnotes omitted). This simplicity, however, is not synonymous
with speed. William F. West, Structuring Administrative Discretion: The Pursuit of
Rationality and Responsiveness, 1984 AM. J. OF POL. SCi. 357 (noting general agency
delays).
180. See Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretationto Improve the Legislative
Process: Can It Be Done in the Post-ChevronEra?, 13 J. L. & POLITICS 105, 147 (1997)
("[A]gencies are more likely than courts to create uniform legal standards. When
separate subunits of an agency adopt different legal standards, such conflicts can and
likely will reach the agency head for resolution.")
181.
On a basic level, there are two principal types of regulatory agency in our
federal government: agencies constituted under the executive branch and independent
See SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 82, at 265 (describing
regulatory agencies.
"independent executive agencies" and "independent regulatory agencies"). Admittedly,
there is no one accepted general definition of the elements of an independent agency or
view as to the true nature of its independence.
Although the term "independent agency" has a special legal meaning, it remains
obscure, constituting what Ernest Gellhorn and Ronald Levin have called a "central
puzzle in administrative law." There is neither a statutory nor decisional definition of
the term 'independent agency' that can be used for general purposes .... Also, no
uniform definition of independent agency appears to exist in American scholarship.
For some commentators an agency is independent if it is situated "geographically"
outside the executive branch, regardless of whether the President can remove.the
members of the board.
Angel Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regulatory
Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461, 468-69 (1994); see also 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5)
(2000) (defining "independent regulatory agency" for purposes of the Paperwork
Reduction Act); Susan Bartlett Foote, Independent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical
View of the Importance of the Debate, 1988 DUKE L.J. 223 (1988) (referring to
independent agencies as "those 'strange amalgam[s]' that blend the functions of all
three branches but are creatures of none"); Peters, supra note 179, at 286 ("An
independent regulatory agency is a government entity that frequently exercises
executive, judicial and legislative power over a specifically defined area of government
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representative; its membership is constituted by, but is not comprised of,
popularly elected federal officials.1 82 Congress created the SEC and
As a general matter, "[m]embers of
determines its authority.' 83
regulatory agency boards or commissions are appointed by the president
with the consent of the Senate .... ,,84 The President selects, and the
Senate confirms, the five members of the SEC in this manner.'8 5 The
President also selects the Chair of the SEC. 186 Moreover, the SEC, like
other independent federal regulatory agencies, is not housed in or
controlled by the President or any Presidential cabinet department, and

interest."); Seligman, supra note 179, at 250 ("An independent regulatory agency is a
constitutional novelty. It is neither fully part of the executive nor the legislative branch.
It is a strikingly vulnerable political actor."). Independent agencies often are referred to
as the "fourth branch" of government. See Edward H. Fleischman, Toward Neutral
Principles:The SEC's Discharge of its Tri-FunctionalAdministrative Responsibilities,
42 CATH. U. L. REV. 251, 251; William H. Hardie III, Note, The Independent Agency
After Bowsher v. Synar-Alive and Kicking, 40 VAND. L. REV. 903, 914 (1997); Peter
Williams, Comment, Securities and Exchange Commission and the Separation of
Powers: SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 149, 161 (1989).
The representative nature of the SEC is so remote that it may be seen as non182.
existent. See Mark S. Kende, Comment, Principles of Competence: The Ability of
PublicInstitutions to Adopt Remedial Affirmative Action Plans,53 U. CHI. L. REV. 581,
619 (1986) ("[M]ost agencies lack one aspect that is critical to Congress's reliability:
representativeness.").
183. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2000) (authorizing the creation of the SEC). See
generally Kathryn J. Basile, New Immunity for Federal Governmental Officials, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1342, 1359, n.157 (1989) ("Congress has used its necessary and
proper power to create executive agencies and define the limits of their power."); Louis
Fisher, CongressionalAccess to Information: Using Legislative Will and Leverage, 52
DUKE L.J. 323, 400 (2002) ("[E]xecutive agencies that are created, authorized, and
funded by Congress."); Williams, supra note 181, at 157.
184. SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 82, at 266.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a). The statute authorizing the SEC also expressly directs
185.
the Commissioners to "appoint and compensate officers, attorneys, economists,
examiners, and other employees in accordance with section 4802 of title 5, United
States Code" and allows the SEC to "accept payment and reimbursement, in cash or in
kind, from non-Federal agencies, organizations, and individuals for travel, subsistence,
and other necessary expenses incurred by Commission members and employees in
attending meetings and conferences concerning the functions or activities of the
Commission." 15 U.S.C. § 78d(b)(1), (c).
186. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, 64 Stat. 1265-66 (1950); see also
Williams, supra note 181, at 157.
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the President cannot remove its leadership from office, once
appointed. 187
Because the SEC is, indirectly representative, it is not highly
accountable to the public. 188 As an independent agency, the SEC is
designed to operate independently of oversight and influence from the
legislative and executive branches that authorize and constitute it. 189
This operational autonomy enables the SEC to develop its own,
independent viewpoints on matters of public policy and regulation. 190
This independence also enables agencies to develop parochial attitudes
about their regulatory territory and resources 9' and may foster
complacency and entrenchment. 92 Finally, it bears noting that the
SEC's independence may be limited in that Congress and the executive
branch can exert influence over it without having formal operational
187. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 129, at 204; LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26,
at 515; SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 82, at 266; George F. Fraley, III, Note & Comment,
Is the Fox Watching the Henhouse?: The Administration's Control of FEC Litigation
Through the Solicitor General, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1215, 1238 (1996).
188.
See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71
B.U. L. REv. 687, 738 (1991); Therese H. Maynard, What is an "Exchange?"-Proprietary Electronic Securities Trading Systems and the Statutory Definition of an
Exchange, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 833, 839 n.27 (1992); Jason Pinney, Note, The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and Environmental Justice: Do the National
Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act Offer a Better Way?, 30 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 353, 367 (2003).
189. See CARY, supra note 174, at 135 (1967) ("[I]t seems clear that some
'independence' from the White House actually exists. It is a relative term, but is not
entirely myth."); LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 515 ("[T]he idea was to give the
agencies a degree of freedom from presidential pressure."); Appropriateness of
Regulation at the Federal or State Level, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 551, 555 (2003)
(comments of Professor Peter Strauss) ("[T]hey're at some remove from the President,
maybe a little vulnerable to the Congress."); Neal Devins, Unitariness and
Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82
CALIF. L. REV. 255, 321 (1994) ("By creating independent agencies, Congress has
sought to insulate some regulatory decision making from the control of elected
government.").
190.
See Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an
Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 273, 284 (1993); Fraley, supra
note 187, at 1238. Cf West supra note 179, at 340-41.
191.
See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 515 (describing the "agency point of
view" that "stresses protection of the agency's budget, powers, staff, and routines, often
at the expense of what elected officials may want").
192. See id.
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independent
control. 93 Despite its unrepresentative, unaccountable,
94
nature, however, the SEC is responsive to public input.1
The SEC is not, then, apolitical' 95 or nonpartisan, in spite of its
relatively balanced political party composition. 96 Its very nature is
political;' 97 as an independent federal agency, it is accountable to
Congress and the executive branch.' 98 However, it is fair to say that the

193.
See CARY, supra note 174, at 26 ("[Tjhe White House has, and indeed already
exercises, a role [in agency activities] through the appointment power, budget, and its
authority over legislation and elsewhere."); id. at 27 ("A commission is an agent of
Congress."); Devins, supra note 190, at 312 ("The paradigm of agency independence
which naturally follows from these case studies holds interesting implications for all
types of federal agencies. It suggests that agency independence is necessarily qualified.
Independence from the executive may mean dependence upon the Congress."); Paul R.
Verkuil, The Status Of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J.
779, 799 (describing the President's powers over rulemaking conducted by independent
agencies).
194. See John C. Coates IV, Privatevs. PoliticalChoice of SecuritiesRegulation. A
PoliticalCost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 531, 554 (2001).
195.
See Ferejohn, supra note 115, at 50 ("Nowadays the notion that politics can or
ought to be confined to the legislative process is recognized as too simplistic. No one
doubts that administrative, or delegated, lawmaking can have consequences that reach
as widely as congressional acts.").
196. Of the five SEC commissioners, no more than three may have the same
political party membership "and in making appointments members of different political
parties shall be appointed alternately as nearly as may be practicable." 15 U.S.C. §
78d(a) (2000). Moreover, SEC commissioners serve staggered five-year terms, during
which time they cannot involve themselves in activities that are regulated by the SEC.
Id. § 78d(a). In fact, the commissioners can have no other "business, vocation, or
employment." Id
197. See Grundfest, supra note 71, at 1018 ("Congress was unable to reach a
consensus regarding many of the key substantive issues raised by legislation that would
regulate the nation's securities markets. Congress therefore created the Commission as
an agency to which it could delegate issues too politically charged for a fractious
Congress to resolve.").
198. See sources cited supra note 193. One scholar summarizes the political
accountability of agencies in the follow manner.
agencies are more accountable to the political branches of government than are courts.
Agency heads are generally appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate (or appointed by another member of the executive branch), and many can
be terminated by the President at will. Over the last twenty years, presidents have
given the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") greater power to supervise
agencies. Likewise, Congress may influence agency decision making by using the
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politics of the SEC may be somewhat out of sync with those of Congress
and the President, since the five-year terms of SEC commissioners are
staggered and may overlap different Congresses and Presidents. 99 In
this way, the SEC enjoys a somewhat uneven engagement with the
overall federal political process. 00 Given this unevenness and the more
representative and accessible character of Congress, political infighting
at the SEC is likely to be less significant than political infighting in
Congress.20 '

power of the purse, enacting (or threatening to enact) legislation, holding oversight
hearings, exercising power to withhold consent to nominations, or stimulating public
protest.
Bell, supra note 180, at 145-47.
199.
A former SEC Chairman has noted this attribute of the SEC.
One of the difficulties confronted by an independent regulatory agency, such as the
SEC, is that it is something of a political orphan. Because it is a collegial agency,
with members serving terms that exceed the four-year tenure of the Presidency, it has
been difficult, since the agency's initial creation and the years immediately thereafter
for the Commission to be treated as anything but a mere nuisance by past
administrations. Moreover, with a majority of its membership potentially reflecting
the political party of the President, possibly a party different from that in control of
either the House of Representatives or the Senate, or both, and particularly because its
Chairman is perceived as an agent of the President, the SEC also has often found itself
without much support from Congress. On other occasions, the Commission has found
itself with unsolicited congressional support for programs of great interest to Capitol
Hill.
Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 179, at 169-70 (footnotes omitted).
200. See CARY, supra note 174 (describing numerous political engagements and
disengagements by the SEC in the period from 1961 to 1964). The existence and
operation of the SEC may even limit legislation.
Over and over again, the SEC has functioned not only to regulate, but also to keep in
check political tendencies to legislate. The system of federal regulation currently in
place has endured many apparent crises and, given its relative prominence as one of
the principal regulatory constraints on the flow of capital, has remained remarkably
durable. The durability and ability of the current system to overcome crisis is due, in
large part, to the SEC itself.
Coates, supra note 194, at 561.
See Grundfest, supra note 71, at 1018 ("Congress was unable to reach a
201.
consensus regarding many of the key substantive issues raised by legislation that would
regulate the nation's securities markets. Congress therefore created the Commission as
an agency to which it could delegate issues too politically charged for a fractious
Congress to resolve."). This does not mean, however, that SEC commissioners and
staff also are immune to acting in their own interests. Stephen J. Choi & A.C.
Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1, 46 (2003) ("SEC
regulators may seek to expand their regulatory authority and prestige[.]").
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The SEC also is accessible, although not in the same way that
Congress is accessible. 202 The key form of public access to the agencies
is provided through the APA: the opportunity for public commentary on
its rule proposals. z 3 This access is relatively inexpensive (and gets
more so as technology increases the speed and means of communicating
information). 20 4 A current federal project to simplify and enhance public
access to the federal agencies-the eRulemaking Initiative-is designed
to result in, among other things, the creation of a Web site that affords

See CARY, supra note 174, at 137-38 ("I do not believe it is fair to conclude
202.
that agencies are not responsive to the public, or as some may say, 'responsible to no
one.' ... [T]here are many forces at work on them, notably Congress and the White
House, and the industries under their jurisdiction."). Some, in fact, have argued that
federal agencies are more accessible and responsive to the public than Congress.
The optimists argue that delegation promotes democracy because it transfers
policymaking authority to governmental actors-agency officials-who are more
publicly responsive than Congress. Scholars make many arguments in support of this
claim. Agencies are more responsive than Congress, they suggest, because they are
more accessible. The costs of participating in administrative proceedings are lower
than the costs of lobbying Congress, and are more likely to pay off because agencies
are legally required to consider the relevant comments and arguments of affected
parties, while members of Congress are not. Agencies also are more responsive
because they are better able than Congress to hammer out regulatory details as
information and policy stakes emerge. Furthermore, agencies are more responsive
because they are more resistant than Congress to interest group influence. . . . In
addition, agencies are more responsive than Congress because they are more likely to
select a policy consistent with the one that voters would select if well informed.
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Getting Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the Regulatory
State Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 87
CORNELL L. REv. 452, 482 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
203.
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
204. A significant number of federal agencies both receive and disseminate
information over the Web.
Agencies, through Congressional and Executive directives have been quick to
embrace the Internet as a method to disseminate information to the public. An
attorney who fails to use the Internet when researching administrative issues runs the
risk of missing out on information that can be found no where else but on an agency's
web site. Many agencies are posting proposed rules and allowing for public comment
on these rules over their web sites. Examples of federal agency information found
exclusively on the Internet, or from online commercial vendors, are bountiful and the
trend appears to be growing.
Michael Whiteman, The Impact of the Internet and Other Electronic Sources on an
Attorney's Duty of Competence under the Rules of Professional Conduct, 11 ALB. L.J.
Sci. & TECH. 89, 98-99 (2000).
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the public a single point of access to all federal agencies. 2° ' A search
capability already is available on the site.2" 6
2. The Substantive Competence of the SEC
Federal agencies generally are deemed to have expertise in the
subject matter area over which they have regulatory control. 20 7 This is
part of their design in the administrative system.20 8 The judicial use of
deference in the review of agency rulemaking is premised, in part, on the
existence of this expertise. 0 9 Moreover, the expertise of federal
agencies, like that of Congress, is enhanced by public involvement in the
rulemaking process. 2 '0 There is some dispute as to the nature and extent

205. See eRulemaking Fact Sheet at http://www.regulations.gov/eRuleMaking.cfm.
206. See Advanced Search at http://www.regulations.gov/advanced.cfm.
207. See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 516; SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 82, at
272; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship,
Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1162, 1193 (2000); Pitt & Shapiro,
supra note 179, at 164; McGowan, supra note 86, at 485.
208. Dean Joel Seligman describes this view.
As Landis put it: "With the rise of regulation, the need for expertness became
dominant; for the art of regulating an industry requires knowledge of the details of its
operations, ability to shift requirements as the condition of the industry may dictate."
Disparaging legislation that attempted to prescribe in too great detail "the conditions
of administrative action," and administrators who took "the legislative approach" of
reading "a governing statute with the hope of finding limitations upon authority,"
Landis argued that the appropriate relationship of the democratic legislature to the
expert agency was to define the agency's area of expertise and recite the appropriate
problems for it to solve, leaving it broad discretion as to means. Exceeding even
Frankfurter's faith in administrative experts, Landis would recommend in his seminal
work, The Administrative Process, greater insulation of the agency from court review
and an increase in the sanctions agencies could enforce. He would urge that the
"singleness" of an agency's function would lead to "a professionalism of spirit" that
would justify its greater independence.
Seligman, supra note 179, at 235-36 (footnotes omitted).
209. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001); Stephen T.
Kaminski, Must Employers Pay for Viagra? An Americans with Disabilities Act
Analysis Post-Bragdonand Sutton, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 73, 125-126 (2000);
James F. Smith, Comparing FederalJudicialReview ofAdministrative Court Decisions
in the United States and Canada, 73 TEMPLE L. REV. 503, 521 (2000).
210. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 332-33 (Del. Ch. 1997) (noting that
the SEC can gain valuable expert input because of its ability to hold public hearings).
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For example, certain administrative
of this expertise, however. 21
agencies may be credited with greater expertise than others, and certain
circumstances may permit more of a presumption of unique expertise
than others.21 2 Still, it seems safe to say that a federal agency is likely to
have at greater expertise than Congress has in most matters within the
agency's authority, especially when the SEC assists Congress in
See Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking PatentLaw in the Administrative State, 42 WM. &
L. REV. 127, 132 (2000) (describing various views as to the expertise of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office relative to that of the courts); Douglas E. Rosenthal,
Sovereignty Revisited-The Dimensions of So vereignty-A U.S. Approach, 24 CAN.-U. S.
L.J. 11, 12 (1998) (noting regarding the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Federal Power Commission that "their expertise in promoting consumer welfare in, for
example, railroad and electrical utility regulation was, in retrospect, wasteful and
mediocre."); Louise G. Trubek, Lawyering for a New Democracy: Public Interest
Lawyers and New Governance: Advocatingfor Healthcare,2002 Wis. L. REV. 575, 579
(2002) (contending that "[t]rust in the expertise of federal agencies has been replaced by
skepticism and even outright disdain"); West, supra note 179, at 341 (citing to JAMES
211.

MARY

0.

FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

(1978))

(describing skepticism about agency expertise because of (a) "American antiintellectualism," (b) "perception that administrators do not have a monopoly on useful
information," and (c) "the realization that administrative choices often rest on value
judgments").
212.
See Wayne Johnson, The Negotiated Rates Act of 1993: Congress Curtails
Undercharge Litigation in Bankruptcy by Amending the Filed Rate Doctrine, 68 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 319, 380 (1994) (referencing, as a basis for the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, "the belief that certain administrative agencies have specialized knowledge
which federal courts should allow them to exercise subject to their review."); Mark J.
Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 916-917 (1984) ("those
agencies... that are likely to [have] some information and expertise about the existence
and probable damage from, say, a toxic tort, are not likely to be particularly astute in
bankruptcy and financial matters. The converse is also true: those agencies... that have
financial expertise are likely to lack scientific ability."); Lawrence M. Sung, Echoes of
Scientific Truth in the Halls of Justice. The Standardsof Review Applied by the United
States Court ofAppeals for the FederalCircuit in Patent-RelatedMatters, 48 AM. U. L.
REV. 1233, 1263 (1999) ("The presumed agency expertise rationale, which typically
militates judicial deference to agency actions, however, may be less significant with the
USPTO. The specialized subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit and the
exclusivity of its appellate relationship with the USPTO undercut the basis for judicial
deference under the APA."); Kathleen M. Vanderziel, Comment, The Hatfield Riders &
EnvironmentalPreservation: What Process is Due?, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 431,
445 (1991) ("Congress's reliance on agency expertise is particularly strong in the area
of environmental protection and regulation.").
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13
formulating and drafting legislation as part of its ancillary duties.
The SEC's rulemaking expertise generally is acknowledged to
extend only to the boundaries of its mandate under the federal securities
laws.2t 4 The breadth and depth of this expertise reflects the knowledge
and experience of the SEC commissioners and staff.21 5 Moreover,
recognition of, and deference to, the SEC's expertise is shaped by
judicial jurisdiction and structural competence considerations.21 6 Courts
and the President have noted the SEC's expertise in interpreting the
statutes that it administers.2 7 In fact, the web of statutes, rules, and

213.
See Fleischman, supra note 181, at 253 (noting that this legislative assistance is
part of the SEC's "responsibility... for the 'accomplishment' of the federal regulatory
policies embodied in the statutes committed to its administration"); see also Mark J.
Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 19
(1991) (noting that "Congress directed the SEC to draft legislation" in connection with
the particular mutual fund regulatory issue); Note, A Critique Of The Insider Trading
Sanctions Act Of 1984, 71 VA. L. REv. 455, 469 (1985) (noting that "the SEC
forwarded a draft bill to Congress that would impose a civil treble damage penalty and
increase the criminal fine for securities violations").
214. See Lisa M. Fairchild & Nan S. Ellis, Rule 15C2-12: A Flawed Regulatory
Framework Creates Pitfalls For Municipal Issuers, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 587, 624
(2000); Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IowA L. REv. 1035, 1097 (2003); Grundfest, supra note 71,
at 1018; Robert G. DeLaMater, Target Defensive Tactics as Manipulative Under
Section 14(e), 84 COLUM. L. REv. 228, 242 (1984).
215. See Nagy, supra note 109, at 934 n.48; Seligman, supra note 179, at 258.
216. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 42 (1977) (noting that the
SEC's "presumed 'expertise' in the securities-law field is of limited value when the
narrow legal issue is one peculiarly reserved for judicial resolution, namely whether a
cause of action should be implied by judicial interpretation in favor of a particular class
of litigants").
217. See Board of Trade v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270, 1273 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The
Securities and Exchange Commission can determine better than we generalist judges
whether the protection of investor and other interests within the range of the statute is
advanced, or retarded."); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 332-333 (Del. Ch. 1997)
("An administrative agency-the Securities and Exchange Commission-has a
technical staff, is able to hold public hearings, and can, thus, receive wide and expert
input, and can specify forms of disclosure, if appropriate."); Statement by the President,
U.S. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 3, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13607107 (in which former
President Clinton says, in connection with the signing of the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, "I am aware of and agree with the expert views on this
issue of the Securities and Exchange Commission..., which, along with my staff,
worked hard in shaping this legislation.").
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institutions involved in securities regulation is sufficiently detailed and
complex such that the SEC itself both directs and relies on the various
self-regulatory organizations to generate rulemaking proposals on key
issues. 2 8
However, apart from the general platitudes referenced in the
preceding paragraph, substantial questions about the nature and content
of the SEC's expertise remain.2 1 9 Each year, the SEC publishes an
Annual Report setting forth its activities in the preceding fiscal year.220
Although one may be able to glean very little about overall or specific
institutional expertise from these reports, they constitute significant
evidence of the cumulative experience of the SEC during the relevant
year in its various areas of operation.22 1 In addition, these reports allow
218. See, e.g., NYSE Rulemaking: Order Approving Proposed Rule Change
Amending the Audit Committee Requirements and Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval of Amendments No. I and No. 2 Thereto, SEC Release No. 3442233 (December 14, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/ny9939o.htm
(NYSE rulemaking proposal, filed two years before the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley,
regarding audit committee composition and related matters); see also Kahan & Rock,
supra note 61, at 34 (noting that the SEC "leaned on the stock exchanges to reform their
corporate governance standards for listed companies"); Peters, supra note 179, at 291
("These statutes are complex and require the high degree of technical expertise that is
readily acquired and maintained by an independent agency. Indeed, technical
knowledge and expertise were viewed as so critical to effective regulation of the
securities markets that Congress specifically provided for significant self-governance by
the securities industry in regulating those markets."). SRO rule proposals are available
on the SEC's Web site at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml.
219. See Edmund W. Kitch, Expertise as Power: A Case Study of the Securities and
Exchange Commission: Reviewing The SEC and Capital Market Regulation: The
Politics of Expertise by Anne M Khademian, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 589, 589 (1993)
(book review) (raising this point and suggesting that the issue be resolved by authorship
of "a non-specialist account of the history and activities of the Securities and Exchange
Commission based upon the literature and extensive first hand interviews with SEC
staff, SEC commissioners, and congressional staff").
220. The text of the SEC Annual Reports for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 are
available on the SEC's Web site at http://www.sec.gov/about/annrep.shtml.
221.
For example, the 2002 Annual Report catalogs, among other things, the total
number of SEC enforcement actions, the number of times the SEC have sought or
received requests for international enforcement cooperation, the number of complaints
and questions received from investors, the number of industry inspections (broken
down into various categories), the number of issuers for which year-end financial
statements were reviewed, and the number of SEC meetings. See SEC 2002 Annual
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the SEC to identify and characterize its own expertise. 2
Substantive competence is, however, acquired through repeated
relevant rulemaking experience over an extended period of time. The
SEC has this experience in securities regulation, including some aspects
of corporate governance. The SEC has been and is an active rulemaking
body. 3 In 2003, the SEC finalized 41 rules and proposed 19 rules
(including a significant number resulting from Sarbanes-Oxley) 4
Commentators vary in their views on the corporate governance expertise

Report
2,
13,
24,
68,
77
&
127,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep02/ar02full.pdf.
222.
For example, the 2002 Annual Report for 2002 indicates, unsurprisingly, that
the SEC's Office of the General Counsel has legal expertise that extends through the
range of SEC regulatory activities and intimates that this expertise is called upon by
Congress.
SEC
2002
Annual
Report
102,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep02/arO2full.pdf ("The Office of General Counsel
provides legal services to the Commission concerning its law enforcement, regulatory,
legislative, and adjudicatory activities. The office represents the Commission in appeals
and in defense of civil litigation, and provides technical assistance to Congress on
legislative initiatives.") Perhaps one also can say, based on the SEC's 2002 Annual
Report description of its Office of Economic Analysis, that the SEC does have some
self-proclaimed expertise in the economic analysis of securities markets and securities
regulation.
The Office of Economic Analysis is the primary adviser to the Commission on the
economics of securities markets and the economic impact of Commission actions. The
economic analysis program provides technical and analytical support necessary to
understand and evaluate the economic effects of Commission regulatory policy,
including the costs and benefits of rulemaking initiatives. The staff also reviews all
rule proposals to assess their potential impacts on small businesses, competition
within the securities industry and across markets, and efficiency, competition, and
capital formation.
SEC
2002
Annual
Report
122,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep02/ar02full.pdf. Finally, the SEC also appears to assert
in its 2002 Annual Report that it has expertise (or at least experience and effectiveness)
in capital market enforcement and regulation.
223.
See David Jonathan White, Rulemaking Under Section 14(e) of the Exchange
Act: The SEC Exceeds Its Reach in Attempting to Pull The Plug on Multiple Proration
Pools, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1313 (1983); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 30 EMORY L.J. 119, 119 (1981); sources cited supra notes
220-222 (referencing the SEC's annual reports).
224. See
Regulatory
Actions,
SEC
Final
Rules,
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final.shtml; Regulatory Actions, SEC Proposed Rules, at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml.
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of the SEC. 2 5 The SEC itself believes that it has corporate governance
expertise, based on, among other things, its lengthy track record in
disclosure regulation.2 26 Yet, disclosure regulation only begins to touch
the overall regulation of corporate governance.
Sarbanes-Oxley represents a much deeper, more substantive foray
into corporate governance regulation.
Arguably, Sarbanes-Oxley
represents a congressional acknowledgement of the SEC's greater
expertise in certain matters of corporate governance. Sarbanes-Oxley
includes many instances of express delegation to the SEC of significant
rulemaking power in broadly drafted legislative pronouncements, and
many of those provisions are drafted in the form of express mandates or
invitations that the SEC take rapid action to implement the new law.227
Certain Sarbanes-Oxley provisions give broad discretionary authority to
the SEC to engage in positive or exemptive rulemaking.2 28 Other
225. George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in
Federal Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REv. 865, 960 (1983) ("In sum, the assumptions that
unsocial corporate behavior is a major problem and that increased government
regulation of corporate governance is the solution are questionable. Even if such
regulation were desirable, the SEC lacks the congressional mandate and the expertise to
perform it."); Fisch, supra note 96, at 1197 ("The SEC has neither the expertise nor the
authorization to decide if corporations should respond to social policy concerns, or if
shareholder-initiated proposals will unduly interfere with management discretion.
Congress has reserved precisely those issues for state law."); David M. Schizer,
Executives and Hedging: The FragileLegal Foundation ofIncentive Compatibility, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 440, 500 (2000) ("[T]he SEC has the offsetting advantage of greater
corporate governance expertise."); Sohne supra note 85, at 258 (noting that the
"SEC ... has the requisite experience to deal with corporate governance issues").
226. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing
Requirements, 54 SMU L. REV. 325, 337 (2001) ("[T]he SEC has long claimed
authority and expertise with respect to corporate governance and made its views felt
through disclosure and other regulation").
227. See Michael A. Perino, Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 671, 673 (2002) ("Many provisions
of the Act are simply delegations of authority to the SEC to adopt rules."); supra notes
100-106 and accompanying text (referencing certain Sarbanes-Oxley provisions that
mandate or permit SEC regulatory action).
228. An especially expansive provision is Section 409 of Sarbanes-Oxley, which
provides that:
Each issuer reporting under section 13(a) or 15(d) shall disclose to the public on a
rapid and current basis such additional information concerning material changes in the
financial condition or operations of the issuer, in plain English, which may include
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provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley are scripted out much more thoroughly,
however, leaving less room for the SEC to engage in rulemaking.22 9 The
statute itself, however, only begins to tell the story. With more
corporate governance rulemaking experience in the aftermath of
Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC's corporate governance expertise is likely to
both broaden and deepen. 30
There is a temptation, based on the foregoing, to assume a high
level of SEC expertise in matters of federal corporate governance. Yet,
important scholars have significant doubts about the scope of the SEC's
expertise-taken alone and as compared to that of Congress and the
federal courts-in specific cases.
Accordingly, SEC competence,
including expertise, on corporate governance matters should be neither
assumed nor disregarded, but rather assessed on a case-by-case basis in
the context of specific rulemaking proposals.

trend and qualitative information and graphic presentations, as the Commission
determines, by rule, is necessary or useful for the protection of investors and in the
public interest.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(l) (Supp. 2002).
229. See, e.g., id. § 78m(k) (the codified version of Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley,
a provision relating to prohibitions on personal loans to corporate executives); id. §
7244 (the codified version of Section 306(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley regarding securities
trading by insiders during benefit plan blackout periods).
230. One might say that the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley both reflect congressional
belief in the SEC's corporate governance expertise and force on the SEC a new level of
corporate governance expertise.
Sarbanes-Oxley left many issues to be resolved in the rulemaking process and critics
fail to acknowledge this extensive rulemaking authority. In most instances, Congress
succeeded in providing sufficient guidance to the SEC and appropriately left many
technical matters to the agency's rulemaking process. The SEC rulemaking process
involves public comments by those impacted by the rules, making it clear that
Congress intended the statute to set out general principles, while leaving the
intricacies to the experts. The SEC has wide latitude to use its rulemaking power
under the Act, and is given the power to promulgate rules and regulations that "may
be necessary or appropriate in the public interest."
John Paul Lucci, Enron-The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the
International Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REv. 211, 231-232 (2003)
(footnotes omitted).
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C. The Competence of the U.S. FederalCourts in Corporate
Governance Rulemaking
1. The StructuralCompetence of the FederalCourts
"Just as the organization of Congress affects its decision-making
processes, the structure of courts affects the way cases are processed."2 3 1
Despite the clear jurisdiction of the federal courts in adjudicating
corporate governance matters arising out of federal statutes (including
especially the federal securities laws),232 the structural competence of the
federal courts in the area of corporate governance rulemaking is
uncertain at best. 233 Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, Congress
determines the existence and nature (as well as the jurisdiction) of lower
federal courts. 23 4 An examination of the structure of the U.S. federal
231.
SMITH, supra note 113, at23.
232. The comprehensive nature of this jurisdiction means that gap-filling and
interpretation of existing statutory law leads to rulemaking in the federal courts. Cf
Kahan & Rock, supra note 61, at 4 ("[C]ourts, in the process of resolving disputes,
often have the first opportunity to address problems through law-making.").
233.
See Current Issues, supra note 64, at 606 (remarks of Jesse H. Choper) (asking,
with respect to federal corporate governance rulemaking, whether it "should... be
done through the politically irresponsible vehicle of the federal judiciary rather than by
Congress?").
234. U.S. CONST. art. III, 1; LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 476; Peter D.
Santori, Comment, Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg: The Supreme Court Injects
Federalism into the Implied Private Right of Action for Breach of Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule 14a-9. A Taste of Things to Come?, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L.
1007, 1053 n.328 (1992). In the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Evarts Act of 1891
(among other laws), Congress exercised this power to set up the core three-tiered U.S.
federal court system. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (establishing the
three levels of the U.S. court system); Evarts Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (making
the federal circuit courts of appeals purely appellate courts); see also EISENSTE1N, supra
note 112, at 144; LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 476-79; SCHMIDT ET AL., supra
note 82, at 284-86; SMITH, supra note 113, at 35-36; K.K. DuVivier, Are Some Words
Better Left Unpublished?:Precedent and the Role of Unpublished Decisions, 3 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 397, 418 (2001); Robert J. Lukens, Jared Ingersoll's Rejection of
Appointment as one of the "Midnight Judges" of 1801: Foolhardy or Farsighted?, 70
TEMPLE L. REv. 189, 189-200 (1997); Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial
Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 603, 603 (1989); Roger J. Miner, Identifying, Protecting and Preserving
Individual Rights: TraditionalFederal Court Functions, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 821,
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courts reveals that federal judicial rulemaking is less deliberative, less
representative, and less accessible than that of either Congress or the
SEC.
Although rulemaking decisions in the federal courts generally are
made by a single judge or a small group of judges,23 5 the actual manner
of rulemaking in the federal courts varies at each level of the federal
court system. The decisionmaking process of the federal district court
judges, as trial court judges, is perhaps the most simple, since a single
judge determines the law.236 Federal appellate rulemaking is a step more
complex in that it typically involves the coordination of at least three
judges to render an opinion. 237 The Supreme Court has the most highly
specialized course of conduct, including nine justices and highly evolved
procedures for determining which cases to hear and for producing
opinions.23 8
The federal courts have certain unique characteristics; still, the
process of making rules in the federal courts shares certain

characteristics with overall judicial rulemaking.

For example, as a

832 (1993); S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the Federal Circuit,
and the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Searchfor a Model,
39 AM. U. L. REv. 853, 856 (1990). There are, however, notable exceptions to this
predominant three-tiered structure. In particular, for purposes of this article, the federal
bankruptcy court system (which has, of late, engaged in significant corporate
governance rulemaking) has a different overall structure that feeds into the three-tiered
federal court system of general jurisdiction.
235. See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 478 ("Appeals in the circuit courts are
normally decided by rotating panels of three judges, although under exceptional
circumstances these courts decide cases en banc, meaning that all judges assigned to the
court participate in the decision. On average, twelve judges are assigned to each
circuit .. "); WALDRON, supra note 13, at 31 ("The judges stand above us in their
solitary splendor, with their books, their learning, and their insulation from the
conditions of ordinary life. If they are not alone on the bench, they are surrounded by a
very small number of intimates of similar distinction, with who they can cultivate
relations of collegiality, scholarship, and exclusionary virtue."). This solitary and
small-group decisionmaking stands in stark contrast to the large-group rulemaking
structures in operation at Congress and the SEC. See supra Parts V.A. 1. and IV.B. 1.
236.
Special district courts having three-judge panels occasionally are appointed.
See SMITH, supra note 113, at 38. Trial courts are, however, less likely than appellate
courts to make legal rules.
237. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional
Doctrine, 30 CONN. L. REV. 961, 991-92 (1998).
238. See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 487-90.
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general matter, judges (unlike legislators) do not set their own agendas,
and they do not have the same fact-finding resources that legislatures
enjoy. 239 Trial and many intermediate court judges must hear the cases
that are properly brought before them. 240 The court's control over the
activities in a particular case, however, does give it a limited ability to
control the amount and type of litigation it hears and will hear. 24' The
resulting federal judicial decisionmaking process is said to be rational,
thoughtful, and professional.24 2
Rationality, thoughtfulness, and professionalism do not ensure

239. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 125; Judicial Engineering Panel, supra note
123, at 172; Kahan & Rock, supra note 61, at 31 ("Judges are brought to the fore
through the decentralized activities of private actors rather than on their own motion,
lack the power and staff to conduct investigations, and are supposed to exercise restraint
in commenting on disputes."). Professor Komesar observes that
[T]he courts face formal restrictions on the disposition of issues brought before them.
They cannot, without justification, ignore a matter properly before them; the
legislature and executive can. A court's agenda and the amount of attention it must
give to an issue are also affected by the willingness or reluctance of litigants to settle
the given case.
Komesar, supra note 112, at 372.
240. See SMITH, supra note 113, at 18, 226 (noting that cases brought before trial
courts "are, in effect, demands on the court system's resources by disputants seeking
judicial assistance" and that "intermediate courts generally have mandatoryjurisdiction
that requires them to decide cases presented to them"); sources cited supra note 239.
Accordingly, placing additional responsibility for corporate governance rulemaking in
the hands of the federal courts would add to an already overly burdensome caseload in
those courts. Two prominent Delaware state law judges have noted the following in
this regard:
As we understand it, the federal courts already face a stiff challenge in addressing
their already formidable caseloads. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist has regularly
noted that the federal courts are overworked and has encouraged reforms (e.g.,
measures to diminish diversity suits) to reduce, rather than increase, their caseloads.
In view of that reality, it seems unlikely that the federal courts are well-positioned to
absorb the burden of adjudicating corporate governance disputes now handled by state
courts.
Chandler & Strine, supra note 56, at 984 n.85 (citations omitted).
241.
See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 146-49 (noting ways in which the courts can
decrease demands made on its resources when they become too great).
242. See Bell, supra note 180, at 142; JudicialEngineeringPanel, supra note 123,
at 172; Regulatory Decisionmaking, supra note 133, at 816; Deanell Reece Tacha,
Judges and Legislators: Enhancing the Relationship, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1537, 1539
(1995).
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thorough, consistent, predictable deliberation, however. As a result of
the individualized, dispersed rulemaking power of the federal courts
(and despite the value precedent and stare decisis), judicial rules of
corporate governance may not be certain or predictable, even when the
Supreme Court is the rulemaking body.2 43 Moreover, because they must
be responsive to the claims and facts properly brought before them by
litigants,244 the federal courts receive significantly fewer sources of input
in their rulemaking activities than does Congress, and that input is
central to the determination of the rulemaking that the court is permitted
to undertake in that case. 245 This means that judges-including federal
judges-may make rules in discrete subject matter areas based on
limited, and perhaps even distorted, facts and contentions.24 6 Moreover,
unlike congressional and SEC rulemaking (which generally is
comprehensive and prospective, or ex ante, in nature), federal judicial
rulemaking generally is narrowly tailored and results in ex post rules in

243. See Donald C. Langevoort, Words From on High About Rule lOb-5: Chiarella's
History, Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 866-67 (1995) (explaining
this lack of certainty and predictability by reference to variations in lower court
interpretations of Supreme Court opinions, asserting that "[c]onsistent orthodoxy is an
illusion; the courts have a mind of their own").
244. See Armacost, supra note 140, at 1006 ("[U]nlike legislatures, courts cannot
hold hearings to gather information that might be relevant to the polycentric aspects or
broader context of their decisions. They are limited to the facts and information made
available by the parties before them."). For the most part, non-parties are not permitted
to participate in the judicial decisionmaking process, even if they have a substantial
interest in the outcome of the litigation. See Armacost, supra 140, at 1005-1006; Amy
Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis And Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1059 (2003);
JudicialEngineeringPanel, supra note 123, at 172; Regulatory Decisionmaking,supra
note 133, at 816.
245.
See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 125; Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the
JudicialProcess,in MURPHY ET AL., supra note 113, at 32; JudicialEngineeringPanel,
supra note 123, at 172; Regulatory Decisionmaking,supra note 133, at 816; Komesar,
supra note 112, at 372. Applicable rules of evidence further restrict what federal courts
can allow to be included in the factual record of a case. See Judicial Engineering
Panel,supra note 123, at 172; Regulatory Decisionmaking,supra note 133, at 816.
246. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 141 (noting that the limited and selective
information flow to judges "can carry a severely distorted view of public needs");
SMITH, supra note 113, at 311 ("Judges address the particular case that happens to
arrive before them ....
In addition, the issue addressed by the judge is framed by
litigants in accordance with their particular interests .... ").
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response to the claims of the particular litigants. 24 In other words, the
federal judiciary generally establishes rules that are applied
retrospectively to specific situations that already have occurred. Of
course, these judge-made rules also may and do have prospective
effects, especially as to factual circumstances identical to those that
underlie a particular case that establishes a new legal rule.24 8
Other characteristics of the process of rulemaking in the federal
courts also impact its deliberativeness. For example, the threat (such as
it is) of appellate review and reversal, as well as judicial collegiality,
may impact a court's decisionmaking process.24 9 In addition, national
uniformity may be difficult to achieve as across all of the federal
districts and circuits. In comparing the rulemaking of the federal
judiciary to that of federal agencies, one scholar writes:
In the federal courts, uniform resolution of issues is less likely. There
are thirteen courts of appeals, and only the Supreme Court can
resolve any conflicts. The Supreme Court cannot hear all the cases
necessary to resolve all the conflicts. Indeed, many view agencies'
interpretations of statutes as one of
greater ability to produce uniform
2 50
the advantages of Chevron.

Like the

SEC,

the

federal

courts

are,

at best, indirectly

247. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 135 ("In the adjudicative process, damage
actions are largely retrospective."); JudicialEngineeringPanel,supra note 123, at 173;
Regulatory Decisionmaking, supra note 133, at 816 ("[I]n exchange for the narrow
information base for a decision, the impact tends to be fairly narrow.").
248.
See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 135 ("[D]amage actions can have significant
prospective effects as their threat affects potential injurers and, thereby, increases the
safety of potential victims."); Cardozo, supra note 245, at 31 (noting that a judge
"must.. .fashion Law for the litigants before him. In fashioning it for them, he will be
fashioning it for others. Every judgment has a generative power. It begets its own
image."); Regulatory Decisionmaking,supra note 133, at 816 ("There is no prospective
impact unless the case has some precedential value.").
249. See SMITH, supranote 113, at 294.
250. Bell, supra note 180, at 147; see also Edward A. Morse, Reflections on the Rule
of Law and "ClearReflection of Income ": What ConstrainsDiscretion?, 8 CORNELL J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 445, 485 (1999) (making the point that consistent federal agency
interpretations may "contribute to greater consistency in application, as compared to
results of independent interpretations in different judicial fora").
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The President, with the advice and consent of the
representative. 2
Senate, appoints federal court judges to the bench in accordance with
Article III of the U.S. Constitution,2 5 2 typically after significant,
substantive careers in law practice or related disciplines. 3 Unlike the
SEC commissioners (who have limited terms of office), however, life
tenure is granted to Article III judges.2 54 They may be removed from
251.
See Ferejohn, supra note 115, at 53 ("Some legal scholars emphasize that
courts have a popular pedigree, and appointments to high courts sometimes conform to
representational norms.").
252. See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 479; MURPHY ET AL., supra note 113, at
138-46; SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 82, at 290; Mark C. Miller, A Comparison of the
Judicial Role in the United States and in Canada,22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 1,
17 (1998). Senatorial "advice and consent" now may be a weak form of control. See
Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, at
6,
2004)
(October
http://papers.ssrn.com/s013/papers.cfm?abstractid=601563
(describing the breadth of court interpretations of the recess appointments clause);
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, DemocratsIssue Threat to Block Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, March
27, 2004, at Al (citing Tom Daschle and Charles E. Schumer in criticizing President
George W. Bush's judicial nominations made while Congress was out of session). The
bankruptcy judges are exceptions to Presidential appointment rule. They are appointed
by the circuit courts of appeals as judicial officers of the federal district courts to serve
fourteen-year terms. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2000); SMITH, supra note 113, at 38.
Accordingly, they are not considered to be Article III judges. See Thomas E. Plank,
Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not Be Article III Judges, 72 AM.
Bankruptcy court decisions may be appealed to the
BANKR. L.J. 567, 567 (1998).
federal district court or, under specified circumstances, to an existent bankruptcy
appellate panel. See Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative
Structuresfor Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 640 (2002) (summarizing
appeal rights under the 1978 Act). Administrative law judges deciding cases at the
SEC, also are non-Article III judges whose decisions are appealable in the Article III
court system.
253.
See EISENSTEIN, supra note 112, at 150 (noting that federal district court judges
typically "are politically prominent residents, successful participants in the local
political culture"); KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 124 ("[F]ederal judges traditionally come
to the bench as a final vocation."); MURPHY ET AL., supra note 113, at 142 ("Nominees
to the lower federal courts have usually been judges, prosecuting attorneys, legislators,
administrators, or lawyers in private practice who have been politically active.");
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Discretionin the Careerand Recognition Judiciary, 7 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 205, 205 (2000) ("The United States follows the common
law model of a recognition judiciary, where judges are appointed late in their careers,
after a full career as practitioners or academics."); id. at 221.
254. U.S. CONST. art. III, 1. See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 479; SCHMIDT
ET AL., supra note 82, at 290; Komesar, supra note 112, at 371.
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office only by impeachment. 255 This allows the federal courts to be less
politically influenced,2 56 but it also may allow federal judges "to become
haughty, arrogant, and even authoritarian, '2 57 not to mention lazy. z
One logically might wonder what, other than altruism, keeps federal
judges from acting capriciously. 259 Moreover, this high level of
independence may allow the federal judiciary to exercise self-interest in
federal governance rulemaking. 260 The life terms of federal judges

255. See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 481; SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 82, at
290.
256. See Bell, supra note 180, at 142.
257.
LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 479. See also Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on
Goldilocks andJudicialIndependence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 198 (2003).
258. See Cross, supra note 257, at 198.
259. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The
Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud
Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 96 (2002) (pointing out that ideologues in the lower
federal courts are few and far between and noting that "[g]iven the diversity of political
beliefs that judges hold, it is unlikely that policy-based preferences will result in a stable
and acceptable doctrinal solution that does not have a lot more going for it."); Cross,
supra note 257, at 198 ("There is nothing intrinsic in judges that causes them to favor,
say, rule-of-law impartiality and the freedoms recognized in the Bill of Rights.
Saintliness is not a historic precondition to becoming a judge, nor does the process of
doffing judicial robes magically make one saintly."). Justice Cardozo notes, in this
regard, that
[t]he judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at
pleasure. He is not a Knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of
beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He
is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is
to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by
systems and subordinated to "the primordial necessity of order in the social life."
Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains.
Cardozo, supra note 245, at 32.
260. It could be argued, for example, that federal judges would have an interest in
corporate governance as a result of their private investments in the securities markets,
some of which may be substantial. See Donald C. Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated to
Create "Good" SecuritiesFraudDoctrine?, 51 EMORY L.J. 309, 317 (2002). However,
some caution that judges often do not perceive self-interest in making decisions that
enhance regulation of the securities markets or corporate governance standards. See
Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 259, at 96 ("[E]ven for those judges who have
reputations for pushing their policy goals, securities policymaking generally is not at the
top of their agendas."); Choi & Pritchard, supra note 201, at 46 ("Judges may seek to
maximize their own welfare, but for many judges self-interest does not translate into
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therefore detract from any aspect of representativeness that federal
judges may be deemed to have because of the involvement of elected
officials in the appointment process.
As appointed, life-term members of the judiciary, federal judges are
not directly accountable to the public for their actions.2 6' While judicial
decisions are subject to public criticism from a variety of external
sources, this is a weak form of accountability.262 The federal courts are,
of course, accountable to the law and to other courts. Federal district
court decisions are reviewable by the relevant circuit court of appeals,

greater regulatory intervention into the securities markets."). The judiciary instinctively
may prefer a judicial solution, however, rather than the exercise of judicial restraint or
deference.
261.
See EISENSTEIN, supra note 112, at 176 (noting, with respect to the U.S.
Supreme Court, that "[fWormal public interaction with outside participants is largely
confined to attorneys presenting oral arguments, and only a small proportion of their
total time is consumed by oral argument."); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?:
The Supreme Court, The Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the "Judicial
Power, " 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 1006 (2000) ("[T]he biggest barrier the Court faces here,
its lack of democratic accountability, is inherent in its nature, and indeed is in some
contexts its greatest strength."); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 345 (1989) ("Because federal judges are not elected and
have lifetime tenure, judicial policymaking lacks this degree of accountability.");
Ferejohn, supra note 115, at 54 ("They are not, of course, accountable in the same way
that elected officials are."); Frederic S. Le Clercq, "The Law Of The Land": Tennessee
Constitutional Law: The Process Of Selecting Constitutional Standards: Some
Incongruities Of Tennessee Practice, 61 TENN. L. REV. 573, 578 (1994) ("Federal
judges do not stand for election and thus, are not politically accountable to the people.
This lack of accountability can be favorably characterized as a quality of independence
insulating federal judges from the passions of the day."); Rex E. Lee & Richard G.
Wilkins, On Greatness and Constitutional Vision: Justice Byron R. White, 1994 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 291, 307-308 (1994) ("A major difference between the judiciary and the
legislature is that legislators must periodically account to the people for the way they
have carried out their public responsibilities."); Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the
Proper FederalRole in American Tort Law, 38 APmz. L. REV. 917, 951 n.159 (1996)
("[J]udges lack the accountability of legislators."); Jed I. Bergman, Note, Putting
Precedent in its Place: Stare Decisis and FederalPredictions of State Law, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 969, 979 (1996) (describing the federal judiciary as "unelected and
unaccountable to the people"); id.at 1018 n.48 (1996) ("The federal judiciary lacks
accountability because it is not elected[.]").
262. See Judicial EngineeringPanel, supra note 123, at 173 ("[Judges] might find
themselves subjected to professional criticism from members of the bar, colleagues on
the bench, or from the academy.").
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26 3
which does constrain somewhat the actions of the district court.
However, decisions of the circuit court may or may not be reviewed by
the Supreme Court, providing for less accountability at this level of
Moreover, as the highest court in the land, the
decisionmaking.
Supreme Court has little accountability. Both its decisions as to whether
to hear cases (by way of writs of appeal and certiorari 26 ) and its
decisions on the merits are unreviewable.26 5
Courts generally are considered relatively apolitical, nonpartisan
rulemaking bodies. 266 The federal courts are no exception to this general
rule.
Yet, despite their life tenure and overall lack of public
accountability, the federal judiciary is not wholly without political
involvement. The federal judicial appointment process is political.261
Because federal judges review the validity and application of
determinations of Congress and federal agencies,26 8 the federal courts
have and may exercise a significant amount of political power within the
context of any particular case or controversy. 269 Effectively, in

263.

See JudicialEngineeringPanel,supra note 123, at 173.
EISENSTEIN, supra note 112, at 177-79 (describing these two appeal

264. See
procedures).

265. See generally LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 488; MURPHY, ET AL., supra
note 113, at 88-89.
266. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 61, at 29-30 ("Judge-made law tends to have
more of a neutral, apolitical aura than statutory law.").
267. See sources cited supra note 252 (regarding the appointment of federal judges);
Ferejohn, supra note 115, at 44; Miller, supra note 252, at 17.
268. See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 470 ("The federal courts interpret the
statutes enacted by Congress and the regulations promulgated by federal agencies.");
Frank M. Johnson, Jr., The Role of the Judiciarywith Respect to the Other Branches of
Government, in MURPHY ET AL., supra note 113, at 45-46 (describing judicial review of
legislative and executive action).
269. See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 470 (noting that the federal courts may
referee conflicts between the other two branches of the federal government and quoting
Alexis de Tocqueville); SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 82, at 281 ("The instant that judges
interpret the law, they become actors in the political arena-policymakers working
within a political institution."); Ferejohn, supra note 115, at 52 ("Whenever general and
prospective rules are made, there can be disagreement as to what the content of such
rules ought to be, and the resolution of this disagreement cannot be confined to settling
the dispute between the litigating parties."); Johnson, supra note 268, at 67 ("In
granting the federal judiciary the power to decide cases arising under our Constitution
and laws, the framers of the Constitution fully recognized that the exercise of such
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determining the validity of a statutory or regulatory rule, members of the
federal judiciary assess in their deliberations, from the judges' own
perspectives, the relative competence of the courts as opposed to
Congress or the applicable federal agency, as warranted in the particular
cases before them. 270 Moreover, in applying a statutory or regulatory
rule, judges may choose to defer to an action taken by Congress or an
agency, or, under certain circumstances, make their own rules.2 7'
The rulemaking process of the federal courts is inaccessible to the
public at large. As a general matter, only litigants with claims that are
properly before the court have access to the judicial rulemaking
process. 27 2 However, nonparties may be allowed to intervene in federal
court proceedings in accordance with applicable rules of procedure.2 73
power would inevitably thrust the courts into the political arena."); Komesar, supranote
112, at 366 ("Whenever a political decision is declared invalid, the judgment of the
judicial branch has been substituted for that of other branches of government."). The
Supreme Court, through its power to pick the cases it hears, can determine which
political cases it wants to decide. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 112, at 179 ("It can avoid
deciding politically sensitive cases if it wishes, or it can postpone them to a more
auspicious time.").
270. See Komesar, supra note 112, at 366 ("When the Supreme Court decides
whether the action of another branch of government is constitutionally valid, it is
inevitably allocating institutional responsibility.").
271.
See supra notes 108-110, and accompanying text (regarding the Chevron
doctrine of judicial deference); SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 82, at 294-95 (describing
the doctrines of judicial restraint and judicial activism); Paul Stephen Dempsey, The
Interstate Commerce Commission-Disintegrationof an American Legal Institution, 34
AM. U. L. REv. 1, 10 (1984) ("Thus, courts often defer to the primary jurisdiction of
administrative agencies and their ostensible expertise in regulating an industry subject
to their jurisdiction. As a result, the federal judiciary often affirms agency decisions on
appeal.").
272. See supra notes 244-246 and accompanying text (indicating that judicial
rulemaking is a narrow response to the facts brought before the court by litigants).
273. See FED. R. Civ. PROC. 24. Permitted intervention by nonparties may cure
some of the deliberative and representative deficiencies inherent in federal court
rulemaking.
Intervention under Rule 24 is the vehicle nonparties use to protect their interests from
potential impairment by a court's adjudication of a dispute between the original
parties. By allowing nonparties to intervene, Rule 24 lets them represent their interests
and arguably improves the court's decisionmaking by allowing the presentation of
different viewpoints and evidence. Courts may also benefit from granting motions to
intervene, because by including intervenors up front, they may be spared relitigation
of the same issue.
Juliet Johnson Karastelev, Note, On The Outside Seeking In: Must Intervenors
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Moreover, a court must or may allow nonlitigants certain limited forms
of access to the rulemaking process under specific circumstances,
including, for example, by taking evidence from them as witnesses in a
proceeding, by allowing them limited rights of appeal, or by permitting
them to brief the court (as amici or "friends of the court") on matters
relevant to litigation already before the court.2 74

Demonstrate Standing To Join A Lawsuit?, 52 DUKE L.J. 455, 455-456 (2002)
(footnote omitted).
274. See generally Barrett, supra note 244, at 1059 n.191 ("Amicus briefs do allow
some interested nonparties to express their views to a court. Nonparties, however, do
not have a right to file amicus briefs."); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The
Influence Of Amicus Curiae Briefs On The Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743
(2000) (showing the importance of amicus briefs in Supreme Court litigation); Charles
W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Civil Procedure,33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 685, 748 (2002) ("in some
instances, if the decree impacts the interest of a nonparty, the nonparty may be allowed
to appeal."); Kevin H. Smith, Certiorariand the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical
Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 773 n.77 (2001) ("In addition to the pleadings filed by
the petitioner and respondent, nonparties are permitted, with certain restrictions, to file
amicus curiae briefs."); Timothy A. Duffy, The Appealability of Class Action
Settlements by Unnamed Parties, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (1993) (summarizing then
existing lead cases on the appeal rights of nonparties in class action litigation); Lora M.
Green, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit: Civil Procedure; 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 696 (1997) ("As a
discovery device, Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the subpoena
of a nonparty witness in federal court."); Eugene Kim, Note, Vindicating Civil Rights
Under 42 U.S.C. 14141: Guidance From Procedures in Complex Litigation, 29
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 767, 783 (2002) ("special masters may help the parties reach
accord and allow for the involvement of nonparties with interests in the litigation.");
Michael K. Lowman, Comment, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does The Party
Begin After The Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1243 (1992) (detailing, among
other things, the history and use of amicus curiae in the U.S. federal courts); Lane
Matthews, Comment, A Survey of the December 1991 Amendments to the FederalRules
of Civil Procedure, 59 TENN. L. REV. 367, 378 (1992) ("The language of Rule 34(c)
was changed to permit courts to compel nonparties to produce documents or submit to
an inspection relating to an action."); Cecilia Lacey O'Connell, Comment, The Role of
the Objector and the Current Circuit Court Confusion Regarding FederalRule of Civil
Procedure 23.1: Should Non-Named Shareholders be Permitted to Appeal Adverse
Judgments?, 48 Cath. U. L. Rev. 939, 984 (1999) ("Despite formal intervention, under
the de facto party doctrine, courts permit appeals by nonparties who participate in court
proceedings as if they were parties.").

302

FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LA W

[Vol. X

2. The Substantive Competence of the FederalCourts
The overall substantive competence of the federal courts, like that
of Congress, is somewhat difficult to gauge, due to the individualized
nature of the rulemaking process; any expertise that does exist is
determined (and must be assessed) more individually than
institutionally, based on the nature and extent of the judiciary's recent
rulemaking experience.275 Most commentators agree, however, that the
Article III federal courts do not possess specialized substantive
experience or capabilities.276 In fact, judicial deference to federal
agency interpretations stems in part from this deemed lack of expertise
vis--vis the federal agencies.277

275.
Specific areas of expertise may be developed by individual judges based on the
nature of their caseload. See Bell, supra note 180, at 144 ("[J]udges may develop
expertise on some issues, particularly those not focused on a discrete subject area.").
For example, courts hearing criminal matters are acknowledged to be experts in
See Richard S. Gruner, Towards an Organizational
criminal sentencing.
Jurisprudence: Transforming Corporate Criminal Law Through Federal Sentencing
Reform, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 407, 442 (1994) (noting the sentencing expertise of the
federal judiciary).
276. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 138-39; SMITH, supra note 113, at 311; Bell,
supra note 180, at 143-44; Bhagwat, supra note 166, at 1309; Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Claims Court at the Crossroads,40 CATH. U. L. REv. 517, 523 (1991); Michael H.
LeRoy & Peter Feuille, PrivateJustice in the Shadow of Public Courts: The Autonomy
of Workplace ArbitrationSystems, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 19, 62 (2001). But
see Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A ManagerialTheory of the Supreme Court's
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 681, 728 n.171 (1984)
(attributing expertise in the "securities field" to the federal court of appeals for the
Second Circuit and expertise in "Indian rights or federal land management disputes" to
the federal court of appeals for the for the Ninth Circuit).
277. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 139 ("Juries and judges can easily be
unfavorably contrasted with the technically more expert bureaucrats of administrative
agencies who, like juries and judges, serve as fact-finders and implementers of rules and
standards."); Bell, supra note 180, at 145 (noting that Chevron deference has roots in
agency expertise); Dempsey, supra note 271, at 10 ("Judges with clogged dockets are
frequently reluctant to review unfamiliar and complex issues beyond the realm of their
expertise, particularly in those areas where Congress has established independent
regulatory agencies with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate such disputes."); Ernest
Gellbom & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOzO L.
REv. 989, 1015 (1999) ("The less important the question of law, the more interstitial its
character, the more closely related to the everyday administration of the statute and to
the agency's (rather than the court's) administrative or substantive expertise, the less
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A few matters regarding federal judicial expertise generally are
undisputed, however. First, the federal courts are considered to have
greater expertise in federal law than state courts have.2 78 Moreover,
federal judges know well how to manage a case through use of the
procedural rules and remedies applicable in their courts. 279 The federal
judiciary also is comprised of highly experienced judges that have a
solid base of knowledge in general principles applicable to legal
disputes, like philosophy and equity. 280 Specialized, non-Article III
courts and administrative courts are deemed to have knowledge of and
experience in the matters within their respective subject matter
jurisdictions.2 1
likely it is that Congress (would have) 'wished' or 'expected' the courts to remain
indifferent to the agency's views.").
278. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic
Theory: A Comment on FederalJurisdiction and ConstitutionalRights, 36 UCLA L.
REv. 329, 333 (1988); Lee Applebaum, Comment, Predispute ArbitrationAgreements
Between Brokers and Investors: The Extension of Wilko to Section 10(b) Claims, 46
MD. L. REv. 339, 365 (1987).
279. See Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in
Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. L. REv. 1254, 1292-1293 (2000) (noting that "courts
reputedly possess special competence to judge procedural issues" related to
"adjudicative proceedings"); Charles Gardner Geyh, ParadiseLost, Paradigm Found:
Redefining the Judiciary'sImperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165, 1219
(1996) (noting, in describing the federal judiciary, that its "expertise includes, but is not
limited to, matters of court practice and procedure, judicial pay and perquisites, and
judicial administration"); Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things:
Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1, 57 (1988) (noting that case
management is an area of judicial expertise); Maureen E. Laflin, Remarks on CaseManagement Criminal Mediation, 40 IDAHO L. REv. 571, 604 (2004) ("For the most
part, judges have the experience and subject matter expertise to adjudicate disputes.").
280. See generally Bell, supra note 180, at 144 ("on issues that recur in a number of
subject areas or that involve the relationship of one area to a broader range of law,
judges, as generalists, may occupy a uniquely advantageous position. Examples of such
issues are those involving the philosophy of law and government and procedural
fairness."); Geyh, supra note 279, at 1219 ( "As lawyers who adjudicate, judges acquire
special knowledge on general issues of law that lawyers who advise, litigate, or legislate
may lack.").
See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
281.
Precedents?,46 STAN. L. REv. 817, 871 (1994) (stating, with respect to disputes arising
under and in connection with bankruptcy cases, that "the bankruptcy judges enjoy
greater expertise with respect to the subject matter"); Ann C. Hodges, Dispute
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Certain federal judges have been or are well versed in corporate and
securities law, including corporate governance issues.282 But many have
no such expertise.28 3 In fact, the securities regulation and corporate
governance expertise of the federal courts specifically has been
questioned on a number of occasions, 84 and there is evidence that the
Resolution Under the Americans With DisabilitiesAct: A Report to the Administrative
Conference of the United States, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1007, 1040 (1996) ("A corps of
ALJs dedicated to ADA cases has the potential to develop a level of expertise in the
subject matter that federal judges may be unable to develop because of the wide range
of cases that are within their jurisdiction."); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for
Specialization, 61 BROOKLYN L. REv. 67, 110 (1995) ("[T]he specialist judge becomes
an expert not only in judging and critical thinking, but also acquires substantive
knowledge and refined technical expertise.").
282. See James A. Fanto, Justice Blackmun and Securities Arbitration: McMahon
Revisited, 71 N. DAK. L. REv. 145, 172 n.6 (1995) ("Justice William 0. Douglas,
known for his First Amendment decisions, was one of the authors of the Securities Act
of 1933 and a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Prominent
judges who have shown great expertise in business law areas readily come to mind:
Henry Friendly, Richard Posner, Ralph Winter, and Frank Easterbrook .. "). These
expert judges, however, are few and far between.
In 1995, Professor Donald
Langevoort cogently explained the expertise of the Supreme Court in an article on Rule
lOb-5 under the 1934 Act.
For reasons that are perfectly understandable, the Supreme Court speaks with very
little expertise, and hence relatively less subject-matter authority, on intricate matters
of federal regulation such as securities law. Since the retirement of Justice Powell, no
current member of the Court can be said to be schooled as a "corporate lawyer" as that
term is understood substantively. Quite apart from the feelings they have about the
particular outcomes, scholars and learned practitioners are giving the Court's
securities law opinions low grades for logic, clarity, and usefulness in future cases.
Langevoort, supra note 243, at 868. This explanation continues to hold true today.
283.
In this connection, one scholar observes (with respect to the U.S. Supreme
Court, specifically) that:
[T]he Justices have not been by training or background familiar with the complexities
of securities markets (including international markets) and corporate finance that
increasingly characterize these areas of the law. Even if a Justice has had some
business law background, chances are that this experience is of a regional nature; he
or she generally has not spent years of practice on Wall Street or in one of the other
world financial centers, in a firm or organization devoted to a specialized corporate
and financial practice. In addition, if the Justices have been law teachers, they have
usually pursued traditional academic specialties that have little to do with corporate,
securities, or financial law.
See Fanto, supra note 282, at 146-147.
284. See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1283 (D.N.J. 1989); Bainbridge &
Gulati, supra note 259, at 138-39; but see Tamar Frankel, CorporateDirectors' Duty of
Care: The American Law Institute's Project on CorporateGovernance, 52 GEO. WASH.

2005]

CHOOSING THE RIGHT VEHICLE FOR
FEDERAL CORPORATE GO VERNANCE INITIA TIVES

305

Supreme Court is not confident in its own competence to handle
corporate governance matters. 285 The lack of expertise of the Supreme
Court in securities regulation and corporate governance may reflect, at
least in part, the small number of business law cases it has decided
relative to the number of cases it has decided in other subject matter
areas.

28 6

The provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley do not expressly invoke the
substantive competence of the federal courts in corporate governance

rulemaking. 28 7 As congressional legislation, however, Sarbanes-Oxley
does, alone and together with SEC rulemaking under it, create

jurisdiction in the federal courts for questions arising under it. 288 A
question remains, however, as to whether Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC's
rulemaking under Sarbanes-Oxley have left the right questions-or too
many questions-to the courts. 89 There is evidence that certain
L. REV. 705, 715 (1984) ("Critics argue that courts are unsuitable to oversee corporate
boards because courts lack business expertise. The argument flies in the face of judicial
reality.").
285.

See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws at Proxy

Contests, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1071, 1142 (1992) ("Why has the Supreme Court so
consistently deferred to state corporate law? Perhaps in part because of concerns about
institutional competence.").
286. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 201, at 46 (noting, among other things, that
federal judges may not have the opportunity to develop strong views concerning
corporate governance or corporate law issues, because such cases do not appear on their
dockets with as much frequency as, for example, criminal cases); Peter Carstensen &
David Hart, Khaning the Court: How the Antitrust Establishment Obtainedan Advisory
Opinion Legalizing "Maximum" Price Fixing, 34 U. TOL. L. REv. 241, 306 (2003). It

also is possible, however, that the lack of expertise of a judge in matters of corporate
governance may impact the desire of a judge to make corporate governance rules. See
Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 L. CONTEMP. PROB. 157,
189-90 (1998).
287. This treatment contrasts sharply with the treatment of the SEC under SarbanesOxley. See supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text (regarding Congress's
delegation of rulemaking to the SEC in Sarbanes-Oxley).
288. See supra Parts III.A. and III.C.
289. See Cowart, supra note 149, at 293 (describing anticipated litigation effects of
Sarbanes-Oxley); Bernhard Grossfeld, Corporate Governance: Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles v. InternationalAccounting Standards?, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM.

REG.

847, 872 (2003) ("The Sarbanes-Oxley Act brings new litigation

implications."); Kathryn Stewart Lehman, Executive Compensation Following the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 81 N.C. L. REv. 2115, 2134-2135 (2003) (asserting that
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Sarbanes-Oxley provisions leave open specific questions, especially
definitional questions, that might have been better resolved at the outset
by Congress or the SEC.2 90 There also is evidence that the SEC may
have exceeded its mandate in adopting certain Sarbanes-Oxley
regulations. 9 1 Challenges to the corporate governance authority of the
SEC under Sarbanes-Oxley will be resolved in the federal courts,
the "broad language" of Sarbanes-Oxley will have harmful, unintended effects,
including extensive litigation); Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Implied
Private Actions Under Sarbanes-Oxley, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 775 (2004) (discussing
the possible implication of private actions under Sarbanes-Oxley); Lucci, supra note
230, at 238 ("Some critics argue Sarbanes-Oxley could lead to increased litigation[.]");
Joseph F. Morrissey, Catching the Culprits:Is Sarbanes-OxleyEnough?, 2003 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 801, 848 (2003) ("As much as the securities fraud regime should

encourage timely and adequate disclosures by corporate officers, section 409 [of
Sarbanes-Oxley] may be requiring the impossible and, in this case, setting up corporate
officers for a flood of litigation as a result."); Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of
Enron and the Sudden Death of "May," 48 VILL. L. REv. 1245, 1279 (2003)

("[W]hatever the wisdom of the SEC's 'reasonably likely' standard [under Section
40 1(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley], it is unclear whether it will survive judicial review."); Philip
F.S. Berg, Note, Unfit To Serve: Permanently BarringPeoplefrom Serving as Officers
and Directors of Publicly Traded Companies After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 56 VAND.

L. REv. 1871, 1883-84 (2003) ("It remains to be seen whether the passage of SarbanesOxley will cause courts to reexamine the six-factor test for officer and director
suspension."); John C. Coffee, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley Act Coming Litigation Crisis,NAT'L
L.J. (March 10, 2003), at B8 (asserting that Sarbanes-Oxley will result in increased
securities litigation).
290. See Berg, supra note 289, at 1902 (proposing an SEC release with respect to
director and officer bars after the enactment of Section 305 of Sarbanes-Oxley, claiming
that "[t]his might.., be an excellent opportunity for the SEC (instead of the federal
courts) to set the terms of what constitutes unfitness after Sarbanes-Oxley"); Lehman,
supra note 289, at 2135 (noting the congressional failure to "define the significant terms
of section 402, such as personal loans"). Interestingly, Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley,
faulted for its lack of definitional content, was converted from a loan disclosure
provision to a loan prohibition provision during the legislative process. See Dennis R.
Honabach, Curbing Misuse of Genetic Information in Light of the Enron Debacle: A
Comment on Dean Partlett's Proposal,42 WASHBURN L.J. 535, 544 (2003); Romano,
supra note 18, at 7 n.15; Sean A. Power, Comment, Sarbanes-Oxley Ends Corporate
Lending To Insiders: Some Interpretive Issues For Executive Compensation
Surrounding The Section 402 Loan Prohibition, 71 UMKC L. REv. 911, 917 (2003).

This explains why Section 402 is included in Title IV of Sarbanes-Oxley, which is
labeled "Enhanced Financial Disclosures."
291. See Partnoy, supra note 289, at 1280 (analyzing the SEC's regulations under
Section 401 (a) of Sarbanes-Oxley).
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requiring the federal courts to delve further into matters of corporate
governance and allowing them to enhance their substantive competence
as to specific corporate governance issues brought before them.
V.

COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL IMPARTIALITY-INFLUENCE AND BIAS

An assessment of institutional impartiality is an important adjunct
to the assessment of institutional competence. An institution may be
more or less desirable to a rule proponent as a result of its ability to
avoid influence and bias. In order to make a comparative assessment of
institutional impartiality, a rule proponent must evaluate the influences
to which the institution is subject and the biases exhibited by the
institution and must make a judgment about the effects on the proposed
rule of each source of influence and bias.
Because institutions (as earlier noted) are made up of individuals, it
is important to recognize at the outset that the individuals comprising the
institution may come to that institution with their own preconceived
viewpoints based on self-interest, personal history, and relationships, as
well as individualized cognitive biases and partiality based on political
party membership or ideology. These personal preconceptions, biases,
and partiality are difficult to isolate, however (especially given that they
may be affirmatively hidden through, for example, pretextual reasoning
or process); furthermore, they represent only the beginning of the bias
story in Congress, the SEC, and the federal courts. Institutions also are
subject to external influences that impact their respective abilities to
engage in impartial evaluations and judgments. This Part summarizes
both key influences to which Congress, the SEC, and the federal courts
are or may be subject and biases that have been attributed to these
rulemaking bodies.
A. Influences, on andPotentialBiases of Congress in Corporate
Governance Rulemaking
Congressional rulemaking may be influenced by many institutions,
organizations, and individuals, including political party leaders, the
President and other elements in the executive branch, federal agencies,
the federal courts, individual and organizational constituents, the media,
and special interest groups. These influences manifest themselves in a
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number of ways.
As earlier noted, the day-to-day rulemaking of Congress often is
partisan.2 92
The type of legislation considered and enacted,
congressional leadership, and other important matters are impacted
significantly by the political party affiliation of the senators and
representatives comprising Congress at any given time. 293 However, the
influence of political party leaders on senators and representatives often
294
is weak as compared to other influences on members of Congress.
Despite the separation of powers that is at the heart of our federal
system of government in the United States,295 the President and other
actors in the executive branch have influence on Congress. 296 Of course,
the most obvious example of this power is the Presidential veto.297
292.

See supra note 147 and accompanying text.

293.
See, e.g., Sharon J. Hussong, Comment, Medical Records and Your Privacy:
Developing FederalLegislation to Protect Patient Privacy Rights, 26 AM. J. L. AND

453, 454 (2000) (describing partisan and bipartisan activities conducted by
political party leadership in connection with federal medical privacy legislation); Joel
MED.

Brinkley, Defying Odds, 2 Lawmakers Push to Bring Back the Draft, N.Y. TIMES
ONLINE, Jan. 27, 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/O1/27/politics/27cnd-

draft.html (reporting that two Democratic party leaders appealed to their colleagues in
Congress to support reinstatement of the draft for men and women aged eighteen to
twenty-six). The President may be among the party leaders exerting pressure on the
legislators in Congress. See Loretta Hagopian Garrison, Note, Who Decides? The
Struggle for Control over the FederalGovernment's Spending Power, 38 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 66, 85 (1988) ("The President through a primary leadership role for the country
and political party has enormous influence over the legislative process."); infra notes
295-301 and accompanying text.
294. See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 255 ("Pressures from party leaders to
function according to a party agenda often are outweighed by perceived pressure from
important groups and interests in a representative's state or district.").
295. The constitutional separation of the three branches of our federal government
neither commands nor implies that the branches are constitutionally designed to be
wholly independent. See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 136, at 292; John Ferejohn,
Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 353, 357 (1999); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the
Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary's
StructuralRole, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 41 (2000).
296. See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 136, at 291-95; MIKVA & LANE, supra
note 126, at 67; L. Anthony Sutin, Check, Please: ConstitutionalDimensions of Halting
the Pay of Public Officials, 26 J. LEGIS. 221 (2000); Garrison, supra note 293.
297.
See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 136, at 305-09; MIKVA & LANE, supra
note 126, at 67; Ferejohn, supra note 295, at 357; Michael Fitts & Robert Inman,
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However, informal influences also exist, 98 and they come from a variety
of sources, including political party affiliation, access to the media, other
abilities to influence public opinion, and respect for the Presidential role
in public policy. 299 Bills may originate from requests made by or
pressure from the executive branch.3"' In fact, the President may infer
Controlling Congress: PresidentialInfluence in Domestic Fiscal Policy, 80 GEO. L.J.

1737, 1755 (1992); Sutin, supra note 296, at 251 n.195; Kathryn Marie Dessayer, Note,
The First Word. The President'sPlace in "Legislative History,"89 MICH.L. REV. 399,
410 (1990).
298. See Fitts & Inman, supra note 297, at 1756 ("Presidents do appear to have
informal influence over Congress that can change the design of fiscal policy."); Peter E.
Quint, Reflections on the Separationof Powers and Judicial Review at the End of the

Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 440 (1989) ("[Tlhe President's effective
influence on the actions of Congress goes far beyond the significant power formally
conferred upon the President through the veto authority.").
299. See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 136, at 291-305 (describing and
discussing five theoretical views of the Presidency and its influence on Congress);
WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS

36 (3rd

ed. 1989) ("The president is able to influence congressional action through the
manipulation of patronage, the allocation of federal funds and projects that may be vital
to the reelection of certain members of Congress, and the handling of constituents'
cases in which senators and representatives are interested."); Fitts & Inman, supra note
297, at 1756 ("While the President's leadership of the party structure and so-called
coattail effect on the election of congressional candidates may have declined, some
believe these party factors may still give the President an ability to attract support from
congressional party leaders and membership on the margin."); id.("[T]he President's
access to the media, direction of executive branch appointments and decisions, control
over the political and public agenda, personal popularity, and intangible leadership
skills can be a source of influence over Congress."); Garrison, supra note 293 (noting
Presidential influence through a "primary leadership role"); William S. Jordan, III,
Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation:The Relevance of English Practice, 29

U.S.F.L. REV. 1, 23 (1994) ("The President presumably has greater influence over
Congress when the same party controls both branches, but the effectiveness of that
influence depends upon the degree of party discipline within Congress.").
300. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 126, at 68 (noting that "the executive, as the
nation's or state's leader, is seen by the public as the most important initiator of
legislation."); Neal Devins, Congress, Civil Liberties, and the War on Terrorism, 11
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1139, 1145-1146 (2003) ("Congress has largely facilitated

presidential dominion of the war on terror by approving most provisions of legislation
introduced by the White House and generally standing on the sidelines when the
President claimed that the Constitution or existing law supported one or another
initiative[.]"); Garrison, supra note 293, at 85 ("The President is given legislative power
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from his election that he has a public mandate to request legislation from
the Congress.30'
Federal agencies (whether independent or located wholly within the
The
executive branch) also may attempt to influence Congress.
Chairman of the SEC, for example, recently asked Congress to stand
aside and allow the Financial Accounting Standards Board to regulate
the expensing of stock options.30 2 The SEC also has influenced
congressional adoption of, or failures to enact, other legislation.0 3
The federal courts, institutions (apart from the Supreme Court) that

to propose legislation to the Congress."); Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance:
Monitoring the Board of Directors in American Corporations,46 AM. J. COMP. L. 317,
346 n.68 (1998) ("High executive compensation also became a campaign issue and
President Clinton proposed and Congress enacted changes in the tax law that tied
compensation to performance."); Dessayer, supra note 297, at 404-10 (describing and
citing to examples of congressional legislation initiated by U.S. Presidents).
301.
See Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to PresidentialInfluence on
Agency Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REv. 1, 29 (1994) ("To the extent that overarching
policy themes are salient to voters, a President who introduces such themes in his
campaign can also claim an electoral mandate to pursue them. This would allow a
President to increase pressure on Congress to enact legislative changes consistent with
the President's overall policy goals.").
302. See Deborah Solomon, SEC Asks Congress to Defer to FASB in Options
Debate, WALL STREET JOURNAL, August 30, 2004, at C3; Mark Schwanhausser, SEC to
Senate: Stay Out of Options Debate, Aug. 30, 2004, available at
http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/9540291 .htm.
303. See, e.g., Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Is the Uniform Law Process a PottedPlant?
The Case of Revised UCC Article 8, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 553, 562-563 (2002)
("The... Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commissi on ... wrote to the
President of the United States and to the leadership of Congress, enclosing a draft of
proposed legislation."); John F. Olson et al., The Searchfor Clarity, 85 Nw. U. L. REv.
715, 716-717 (1991) ("[W]ith the cooperation of the Commission, several major
attempts were made to draft an insider trading definition for Congress."); Joel
Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic
Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1139-1140 (1985) (referencing "the recent success
enjoyed by the SEC in securing enactment of the Insider's Trading Sanctions Act of
1984"); Daniel Mulligan, Comment, Know Your Customer Regulations and the
International Banking System: Towards a General Self-Regulatory Regime, 22
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2324, 2336 (1999) ("The... Securities and Exchange
Commission ...lobbied Congress to draft legislation that would provide bank record
keeping requirements to aid the fight against organized and white collar crime. In
response to this need, legislation was proposed in both the U.S. House of
Representatives and the U.S. Senate.").
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are the product of congressional action, 0 4 also exercise influence over
the federal legislative agenda.30 5 The federal courts have and exercise
the ability to affect congressional rulemaking through their judicial
review and statutory interpretation powers, as well as its ability to decide
what cases will be heard.0 6 All of these formal powers can create
significant incentives for (or disincentives to) congressional action or
inaction. Moreover, informal means of influence exist, including giving
testimony at congressional hearings,30 7 public appearances, and personal
relationships.30 8 Congress has shown respect for the federal judiciary
304. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
305. See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 136, at 347; Susan Block-Lieb, The
Politics of Privatizing Business Bankruptcy Law, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77, 91 n.64
(2000); Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law:
The Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a StructuralistApproach,
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 79 (1997); Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary:
Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L.
REV. 269, 277-278 (2000).
306. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and
Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 962 (2003); Andrew S. George,
Note, Williams v. Immigration andNaturalizationService: Another Circuit Bows to the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Ban on CriminalAppeals, 8 WIDENER J.
PuB. L. 85, 93 (1998). This influence may or may not be a necessary result of the
federal judiciary's constitutional power and authority. See A. Christopher Bryant &
Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New "On the
Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 373
(2001).
307. See Geyh, supra note 279, at 1168-69.
308. These personal relationships between federal judges and members of Congress
often have a strong political basis or component.
Apart from the halo of integrity that accompanies the position, the judge-lobbyists
credibility is further augmented by the relationships she has formed with individual
legislators - relationships often predating the judge's ascension to the bench.
Nominees for federal judgeships typically are selected by the President upon the
recommendation of a senator from the nominee's home state, meaning that most
judges will have at least one acquaintance in Congress. To have attracted the attention
of a United States Senator, the nominee often will have led a public life sufficiently
high in its political profile to have brought her into contact with other members of
Congress as well.
Judges can and do exploit these contacts. In his study of the Judicial Improvements
Act of 1990, Professor Christopher Smith argued that magistrate judges were
successful in their efforts to lobby for certain amendments to the Act because they
joined forces with Article III judges, who took advantage of the 'political connections
and personal relationships [that they] utilized in order to gain appointment.'
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and may even look to and rely upon its members as experts on certain
matters. 30 9 These various sources of influence are not apparently
inconsistent with judicial ethics or independence.3 10 In fact, judicial
interaction with the federal legislative process1 may enhance the
operation of both the federal courts and Congress."
The media also has an influence on Congress. By assembling and
publishing information from public opinion polls and printing or airing
editorials, op-editorials and other reader opinions, the media both
informs and shapes congressional decisionmaking. 1 2 Moreover, the
public media inform and instigate the public at large, who, as
constituents or members of interest groups, may then take action to
influence Congress. Finally, as earlier noted, the President may use the
media to forward his own agenda in Congress.3" 3
Individual constituents may influence Congress by lobbying
(conducted directly or through their agents); by otherwise expressing

Geyh, supra note 279, at 1220-21.
309.
See Geyh, supranote 279, at 1220.
See Arthur L. Alarcon, Perspectives on Judicial Speech: Off-the-Bench
310.
Criticismof Supreme CourtDecisions by Judges FostersDisrespectfor the Rule ofLaw
and Politicizes our System ofJustice, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 795, 801 (1995). One legal
scholar notes
Taken together, the constitutional, statutory, and ethical constraints on judge-legislator
interaction impose insignificant limits on the information judges can impart to
legislators. This is not to say that there are no meaningful limits upon such
communication. Even if one accepts that aggressive judicial lobbying and expansive
judicial rulemaking are lawful and ethical, it would not compel the conclusion that
they are prudent-interactive paradigm notwithstanding. To the contrary, the
paradigm depends for its success upon the continued ability of the judiciary to
influence Congress ....
Geyh, supra note 279, at 1206.
311. See Geyh, supranote 279, at 1169.
312. See Michael P. Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut, Statutory Construction to Cover
the Corporate Universe: The MisappropriationTheory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L.
REV. 139, 177 n.254 (1995) (noting that the "popular press... perhaps influenced
Congress in the 1980s"); James T. O'Reilly, Applying FederalOpen Government Laws
to Congress: An Explorative Analysis and Proposal,31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415, 421
(1993) ("[T]he public and press have great influence on members of Congress through
the electoral process."); James A. Gardner, Comment, Protecting The Rationality of
Electoral Outcomes: A Challenge to First Amendment Doctrine, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
892, 924 (1984) (stating that "high-pressure media blitzes" influence Congress).
313. See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 136, at 295-97; Fitts & Inman, supra
note 297, at 1756.
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views on discrete legislation (through letter-writing campaigns,
demonstrations, protest marches, and acts of civil disobedience, among
other things); and by exercising voting power at the polls. 3 14 Voting is
well recognized as a check on overall congressional power. 1
Moreover, constituents may be significant campaign contributorscontributors that may expect to receive access to their elected officials
for the purpose of sharing their concerns and views.316
Congress also is influenced by minority special interest groups and
other organizations of various kinds,31 7 including public interest

314. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 129, at 89 ("Members of Congress want to be
reelected, and they know that the inattentive public, many of whom will vote in the next
election, can be roused into action on particular issues under certain conditions.");
LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 212 ("In the United States, writing letters to public
officials, contributing money to causes and campaigns, and assembling to conduct
peaceful protests are all legitimate expressions of political preferences."); Warren R.
Leiden, The Role of Interest Groups in Policy Formulation,70 WASH. L. REV. 715, 719
(1995) ("As a body, Congress approaches decisionmaking as most individuals do.
Sometimes its decisions are based on financial interests, sometimes for reasons of
justice or its hopes, fears, or passions. In the immigration field, . . . Congress members
are most influenced by constituent interests and media attention."); Mary H. Strobel,
Delegationand Individual Rights, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1321, 1334 (1983) ("Members of
Congress are necessarily sensitive to the expressed views of their constituents.
Individuals thus have some leverage in influencing decisions which may affect their
own personal rights."). The Internet has enhanced the ability of individuals to
communicate with legislators. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet Is Changing the
Face ofAmerican Law Schools, 33 IND. L. REV. 253, 253 (1999) (noting that comments
on legislation can be submitted by electronic mail).
315. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) ("The wisdom and the
discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their
constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, . . . the sole
restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from ... abuse.").
316. See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 415 (noting that campaign funds come
from "wealthy contributors and political action committees . . . who clearly expect
something in return").
317. See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 136, at 367-89 (describing the
interactions between and among Congress and interest groups); ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra
note 129, at 82 (citing to various definitions of "interest group"); Shubha Ghosh & Jay
Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent
Office, 40 Hous. L. REV. 1219, 1256 (2004) ("Congress is directly influenced by
pressure groups."); Melissa Ann Miller, Note, Will the Circle be Unbroken? Chile's
Accession to the NAFTA and the Fast-Track Debate, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 153, 171-172
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groups-organized groups of individuals that seek political change not
for themselves but for the good their represented constituencies."' The
resulting bias, whether created through lobbying or other means, is
commonly referred to as "minoritarian bias," signifying the influence of
the few on the many. 9 Interest group influence may be exercised in a
number of ways, some of which are the same as those used by individual
constituents.3 2 °
(1996) ("[L]obbying groups have exerted political pressure on Congress demanding that
labor and environmental issues be excluded from any trade negotiations with foreign
nations. These constituent groups have already influenced the conduct of Congress.");
Strobel, supra note 314, at 1334 ("[I]nterest groups... will be aware of the proposed
legislation, and will lobby against the legislation."). A whole body of scholarly
literature has propounded an economic theory of politics based on this perceived
influence by public interest groups on the political process. See KOMESAR, supra note
2, at 53-65 (describing and critiquing the interest group theory of politics).
318.
See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 285.
319. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 129, at 87 (noting the theoretical conclusion
that "small groups have the advantage over large ones because the former can work to
receive targeted benefits at the expense of the diffuse and organized public.");
KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 56 (using the term "minoritarian bias" to "refer to the
disproportionate influence of the concentrated few"); id. at 76 ("[M]inoritarian bias
occurs when a concentrated high per capita minority prevails over the dormant low per
capita majority even thought the total social costs imposed on the losing majority are
greater than the total social benefits gained by the successful minority."). See generally
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY

OF GROUPS (1965) (providing theoretical evidence for why large interest groups are rare
as compared to smaller interest groups). The operation of these interest groups may
negatively impact the congressional rulemaking process. See Schwartz, supra note 39,
at 586-87 (mentioning "special interest electioneering" as an inefficiency).
320. See Annette C. Escobar, Comment, Aggravating the ImmigrationParadox: The
NicaraguanAdjustment and CentralAmerican Relief Act's Effect on U.S. Immigration
Policy, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 445, 459 (1999) ("Through the use of campaign
contributions, voting and electoral support, media attention and constituent interest,
interest groups seek to influence Congress."); Leiden, supra note 314, at 720
("[A]dvocacy groups are able to act politically to assist congressional supporters and
punish congressional opponents. Campaign contributions, voting and electoral support,
media attention, constituent interest, flattery and scorn are only some of the tools that
advocacy groups can bring to bear."); Lock and Load the Latest, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2004 (noting that the National Rifle Association recently began a three-hour daily radio
program to promote its agenda). A key way in which Congress may be influenced by
interest groups is through the communication of selective information to Congress by
interest group members. This influence can create both knowledge and bias.
Advocacy groups routinely provide draft materials-speeches, amendments, talking
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Among the interest groups that may influence congressional
deliberations are associations comprised of businesses with joint or
overlapping rulemaking interests, industry or trade groups, professional
associations, and other business interest organizations (e.g., the Chamber
of Commerce and the Business Roundtable)."' In fact, many observers
assert that business interests have disproportionate influence in
American politics because of their strong representation in U.S. interest
groups. 322 Interest groups representing accounting and business interests
are widely credited with defeating a proposal (made in the early 1990s)
to expense stock options. 323
Larger constituent influence groups also form to influence
Congress. At times, these groups are large enough to exert significantpoints, and press releases-and can arrange news media contacts. In building
coalitions inside and external to Congress, advocacy groups depend on their
relationships of trust and their reputation for integrity. Congress members suffer the
common problem that, once they're removed from the issues with which they are
personally familiar, they are at the mercy of others to know what is true and what is
important. It goes without saying that most policy advocates are sincere, persuasive,
and motivated. So, how is a Congress member to know who is telling the truth as they
would see it? Successful relationships of trust, built over time, provide this needed
credibility. However, these same close relationships also pose the danger of myopia
and bias.
Leiden, supra note 314, at 722. The Internet facilitates this information flow, as well as
interest group formation and intragroup communication. See Perritt, supra note 314, at
253 ("Internet connectivity eases the formation and maintenance of political action
groups and Non-Governmental Organizations.").
See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 136, at 367; LYONS & SCHEB, supra
321.
note 26, at 278-79; Kahan & Rock, supra note 61, at 9; Ribstein, supra note 22, at 47
("[R]egulated entities such as auditors or executives may have enough clout to defeat
significant increases in liability or regulation of compensation[.]").
322.
See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 129, at 85-86 (describing scholarship with
respect to the "overrepresentation of business interests" in the interest group system);
LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 301 (noting that some believe the interest group
system has a "conservative, probusiness bias").
323.
See Ribstein, supra note 22, at 47 ("[E]xpensing of stock options was defeated
in the Senate after heavy corporate pressure against it."). Similar interest group
pressure recently was brought to bear on the same issue. See Bill Carlino, Options
debate rages on: House passes Baker bill, ACCOUNTING TODAY, August 9, 2004, at 1;
Carrie Johnson, House Votes To Limit Options Rule; Only Some Would Count as
Expenses, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 21, 2004, at E01; Richard Simon, Options
Expensing Takes a Hit; The House passes a bill that would block an accountingreform
rule strongly opposed by Silicon Valley, Los ANGELES TIMES, July 21, 2004, at C3.
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even majority-voting control. The influence exerted by these large
groups may be said to create the potential for "majoritarian bias," the
imposition of the will of the many on the few. 32 4 Partisan political
activity may be secondary to other activity in these larger groups.32 5
Interestingly, the critical influence on members of Congress in
acting upon the bills that would become Sarbanes-Oxley came from both
individual and organizational constituents.3 26 In other words, it was a
majoritarian influence. Majoritarian influence is common in times of
perceived crisis, at least in the context of corporate and securities
reforms.32 7 Sensing and reflecting the public will, President George W.
Bush may have served as one influencing factor in congressional action
on Sarbanes-Oxley. In a series of announcements starting early in 2002,
President Bush outlined desired reforms in the area of corporate
governance, some of which required federal legislation. 32" These ideas
are reflected, to a great extent, in Sarbanes-Oxley. Moreover, the
media's relentless coverage of the corporate fraud uncovered at Enron
and elsewhere undoubtedly strongly contributed to development of a
populist influence. The power of that influence, and whether it created a
bias in favor of the investor constituents at the expense of corporate
interests is both difficult to objectively establish and a matter of
perspective. 32
329

Although the public eventually won out over special interests in the
negotiations over the contents and passage of Sarbanes-Oxley as a
whole, interest groups played significant roles in the early discussions
324. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., .upra note 129, at 87; KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 65.
325. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 129, at 87-88 (describing theoretical
explanations for the formation of large interest groups).
326. See Carney, supra note 148, at 1291; Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal
and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud,Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 IOWA J. CORP.

L. 267, 280-81 (2004); Ide, supranote 18, at 831; Kahan & Rock, supra note 61, at 11.
327. See Paredes, supra note 23, at 526 n. 133.
328.

See The White House, The President's Leadership in Combating Corporate

Fraud,at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/corporateresponsibility.
329. See Corporate Counsel: Taking Stock, 40 AZ ATTORNEY 12, 18 (2003)
(comments of Tim Eigo) ("A recent poll by the American Corporate Counsel
Association found 70 percent of corporate counsel said it was largely media hype that
led to Sarbanes-Oxley and other legislation, that there were a few bad apples, but that's
it."); Cunningham, supra note 167, at 958 ("Two provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
directly regulating management are direct responses to two perceived injustices widely
reported by the media.").
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and debates and in the final language for certain provisions.33 ° The
American Bar Association, for example, fought battles on the
professional responsibility issues embedded in Sarbanes-Oxley and its
predecessor bills.331 Some of these efforts, while not incorporated into
Sarbanes-Oxley itself, have impacted its implementation."2 Moreover,
some interest group efforts to alter certain provisions of the law actually
The full story regarding interest groups and
were successful.3 33
Sarbanes-Oxley is yet to be written.
There are various theoretical explanations for interest group

330.
See generally Ide, supra note 18, at 830-31 ("The dikes of containment that
had been successfully maintained by corporate and accounting interests, using sound
policy arguments of deference to SEC and state regulatory prerogatives, gave way. As a
result, Congress passed... Sarbanes-Oxley... with little opposition, a classic example
of policy giving way to politics.").
See The Evolution of Corporate Governance, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 613, 618
331.
(2003) (comments of Richard Painter); Nicole Kroetsch & Samantha Petrich, Task
Force on Corporate Responsibility: Should the American Bar Association Adopt New
Ethics Rules?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 727, 729-730 (2003); Stewart M. Young,
Whistleblowing in a Foreign Key: The Consistency of Ethics Regulation under
Sarbanes-Oxley with the WTO GA TS Provisions, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 55, 73
(2003).
332.
See Young, supra note 331, at 73 ("[T]he ABA suggestions were not without
effect. The SEC stated that its proposed rules incorporate some additional provisions
derived from legal commentators and from the ABA proposals themselves.").
333.
See David J. Beck, The Legal Profession At The Crossroads: Who Will Write
The Future Rules Governing The Conduct Of Lawyers Representing Public
Corporations?,34 ST. MARY'S L. J. 873, 900 (2003) (asserting that "the impetus for
section 307, the provision requiring the SEC to establish standards of conduct for
attorneys practicing before the SEC, began with a letter written to SEC Chairman
Harvey Pitt, dated March 7, 2002, by some forty professors and academics."); Stefania
A. Di Trolio, Corporate Governance and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Public Choice
Theory, Federalism, and the Sunny Side To Blue-Sky Laws, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1279, 1305-06 (2004) (noting that certain exemptive provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley that
benefit the mutual fund industry were, in fact, insisted upon by the Investment
Company Institute, an investment company industry group); Fisch & Rosen, supra note
19, at 1107 (making a claim similar to that of David Beck with respect to the influence
of law professors on the enactment of Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley); Gregory
Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals,And Causal Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1517, 1608 n.5 (2004) ("[L]aw professors seem to have successfully influenced the
drafting of a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307[.]").
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formation and influence.334 Public choice theory has gotten a lot of
attention in this regard."' Because of the potential for interest group
influence, an understanding of interest group theories (including public
choice theory) is particularly helpful in understanding the potential for
minoritarian or majoritarian bias in specific situations.336
See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 54-58 (describing various minoritarian
334.
interest group theories and denominating them as the interest group theory of politics);
id.at 65-97 (suggesting, describing, and illustrating a two-force model of interest group
theory that incorporates both minoritarian and majoritarian influences); Susan BlockLieb, Congress' Temptation to Defect: A Politicaland Economic Theory of Legislative
Resolutions to FinancialCommon PoolProblems, 39 ARiz. L. REV. 801, 819-38 (1997)
(describing economic and political theories of legislation); Alan L. Feld, Congress And
The Legislative Web Of Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 349, 349 (2001) (describing and
differentiating public choice and other theories of legislation); Daryl J. Levinson,
Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of ConstitutionalCosts,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 374 (2000) (suggesting the need for both majoritarian and
minoritarian models to explain legislation); Macey, supra note 144, at 223 (describing
economic and other approaches to statutory interpretation); Richard A. Posner,
Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L.
REV. 263, 265-72 (1982) (describing various theories of legislation, including public
interest theory, interest group theory, and legislative process theory and suggesting a
"four-fold typology" to combine the learning from these models).
335. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 129, at 85-90 (explaining public choice
theory). Many scholars use the terms public choice theory and interest group theory
interchangeably or understand all interest group theory to be a variant of public choice
theory. See Block-Lieb, supra note 334, at 830 ("Critics of public choice theory offer a
more complicated, and ultimately a richer, model of the political process. In the end,
however, critics qualify rather than question the conclusions of public choice theory.");
Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reappraisal,51
ALA. L. REV. 977, 1014 (2000) (indicating that the terms are synonymous). Still others
have different ways of describing public choice theory.
Public choice theory encompasses two positive components and a normative theory.
The two positive components are interest group theory, which focuses on incentives
facing actors in the political market, and social choice theory, which evaluates various
preference-aggregation mechanisms. The normative component-normative public
choice theory-applies the insights of the two positive theories while seeking to
increase overall social wealth without regard to its distribution (a goal known as
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency), and to decrease the supposed instability and arbitrariness
inherent in all preference-aggregation mechanisms.
Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/PublicChoice
Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8 (1996) (footnote
omitted).
336. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 129, at 90 ("Despite their limitations, public
choice theories of interest group activity can help explain why Congress passes some
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B. Influences on, and PotentialBiases of the SEC in Corporate
Governance Rulemaking
Like Congress, federal agencies are subject to influence from
various individuals and entities that may result in biased
decisionmaking.3 37 As a general matter, however, the SEC is somewhat
less exposed to influence from external sources than Congress.3 38
Congress, as the principal institutional source of SEC power and

authority, exerts influence over the SEC. 33 9 For example, Congress
directly affects the SEC and other agencies through the exercise of its
constitutional funding power.340 Direct congressional influence over the
SEC and other federal agencies also may result from the Senate's
consent power with respect to agency appointments, the failure by
Congress to approve legislation requested by the SEC, the approval of
legislation that represents a selective or narrow delegation of authority to
the agency, the exercise of congressional committee oversight of the
relevant agency and its proposed rulemaking, or the approval of
legislation that contradicts-or effectively overrules-agency
kinds of legislation more frequently than other kinds.").
337. See Coates supra note 194, at 561; Foote, supra note 181, at 223; Jeffrey M.
Gaba, Informal Rulemaking by Settlement Agreement, 73 GEO. L.J. 1241, 1259-60
(1985); Kahan & Rock, supra note 61, at 7 n.17.
338.
See Black, supra note 51, at 565.
339. See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 526; A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70:
Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1073, 1076 (2005).
340. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 129, at 207; LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26,
at 526; Black, supra note 51, at 565; Choi & Pritchard, supra note 201, at 45; Coates,
supra note 194, at 561; Ribstein, infra note 341, at 147. One scholar summarizes
congressional influence in this area as follows:
Congress also exerts significant indirect influence over independent agencies. For
example, despite the fact that for the last several years the SEC has collected more
money in fees than it spends, the Commission, like most agencies, depends entirely on
funds authorized and appropriated by Congress for its operations. The budget process
provides a powerful means of control. It is neither unusual nor inappropriate for
Congress to use the budget process to ensure that an agency is fulfilling its statutory
mandate.
Peters, supra note 179, at 294. Cf Francis J. Facciolo, When Deference Becomes
Abdication: Immunizing Widespread Broker-Dealer Practices From Judicial Review
Through The Possibility Of SEC Oversight, 73 MISS. L.J. 1, 91 (2003) ("In part, selffunding has been rejected by Congress because it would weaken congressional
influence over the SEC and its agenda.").
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rulemaking. 34' Informal means of influence include inter-institutional
conferences and discussions, including those between congressional
committees and the agencies.342 These forms of influence permit
Congress to exert control over the SEC by controlling its significant

See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 129, at 207 ("Congress can always pass
341.
legislation abolishing the agency, transferring its powers, or narrowing its powers.");
LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 526 ("Congress has numerous legislative tools to use
Congress may pass new legislation or attach
in controlling the bureaucracy ....
amendments to other legislation changing certain policies."); id. ("The Senate can also
influence the bureaucracy through its approval of the president's bureaucratic
nominations."); Black, supra note 51, at 565 (noting that the SEC's "role in corporate
law is limited by its statutory mandate"); id. ("Congress rarely overturns SEC rules,
partly because of inertia"); Choi & Pritchard, supra note 201, at 45 ("Congress may
legislate changes in the SEC's mission and any other aspect of the current securities
regulatory regime through legislation."); Coates, supra note 194, at 558 ("Congress, by
using its ability to call hearings and put a spotlight on the SEC's actions, has been
successful in pressuring the SEC to change its direction on several occasions and, more
importantly, has served as an important check on the inevitable empire-building
tendencies of unelected bureaucrats."); id. at 561 (noting that the Senate's appointment
confirmation power is a source of influence and that "[t]he SEC often seeks new
legislation from Congress, the majority party of which cannot be expected to oblige if
the SEC has strayed too far from the ideological goals of a majority of voters"); Foote,
supra note 181, at 232 (citing to a study of the Federal Trade Commission indicating
that "the agency was tied closely to the congressional subcommittee charged with
oversight"); Peters, supra note 179, at 288 ("The Senate, of course, influences the
Commission through the confirmation process, in which the Senate can exact promises
from nominee commissioners or even reject their nominations."); Larry E. Ribstein,
Federalism and Insider Trading. 6 S. CT. ECON. REv. 123, 147 (1998) ("Congress
controls the SEC through ... legislative grants of agency power."); David B. Spence,
Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J.
LEGAL STUD. 413, 459 n.6 (1999) (noting that Congress and the courts exercise both ex
ante and ex post control over agency activities); Sunstein, supra note 85, 497 n. 352
("There can be no doubt that independence... increases the supervisory power of
legislative committees[.]").
342. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 129, at 209 (noting that members of Congress
"consult informally with agency administrators"); Foote, supra note 181, at 233 (noting
research supporting the contention that "congressional influence over agency choices
can occur without systematic, continuous, or publicly held oversight hearings. In other
words, there are many informal mechanisms of control."); Peters, supra note 179, at
295 ("[I]n recent years, at least in the case of the SEC, the agency has been subjected to
the conflicting demands of a number of committees seeking to influence it. This can
create an atmosphere of intimidation and uncertainty that ultimately may delay or
completely forestall regulatory action.").
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nonmonetary resources-time and information.3 43
Moreover, like Congress, the SEC is a rulemaking body with ties to
individuals and institutions.34 4 Consequently, the SEC, as a federal
agency, is subject to some of the same sources of influence to which
Congress is subject, although the pressure exerted against the SEC by
these individuals and institutions is weaker than that exerted against
Congress.3 45 These non-congressional sources of influence include the
President and others in the executive branch,346 the federal courts, the
media, and individual and organizational special interests.347
The President may employ his or her presidential power and
influence over agency decisionmaking in various ways.34 8 For example,
343.
Peters, supra note 179, at 295 ("Congress... has inhibited the Commission's
momentum by inundating it with a nearly overwhelming number of requests for
information on a wide range of topics ....
In addition to testimony and other
congressional liaison activities relating to legislation affecting the Commission or the
securities laws, congressmen and their staffs made innumerable requests for
information, documents and briefings on specific items or cases.").
344. See Sunstein, supra note 85, 497 n.352 ("Moreover, independent agencies are
by no means genuinely liberated from political control.").
345.
See Coates, supra note 194, at 562 ("[I]ndependent agencies, such as the SEC,
are more able to resist general political pressures to alter policies in ways that would
harm their regulatory constituents.").
346. See Black, supra note 51, at 565; Steven Croley, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 821, 821-22
(2003); Peters, supra note 179, at 293.
347.
See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. To Order That Funds Have Outsiders As
Chairmen, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2004, at Cl (noting the ultimately unsuccessful
influence exerted by the mutual fund industry with respect to a rule regulation
mandating that mutual fund companies have independent board chairmen and
increasing the required number of independent fund board members).
348. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency
Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 443, 445 (1987); Sunstein, supra note 85, 497
n.352. One scholar notes that the executive branch uses both procedural and
substantive ways of creating influence.
As many have observed, recent presidential administrations, beginning most
significantly with the administration of President Ronald Reagan, have sought to
exercise increased influence over agency decisionmaking in both procedural and
substantive ways. Procedurally, presidents have required agencies to inform the White
House of important pending regulatory actions and, far beyond that, to seek some
form of White House approval for those actions. Substantively, recent presidents have
required agencies to demonstrate to the White House, in the course of getting approval
for their pending regulatory decisions, that major regulatory actions are justified by
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the President exercises some influence over the SEC through the power
to select its members and designate its chair, a power that can be
exercised to gain political advantage in spite of the statutory constraints
on its exercise.3 49 Both senatorial advice and consent and restrictions on
the removal of the appointed agency officials temper this power.3 50 The
President also has a role in the budgetmaking process, and may use that
process as a means of exerting influence (by withholding or requesting
appropriation of funds for agency activities). 351 The President often is
characterized as competing with Congress for power over federal
agencies.3 52
The SEC and other federal agencies may be influenced by the
federal courts, especially in matters relating to insider trading regulation
(and other areas in which the SEC enjoys authority that is shaped
principally by judge-made doctrine).35 3 This influence may be exercised
one form or another of cost-benefit analysis, and that those actions otherwise conform
to the president's own regulatory priorities. While this trend toward greater executive
control over agencies was originally closely associated with the deregulatory agenda
of the President Reagan and President George H.W. Bush administrations, President
Clinton reincarnated earlier Republican efforts to effect greater control over agencies,
and White House oversight eventually was seen as a potential friend of regulatory
government.
Croley, supra note 346, at 821-22.
349. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2000) (establishing the SEC and requiring that it be
comprised of five commissioners, not more than three of which may be members of the
same political party, with appointments alternating between members of the different
political parties "as nearly as may be practicable"); Black, supra note 51, at 565;
Coates, supra note 194, at 561; Peters, supra note 179, at 287-88.
350. See supra notes 184-186.
351.
See Coates, supra note 194, at 561 (noting that the President has influence over
the SEC through his role in the budgetmaking process).
352. One commentator describes this competition in the following way:
Truces may be declared in the continual battle between the President and Congress
over the power to influence regulatory agency decisionmaking; the battlegrounds may
shift, but the war will never end. Congress has the power to win the war through the
exercise of its spending power, but that weapon is more like an arsenal of nuclear
bombs. It is so potent, and its consequences so devastating, that it will never be used
to its full potential. Congress can, however, use its less awesome powers under the
necessary and proper clause to ensure that the President does not shirk his duty to see
that laws are faithfully executed. In particular, Congress can require the President to
fight his battles for control over agency decisionmaking in open view, where the
public can work its will through the democratic process.
McGarity, supra note 348, at 489.
353. See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 527.
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by the federal judiciary through both original rulemaking by the
judiciary in areas of agency authority and judicial review of agency
actions.35 4 Admittedly, both forms of influence are limited-the former
by the more limited structural competence of the federal courts and the
latter by the more limited jurisdiction of the federal courts. Such
judiciary's policy of Chevron deference to
limitations include the federal
3 55
agency decisionmaking
As a deliberative, limitedly representative, accessible, independent
federal agency, the SEC is less open to influence by individuals than is
Congress and more open to influence by individuals than the federal
to electoral
courts.35 6 The SEC is not, however, directly susceptible
3 57
elected.
publicly
not
are
members
its
since
influence,
Like Congress, the SEC is subject to direct and indirect influence
by interest groups.3 58 Recently, for example, interest groups have
354. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 201, at 45. Former SEC commissioner
Aulana Peters summarizes ex post federal judicial influence in the following manner:
The courts, too, play a particularly important oversight role with respect to the
Commission's actions. Final actions of the Commission are subject to judicial review
pursuant to the federal securities laws, the Administrative Procedure Act and other
statutes. This oversight authority, which applies to rules promulgated by the
Commission as well as to its adjudications in administrative proceedings, significantly
restrained a recent Commission rulemaking initiative.
Peters, supra note 179, at 293.
355.
See Nagy, supra note 109, at 969.
356. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 140 (contrasting the relative ease of influencing
trial court juries and administrative agencies and noting bribery as a possible means of
influence over agencies); Choi & Pritchard, supra note 201, at 45 (describing the
"public choice motivations of SEC regulators").
357. Professor John Coates notes that
at least during periods of "normal" politics when securities-related issues are not on
the "public agenda," the SEC will have little reason to worry about the policy
preferences of voters as a whole. Despite the pronounced rise in stock ownership
among individuals in the United States, most voters do not concern themselves with
the ordinary activities of the SEC. In fact, voters would face large collective action
problems were they to want the SEC to take a particular action. Agents of large, highgrowth or capital-intensive corporations, large investors, investment banks, venture
capital funds, Wall Street law firms, and organizations representing those groups, face
relatively lower organization costs than dispersed voters, and can be expected to exert
a much greater influence on the SEC than do other members of the polity.
See Coates, supra note 194, at 561-62 (footnote omitted).
See LYONS & SCHEB, supra note 26, at 527, 529; Ferejohn, supra note 115, at
358.
51. In commenting on interest group influence over the SEC in the insider trading
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attempted to influence rulemaking under Sarbanes-Oxley35 9 and played a
large role on both sides of the debate over whether to increase the power
of stockholders to nominate and elect their own candidates as corporate
directors.3 60 Among the interest groups that influence SEC rulemaking
are the very institutions that the SEC regulates, among them selfregulatory organizations, stock exchanges and other markets, and public
companies, and their individual members.3 61 In its most extreme form,
context, Professor Larry Ribstein makes the following salient observations:
Congress and the SEC are, in turn, influenced by interest groups. As Haddock and
Macey have pointed out, securities analysts and others who are further from the
source would oppose an insider's monopoly on use of the information. They also
would favor the misappropriation theory even though it applies to non-corporateinsiders because the Court clarified in Dirks and reiterated in O'Hagan that the theory
is not intended to catch "legitimate" use of information by those who create it through
their analysis. This helps explain the amicus brief of the Association for Investment
Management and Research arguing for a bright line test of misappropriation.
The winning interest group is not necessarily the largest voting bloc, but rather the
one that is able most cheaply to coordinate for effective action. Non-insider market
professionals therefore are likely to prevail over corporate insiders. Though corporate
insiders might seem to have considerable power through their ability to use corporate
assets to lobby, they face daunting coordination problems because they are spread
diffusely through all the states, have a full agenda of legislative preferences, and
compete with each other. By contrast, securities analysts and others who depend on
access to information have a strong common interest and are geographically
concentrated. To be sure, securities professionals cannot secure passage of grossly
inefficient laws because at some point the costs of action by transferor groups will be
less than their coordination costs. But securities professionals have some power to
mobilize votes on this issue because popular sentiment seems to favor insider trading
liability.
Ribstein, supra note 341, at 148 (footnotes omitted).
359. See Brian Kim, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 235, 251 (2003)
("Political debate and maneuvering over these issues will never cease. The SEC will
always depend on Congress for its funding to fill its expanded role under the SarbanesOxley Act."); Partnoy, supra note 289, at 1280 (arguing that financial lobbyists may
have impacted the SEC regulations under Section 401(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley and
concluding that "[p]ublic choice scholars looking for recent examples of agency capture
will feast on the SEC's final response to Section 401(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley").
360. See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. at Odds on Plan to Let Big Investors Pick
Directors, N.Y. TIMEs, July 1, 2004, at C1 ("The paralysis at the agency is a major
victory for corporate executives who have fought to kill the rule and a setback for labor
organizations and institutional investors who have pushed for years to get the
commission to adopt it.").
361. See Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L.
REv. 313, 359 (2002) ("[O]nce regulators attempt to provide more tailored regulation
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this phenomenon-influence by the regulated on the regulator-is often
referred to as "agency capture. 362 That this reciprocal influence may
for particular firms, regulators may face an increased risk of coming under the influence
of the various securities market professionals, leading to regulations less designed to
increase overall social welfare and more tailored toward the interests of such groups.");
James Barker, Jr. et al., Regulation of Power Pools and System Operators: an
InternationalComparison, 18 ENERGY L. J. 261, 326 n.85 (1997) ("[T]he staff of the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission... routinely holds non-public meetings
with stock exchanges even after the exchanges have formally filed proposed rule
changes with the commission."); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency
Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15
CARDozo L. REv. 909, 922 (1994) ("The predictable phenomenon of agency 'capture'
by special interest groups has led to subsidies to favored constituencies, particularly
securities analysts, institutional investors, market professionals (traders and market
makers), and retail brokerage firms."); Di Trolio, supra note 333, at 1305 ("[C]ritics of
the SEC and former officials claim that the Investment Company Institute..., the
mutual fund industry's trade organization, exerted enormous influence over both the
SEC and Congress, resulting in lax enforcement policies for mutual funds.").
362. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on ConfidentialInformation-A
Breach in Search ofa Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 83, 127 (1998) ("It can be argued that
the SEC's solicitude towards securities analysts is an example of agency capture and
that this concern for the role analysts play in disseminating corporate information to the
marketplace has kept the SEC from imposing more stringent obligations on public
companies to disclose material facts promptly."); Macey, supra note 361, at 923
(asserting that the SEC has been subject to agency capture); Partnoy, supra note 289, at
1280 ("Public choice scholars looking for recent examples of agency capture will feast
on the SEC's final response to Section 401(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley."). Dean Joel
Seligman argues that theories of agency capture are not applicable to the SEC.
Few have seriously suggested that the SEC has been a "captive" of the industries it
regulates. Quite simply, such a suggestion cannot be sustained by a reasonable reading
of the Commission's history. The "capture" theory and its many variants are of
relatively little use in explaining how any particular SEC decision was actually made.
Such theories typically begin with the unarticulated premise that all firms and trade
associations in an industry have identical aims. In fact, much of the power of an
agency, such as the SEC, is derived from the divisions within the industries it
regulates. Accurately perceived, the SEC did not directly "reorganize" the New York
Stock Exchange in 1937-1938. The Commission enabled a reform faction within the
Exchange to do so. The capture and kindred theories tend to underestimate the
political force of well prepared agency studies, the idealism of agency staffs, the
differences for an agency among proceeding by litigation, a rule, or legislation, and
the support that can be provided to an agency by Congress or the press.
Seligman, supra note 179, at 252; see also David L. Ratner, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply
to Professor Macey, 16 CARDozo L. REV. 1765, 1776 (1995) ("if agency 'capture' is an
indicator of obsolescence, then the SEC is the least obsolete of the financial regulatory
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exist with respect to the SEC is not surprising, given the movement in
staff between the SEC and the entities it regulates.363
Finally, the five SEC commissioners (and, therefore, the SEC's
agenda) are subject to some influence from the SEC's staff members,
who can persuade the commissioners to take action on items that
otherwise would not be on their agenda or determine to keep items off
the SEC's agenda by not bringing them to the commissioners for
action.

34

agencies.").
363.
In this regard, Professor John Coates observes that
many SEC commissioners and chairmen have been drawn from business or Wall
Street-such as its highly successful first chairman, Joseph Kennedy, a notoriously
successful businessman; William Casey, a venture capitalist; Harold Williams, a
businessman and dean of the UCLA business school; or the current chairman, Arthur
Levitt, the former president of Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc-and that SEC staff
members frequently find post-SEC employment with Wall Street firms or large
corporations. SEC literature used to recruit law students contains ringing
endorsements from former SEC staffers who now include the Vice Chairman of
Merrill Lynch, as well as partners at major law firms, and in the 2000 brochure,
modestly notes that, "former SEC staff attorneys have moved on to careers at the
highest levels of securities firms, self-regulatory organizations, corporations, other
government agencies and law firms." It should also be no surprise, then, that the SEC
has been as responsive as it has in expanding private choice of disclosure rules,
tailoring its rules to issuers, and responding to industry concerns. To be clear, this
analysis should not be read to suggest that the SEC favors industry interests over the
public interest.
Coates, supra note 194, at 563 (footnotes omitted).
364. See, e.g., John M. Fedders, The Tri-FunctionalModel and Fairnessat the SEC:
Responding to Mr. Fleischman, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 263, 265-66 (1993); Michael R.
Lanzarone, Note, Professional Discipline: Unfairness and Inefficiency in the
Administrative Process, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 818, 831 n.90 (1983); Peter Talosig III,
Regulation FD - Fairly Disruptive? An Increase in Capital Market Inefficiency, 9
FORDHAM J. CORP. FIN. L. 637, 677 (2004); David Franklin Levy, Comment, The
Impact of the remedies Act on the SEC's Ability to Obtain Injunctive Relief, 44 AM. U.
L. REV. 645, 696 (1994). Cf Stefan H. Krieger, Problemsfor Captive Ratepayers in
Nonunanimous Settlements of Public Utility Rate Cases, 12 YALE J.ON REG. 257, 316
(1995) (noting that "the commission staff has significant influence over the
commission" in the context of federal energy regulation); Ronald L. Lehr, Regulatory
Negotiations, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 13, 1990, at 20, 23 ("While it is often said that
regulators are captured by the industries they regulate, it is often more true that they are
captives of their staff.").
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C. Influences on, and PotentialBiases of the FederalJudiciary in
CorporateGovernanceRulemaking
Of the three rulemaking bodies analyzed in this article, the federal
courts historically have been the least likely to be subject to outside
influences and bias. In fact, the courts may be a place where bias in
earlier legislative and regulatory decisionmaking is identified and offset
in some way. 365 It is said that the federal judiciary is characterized by
its independence, and it is the least interdependent of the three
branches.36 6 The federal courts are not, however, immune to influence,
including influence that may create bias.367
The executive branch exercises a limited amount of influence on
the federal courts, generally through the President's appointment power
and budgetary recommendations. For many, the President's appointment
and veto powers are the spoilers of the notion of judicial independence
because these powers infuse the judicial process with politics and
favoritism.3 68 The executive branch also may exercise influence over the
365. KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 150 ("Severe biases in other institutions, in
particular the political process, are sometimes avoided or reduced in the adjudicative
process.").
366. See, e.g., EISENSTEIN, supra note 112, at 185 (indicating that the Supreme
Court is above political influence).
See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 113, at 252 ("[Glroups of all types, including
367.
those representing more 'advantaged' elements of society, have used courts for their
goals."); Charles G. Geyh, JudicialIndependence, JudicialAccountability, and the Role
of ConstitutionalNorms in CongressionalRegulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153,
159 (2003). ("Federal judges are... rendered autonomous in the limited sense that they
have an enforceable monopoly over "the judicial power," and are insulated from two
discrete forms of influence or control, namely, threats to their tenure and salary. That
much said, it is worth emphasizing how limited these guarantees are."). Of course, a
judge should recuse himself or herself "in any proceeding in which [her] impartiality
might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. §455(a) (2000).
368. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 113, at 140-43; Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L.
Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation Of Powers Or Separation Of Personnel?,
79 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1143 (1994); Thomas I. Vanaskie, The Independence and
Responsibility of the Federal Judiciary,46 VILL. L. REv. 745, 770, 773-74 (2001). A
state court judge describes the issue in the following terms:
[Miany believe the appointive system for selecting judges has also become a
significant threat to decisional judicial independence. In the federal system some
judges are appointed by the President "with the Advice and Consent of the Senate"
and "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour," that is, for life. Nevertheless,
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federal judiciary through its indictment power, although the use of that
power is not considered likely.369
However, the capacity for informal, personal influence by members
of the executive branch or Congress is a constant, looming specter that
has become more visible in the recent and current political climate. A
recent issue in this regard has been the political tempest over Vice
President Richard Cheney's highly publicized personal relationship with
Associate Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.3 v° This publicity,
together with a related motion to recuse Justice Scalia in a case
involving Vice President Cheney (in his official capacity) that was the
subject of a petition for certiorari, resulted in the publication of a lengthy
memorandum opinion written by Justice Scalia.37 '
Given the jurisdictional control that Congress exercises over the

many other federal judges, namely bankruptcy and magistrate judges, are appointed
by federal judges themselves for limited terms.
The threat here is that the appointive system has increasingly turned into a search for
people with particular views about the law. Litmus tests abound.
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes: Perspectives on Judicial
Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 9-10 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
369. See Eric M. Freedman, On ProtectingAccountability, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 677,
691 (1999) ("Judicial independence is important, and could easily be threatened if the
executive branch used its indictment power in a partisan way."). One scholar writes:
There is little basis upon which to conclude that pre-impeachment prosecution has or
could significantly impact the independence of the federal judiciary. First, the
executive branch clearly could not begin to prosecute or incarcerate even a small
number of the judges with whom it had philosophical or political differences. The
federal judiciary now contains over 700 judges, and yet concerns have been raised
because five have been prosecuted over the past ten years. Moreover, the collateral
impact of these prosecutions on the independence of other federal judges seems
minimal or even nonexistent. The critics of pre-impeachment prosecution cite no
empirical evidence to support their claims of threatened independence. Indeed, no
federal judges have publicly argued that the recent prosecutions have had an impact
on them or any of their colleagues. There is simply no evidence that any judge has
pulled any punches or acted with diminished freedom and independence because of
the recent prosecutions.
Todd D. Peterson, The Role of the Executive Branch in the Discipline and Removal of
FederalJudges, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 809, 848 (1993).
370. See Michael Janofsky, Scalia Refusing to Take Himself Off Cheney Case, N.Y.
TIMES, March 19, 2004, at Al; Michael Janofsky, Scalia's Trip With Cheney Raises
Questions of Impartiality,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2004, at A14; Justice Scalia and Mr.
Cheney, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at A14; Justice Scalia's Misjudgment, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 25, 2004, § 4, at 14.
371.
See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the D.C. Cir., 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
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federal courts and its role in the federal judicial appointment process,
one might expect Congress to have continuing influence over
adjudications in the federal courts, even if that influence is
counterbalanced somewhat by the federal judiciary's power to review
congressional action.372 Potential congressional means of exerting
influence over the federal courts include: the adoption of limited
legislative mandates that confine federal court jurisdiction to certain
matters;3" 3 the Senate's influence and consent and approval rights over
judicial appointments, especially those that may lead to expansive (or
otherwise objectionable) judicial rulemaking;37 4 Congress's power
judiciary; 37 5 and, of
(albeit a narrowly tailored one) to unseat the3 federal
76
course, the congressional power of the purse.
372. See Geyh, supra note 279, at 1168 ("Congress has asserted too much power
over the judiciary in some instances, whereas the judiciary has asserted too much
influence over Congress in others."); Ribstein, supra note 341, at 147 (noting that
Congress "can ... trump judicial interpretation by revising the statute"); id. at 147
("The threat of congressional reaction may influence the Court if this would shrink the
Court's ability to continue to shape the securities laws in general and insider trading law
in particular.").
373. See Vanaskie, supra note 368, at 770-71 (discussing and describing instances
of congressional actions to limit federal court jurisdiction and discretion to hear cases);
supra Part III.C. (regarding the jurisdiction of the federal courts).
374. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 113, at 140 (noting that "Senators typically try
to build up power bases within their home states by rewarding supporter... with
federal judgeships."). Powerful senators, members of Congress, or other prominent
political figures from a particular district greatly influence the selection of judges for a
particular locality. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 112, at 149. But see MURPHY ET AL.,
supra note 113, at 142 ("Reagan's White House rejected candidates supported by
Republican Senators ... if those would-be nominees failed the President's ideological
tests.").
375. Vanaskie, supranote 368, at 769 ("For nearly 200 years, the principle has been
established that a particular decision is not the basis for removal of a judge. Calls for
removal or impeachment based upon a single ruling needlessly create inter-branch
fiction and, more importantly, serve to undermine public confidence in the judiciary.").
376. See Vanaskie, supra note 368, at 773-74 (describing executive and legislative
branch controls over judicial salaries); see also Todd D. Peterson, Controlling the
Federal Courts Through the Appropriations Process, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 993, 1024
(1998) (noting many of the powers referenced in this sentence). With respect to the
Supreme Court, one scholar notes:
There is a multitude of ways that a motivated Congress could conceivably get the
Supreme Court's attention. I have already alluded to some: it could impeach and
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By delegating to the political branches the authority to appoint and
remove judges, establish lower federal courts or not, and modify the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, the Constitution not only
authorizes encroachments on the absolute independence of federal
judges, but circumscribes the independence afforded by Article III
tenure, salary, and power protections. Judges may enjoy tenure
during "good behaviour," but Congress alone decides when good
behavior degenerates into impeachable high crimes and
misdemeanors. Judges' salaries may be beyond congressional
control, but not the funds for courtrooms, chambers, clerks,
secretaries, court security, office equipment, and supplies. Finally,
the judiciary may possess exclusive authority to wield judicial
power, but the resulting autonomy is diminished by Congress's
the
powers to establish, and by negative implication, disestablish
377
lower courts, and to curb the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.

The SEC also has a limited influence over the courts. This
influence generally is exercised through the litigation process. The SEC
has the authority to bring actions in federal court. 378 It may (and does)
use that authority to push the boundaries of ill-defined areas of the law
in directions that suit its own parochial regulatory interests.379 Incases
where the SEC is not a litigant, it may file an amicus brief as a means of
influencing the court.380 Also, the existence and strength of the Chevron

remove justices who issue offending opinions, or it could defy unacceptable decisions,
exclude troublesome categories of cases from the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction, pursue constitutional amendments limiting judicial review, or manipulate
judicial appointments so as to avoid the confirmation of judges who would perpetuate
a narrow view of congressional power. In addition, it could hold the judiciary's
budget hostage, or (with the aid of a cooperative President) enlarge the size of the
Supreme Court to ensure a sympathetic majority.
Geyh, supra note 367, at 156.
Geyh, supra note 367, at 159-60.
377.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa (2000).
378.
379. See Pritchard, supra note 56, at 933 ("The SEC and the Justice Department
were attempting to extend section 10(b) beyond Powell's understanding of Congress's
intention in 1934, and the Second Circuit was acquiescing in those efforts."); Ribstein,
supra note 341, at 147 ("The SEC also can shape judicial interpretation by choosing
cases to litigate and by arguing these cases in court. It has used this power to press for
the widest possible judicial expansion of the implied remedy under Section 10(b).")
380. See Allison Lucas, Note, Friends of the Court? The Ethics of Amicus Brief
Writing in First Amendment Litigation, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1605, 1609 (1999)
(noting that "from 1981 to 1989, the Securities and Exchange Commission ...filed
briefs on the merits as amicus in nine Supreme Court cases-the SEC's views were
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doctrine allow the SEC to influence the court through its rulemaking.38 '
As a general matter, the federal courts are well shielded from public
influence, whether from interest groups, other organizations or entities,
or individuals.3 82 Procedural rules in the courts reinforce these values.38 3
It has been observed, however, that federal judges may feel obligated to
the public in the geographical area in which they serve, and that this
allegiance may constitute a form of influence on judicial
decisionmaking.38 4 Moreover, federal judges, like all judges, may accept
bribes.38" Friends, relatives, and colleagues on the court also may
influence judges. 386 At the appellate level, the make-up of the panel
hearing a particular case may be outcome determinative. For example,
where a single appellate judge decides which judges will hear a
adopted by the Court in eight of these cases"); David S. Ruder, The Development of
Legal Doctrine Through Amicus Participation: The SEC Experience, 1989 WiSC. L.
REV. 1167 (1989) (describing the SEC's influence over decisional law through its role
as amicus curiae).
381.
See supra notes 108-110.
382.
See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 125 ("[I]nformal, ex parte discussion is, at least
formally, precluded and is, in reality, much more difficult to accomplish than in the less
");Ferejohn, supra note 115, at 50 ("Citizens have no
formal political process ....
legitimate claim to influence courts as they do the legislature, or at least not in the same
ways that they seek to influence the legislature."). But see MURPHY ET AL., supra note
113, at 252-58 (describing the actual and potential influence of interest groups on
judicial access and decisionmaking); Gardner, supra note 312, at 924 (noting the
media's effect on the Supreme Court). Even juries are reasonably well protected from
influence. KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 140 ("The transient jury is not a good target for
one-sided efforts at influence .... In addition, the random jury selection process makes
any attempt to staff the jury with cronies extremely difficult if not impossible.
Although inducement-most likely in the form of bribes-is not unknown, it is
difficult ...").
383.
See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 125 ("The requirements of written complaints,
service, and notice along with pretrial discovery and the rules of evidence are designed
to give all parties to a lawsuit equal access both to information and to official decisionmakers.").
384. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 112, at 149-50 (noting that individuals considered
for appointment to the federal bench are "influenced to a significant extent by the social
and economic conditions, value, and structures of political power within their local
districts" and citing to examples).
385.
See Cross, supra note 257, at 198 ("Judges may allow corruption and bribery to
influence their decisions.").
386. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 112, at 186-189.

332

FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LA W

[Vol. X

particular case, he or she may be able to sway the reasoning, holding, or
result.

387

VI. COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRANSITION COSTS

The relative costs of congressional legislation, SEC rulemaking,
and federal court adjudication also are and important factors in choosing
the optimal rulemaking body for federal corporate governance
initiatives. 38 These costs are not those associated with the substance of
a new corporate governance rule 389 or the rulemaking process, 390 but

rather those associated with the "friction" caused by establishment of a
new rule. 39 ' The analysis of legal transition costs included in this Part is
a comparative institutional application of a framework proposed by
Professor Michael Van Alstine.3 92
This cost assessment model
387.
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 810-14 (6"' Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting) (Procedural Appendix regarding the Chief Judge's impact on the
composition of the en banc panel); EISENSTEIN, supra note 112, at 193.
388.
See Neil K. Komesar, Exploring the Darkness: Law, Economics, and
Institutional Choice, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 465, 470 (1997) (noting certain criticisms and
limitations associated with using economic analysis in resolving legal issues and
arguing that "economic analysis can be useful to institutional analysis, not least of all
because it is explicit in its simplifications").
389.
This more traditional cost assessment ideally would have been done in
connection with other considerations relating to the substance of the new proposed rule.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text (regarding the assumption, for purposes of
the model proposed in this article, that a cost-benefit assessment of this kind has been
done).
390. See supra Parts IV.A.I., IV.B.I., and IV.C.1. (identifying the processes that
result in many of these costs in describing the structural competence of Congress, the
SEC, and the federal courts).
391.
See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Role of National Courts: Treaty Law and
Legal Transition Costs, 77 CHi.-KENT. L. REV. 1303, 1303 (2002) ("Significantly, these
costs of accommodating new legal norms will arise-although in differing degrees in
different contexts-irrespective of the substantive policy goals the new norms pursue
and of the particular regulatory vehicle by which they come into being-whether by
statute, administrative regulation, treaty, or otherwise.").
392.
Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789
(2002). This author has enhanced Professor Van Alstine's model to a limited extent,
including by adding a comparative dimension to Professor Van Alstine's work-a
dimension suggested by, but not explicitly implemented in, his article See id at 797803; see also Van Alstine, supra note 391. The comparative institutional element
introduced in this article is intended to enhance the value of Professor Van Alstine's
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necessarily reflects upon and uses the information included in Parts III,
IV, and V of this article, but under the proposed framework, it does not
represent a substitute for the assessments outlined in those Parts or in
Part VII.3 93 In pertinent part, however, the comparative transition costs
model highlights the potential importance of deliberativeness,
substantive competence, and bias in the overall institutional choice
analysis proposed and illustrated in this article.
As a general matter, identifying and measuring legal transition costs
involves looking at the costs associated with a change in legal regime.
Whatever one's normative perspective, a legal system will incur
costs simply in adjusting to the existence of a new legal norm. These
will arise, for instance, from the need to learn about the content of
new law, as well as from an increased risk of uncertainty about its
meaning and effect. Changes in legal directives likewise will compel
intraparty adjustments and have subtle effects on interparty
relationships forged around the old legal order. Indeed, transition
costs reflect a systemic phenomenon. Although in differing degrees,
they will arise from legal change in all fields, with all lawmaking
and for all
structures (whether statutory, administrative, or judicial),
394
types of reform (regulatory, deregulatory, and so on).

This Part compares these legal transition costs on an institutional
basis as among Congress, the SEC, and the federal courts.

framework for its intended overall purpose-namely, the ex ante assessment of legal
transition costs for the purpose of making more informed judgments about rulemaking.
See id. at 795 ("[T]he presence and extent of legal transition costs should be viewed as
material inputs in any reasoned decisionmaking process on the merit, form, and
structure of proposed changes in the law.").
393.
As a result of this overlap, the overall analytical model set forth in this article
may be deemed to lack the simple elegance of a purely economic model and may be
criticized for the overlapping nature of its components. See infra Part VII.
394. Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 793. Cf Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of
Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain
the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 855 (2003) ("There are transaction
costs inherent in many legal changes, as established relationships and practices get
upset, and decisions made long ago may have forced the law on to a path that it is too
costly to divert from."). Rulemaking in highly regulated areas (including, for example,
federal and state securities regulation) may, however, create comparatively significant
legal transition costs. See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 857.

334

FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. X

A. Learning the New Legal Regime-Learning Costs
When a new rule is adopted, a variety of people then must learn its
provisions and effects, including legal professionals (e.g., judges,
lawyers-both public servants and private practitioners-and law
teachers), firms and individuals that are or may be subject to the rule,
and interested members of the public (including those connected in some
way to regulated firms). 395 There are economic and noneconomic costs
associated with learning about the content of a new rule.3 96 Economic
costs may include expenses associated with the acquisition of the text of
the new rule and any associated legislative history (or other interpretive
or advisory record of the proceedings leading to the adoption of the
rule). Economic costs also may include continuing legal education
attendance fees3 97 and the expenses associated with the production of
summary descriptions of the new rule, potentially written for a variety of
395. See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 820-22. For example, because of its length
and complexity, Sarbanes-Oxley has resulted in a steep learning curve for many. See
Douglas Michael McManamon, Comment, Should Attorneys Be Footsoldiers in the
War on Corporate Fraud?,38 U.S.F.L. Rev. 163, 182 (2003) ("[L]awyers struggle to
understand the full impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and how it will affect their
everyday practice of law."). This author earlier observed this learning curve, and
certain of its associated costs, in another context.
Law teachers and casebook authors, for example, struggle to stay apace with the
seeming legion of new regulations that have emanated from the Securities and
Of course,
Exchange Commission... by dictate of... Sarbanes-Oxley ....
practitioners also are scrambling to keep up with the evolving law and regulation in
this area, albeit with the more cheerful thought, whether consciously or
unconsciously, that legislation and regulation on this large a scale is tantamount to a
"Full Employment Act for Lawyers."
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Enron 's Tangled Web: Complex Relationships; Unanswered
Questions, 71 U. CTN. L. REv. 1167, 1168 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
396. See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 817-28; infra Part VI.B.
397.
One scholar succinctly describes both the expected costs and anticipated
limitations associated with continuing legal education courses relating to SarbanesOxley.
Another way of thinking about Sarbanes-Oxley is to think of it as the 'Continuing
Legal Education Relief Act of 2002.' . .. [T]here will be a large number of
Continuing Legal Education... programs with people-large numbers of people
paying huge amounts of money-to hear people like us who are very good at asking
questions but end up with no answers.
Panel Three: Ethical Dilemmas Associated with the Corporate Attorney's New Role
(November 22, 2002), 52 AM. U. L. REv. 655, 658 (2003) (comments of Jeffrey D.
Bauman).
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audiences. 398 Learning costs may be built into the terms of the statute.
Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, expressly calls for a number of studies to
be made by the SEC and others.399 In addition, the novelty of various
provisions of the act may encourage ongoing learning and
communication regarding the subject matter areas covered by SarbanesOxley. 40 0 These economic costs, however, are negligible in comparison
to the fees and disbursements of legal professionals retained by public
398. See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 821. These rule summaries may include
government publications, law firm client memoranda and advisory reports, articles
written or published by professional or industry associations, memoranda from the
management of regulated firms to their employees, and other similar publications. See,
e.g., Maria Camilla Cardilli, Regulation Without Borders: The Impact Of SarbanesOxley On European Companies, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 785 (2004) (a study by a law
firm associate of Sarbanes-Oxley's impacts on European issuers with securities
registered or listed in the United States); Earl M. Jones, III et al., Employment and
Labor Law, 56 SMU L. REv. 1547, 1547 (2003) ("Much has been written to educate
employers of the broad prohibitions against firing or retaliating against employees who
blow the whistle on corporations, their officers or directors, or employees who
otherwise participate in any federal investigation."); Irma S. Russell, Keeping the
Wheels on the Wagon: Observations on Issues of Legal Ethics for Lawyers
Representing Business Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REv. 513, 535 (2003) ("[T]he ABA
has authorized additional study of the rule [Model Rule 1.6] in light of the SarbanesOxley Act.").
399. See 15 U.S.C. § 7218(d) (Supp. 2002); id. § 7232; id. § 7246(c); id. § 7261(c)
(Section 401(c) of Sarbanes-Oxley, calling for a study by the SEC of special purpose
entities); Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 at §§ 701-05 (2002); see also William W.
Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents,
48 VILL. L. REv. 1023, 1028 (2003); James D. Cox et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics.
An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 764 n.96 (2003); Richard W. Painter,
Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers and Auditors, 29 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 397, 399 n.6 (2004); Niels Schaumann, The Sarbanes-OxleyAct: A Bird's-Eye
View, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1315, 1323, 1325, 1337, 1349 (2004); David A.
Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist
Reimagination,92 GEO. L.J. 61, 77 n.93 (2003).
400. See, e.g., Stephen Fraidin & Laura B. Mutterperl, Advice For Lawyers:
Navigating The New Realm Of FederalRegulation OfLegal Ethics, 72 U. CIN. L. REv.
609, 662-664 (2003) (suggesting, with respect to the new attorney reporting
requirements, that "lawyers and law firms might consider consulting with and learning
from each other in their efforts to clarify the meanings of the SEC regulations, establish
internal compliance procedures, and advise attorneys regarding measures to take when
they suspect a client of material wrongdoing" and listing ways in which that could be
done).
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companies and others to advise them on the new rule.4 ' 1 Noneconomic
costs (many of which are monetized in the form of professional or other
fees or, in the case of the government, taxes) may include "investments
of time and foregone opportunities. '40 2
Based on this description, it is likely that the costs associated with
the learning of a new rule principally vary with the length and intricacy
of the rule, not the nature of the rulemaking body. 403 Accordingly, by
assuming the existence of a specific proposed rule, the identity of the
rulemaking body should not significantly impact the nature or
magnitude of legal transition costs. 40 4 Possible significant exceptions
could exist, however, if it were established that a particular form of
rulemaking-legislative, regulatory, or judicial-results in a longer,
more complex, or more ambiguous articulation of a proponent's
proposed rule or more difficulty in interpretation.4 5 Moreover, the
establishment of a specific proposed rule through simultaneous or
sequential rulemaking activity in more than one federal institution
logically should result in higher learning costs.
Under that
circumstance, those undertaking to learn about the new initiative would
have to look in more than one place to piece together the substance of
the new rule and their consideration of the rule would need to
incorporate an understanding of the way that the activities of the
involved rulemaking bodies interact in establishing and interpreting the
rule. A piecemeal rulemaking approach also may extend the time over
which the rulemaking process-and, therefore, the learning process40 6
occurs, which may further increase learning costs.
401.
See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 820 n. 155 and accompanying text.
402. See id. at 820.
403. See id. at 819.
404. Cf id. at 819 ("Whether in the form of a statute, administrative regulation, or
judicial opinion, a new rule of law must be identified, analyzed, and digested").
405. See id. at 819 ("An incrementally new common law rule, for example, likely
will impose lower learning costs than a comprehensive legislative product.").
406. One can imagine a scenario in which large pieces of a new rule are adopted and
implemented by Congress and the SEC or by Congress and the federal courts over a
period of several years. Unless the plan for the rule is laid out well in advance,
executed without change, and implemented in a timely manner, those interested in
understanding the new rule will be required to learn its contents and effect in
overlapping substantive segments over those several years. Each time the newest part
of the rule is adopted, the learner likely will have to review his or her knowledge of the
then existing rule before moving on to the newest part of the rule.
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B. Uncertainty Caused by the New Legal Regime-Uncertainty Costs
New legal rules create new uncertainty, even after a thorough
learning process has taken place.4 °v In his transition costs model,
Professor Van Alstine separates the costs associated with this
uncertainty into two categories: negative and positive.
Uncertainty costs arise in what might be viewed as both negative and
positive forms. Negative uncertainty costs .. . reflect the loss of the
accumulated experience with a legal regime over time. Positive
costs, on the other hand, reflect the uncertainty created by doubts
over the precise meaning of, and simple lack of familiarity with, a
new body of law. The two notions obviously are closely related, and
indeed may be viewed as opposite sides of the same conceptual coin.
But as we continue to examine the broad variety of legal transition
these two aspects of
costs, there is a value in pulling apart
408
uncertainty and analyzing them separately.

Professor Van Alstine also notes "a more subtle form" of
uncertainty cost-that associated with foregoing desirable opportunities
because of legal uncertainty. 40 9 The rulemaking body may create this
type of uncertainty cost by being too vague in an attempt to encourage
or discourage a particular type of transaction or activity, including by
drafting a broad standard rather than a more narrowly tailored rule.4 10
Effectively, negative uncertainty costs represent a write-off or
write-down of the value of accrued experience with the former legal
regime, potentially including experience in advising, drafting,
407. See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 823 ("[E]ven after all that is learnable
about a new body of law is learned, some level of uncertainty likely will remain.").
Resolution of these uncertainties may take place over a period of years. See
McManamon, supra note 395, at 182 ("As with all quickly executed, sweeping
legislative changes, the full effects of the new law will take years to percolate through
court decisions, altering many things that were never intended to be touched.").
408. Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 823.
409. See id. at 835 ("By decreasing guidance on the content of the law, the
introduction of new legal norms may deter activities a legal system would want to
encourage. The net result is a form of opportunity cost, because affected legal actors are
unwilling to bear the increased risks that accompany the increased uncertainty in the
law.").
410. See id. at 835-36 (indicating that legal actors choose to stay away from
transacting in the unlawful zone).
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negotiating, and strategizing. 4 11 Legal professionals and their clients
will likely have to "retool" themselves in light of uncertainties
associated with the new rule. For example, by disallowing most, but not
all, loans to corporate executives, Sarbanes-Oxley results in a loss of the
investment that public companies and their legal counsel had made in
compensation structures utilizing, and form documents (loan
agreements, board procedures and resolutions, etc.) relating to, most
executive loan transactions that were legally valid prior to SarbanesOxley.4 12
Positive uncertainty costs include expenses associated with:
planning to and taking action to accommodate the gaps in and
ambiguities of the new rule; 413 an increased or different need for external
professional services; 414 negotiation of and around new transactional
issues and assessments; 4 15 and an increased need for dispute
resolution.4 1 6 Unclear and incomplete provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, for
example, create apparent positive uncertainty costs. 417 Regulated firms
411. See id. at 828 ("When, then, a legal system chooses to repeal or replace an
established legal norm-even one that upon original adoption was uncertain or
otherwise suboptimal-it risks the loss of an important societal investment.").
412. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (Supp. 2002) (prohibiting the extension and renewal of
personal loans to directors and executive officers).
413. See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 829.
414. See id. at 830 (indicating that the uncertainty of the new law will mean less
competition for providing these legal services, thus leading to increased costs).
415. See id. ("[A] new body of law may introduce friction into the negotiation of
transactions within its scope. The resultant increase in the costs of private ordering will
make some socially desirable transactions less efficient and deter others altogether.").
416. See id. ("[A] new legal regime of uncertain content likely will lead to increased
dispute resolution costs."). The costs of dispute resolution also are borne by the
government, both through the government's provision of courts for adjudicating
disputes and, in the case of the federal government, through its provision of
administrative courts housed in various agencies, including the SEC. See id. at 850-52.
417. Notable in this regard is the so-called "whistleblower" protection afforded to
employees of public companies in accordance with Section 806(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley.
18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. 2002). The statute's causation and state of mind
requirements, among other things, create uncertainty and the potential for increased
planning and dispute resolution costs. Moreover, the imprecision of those standards
creates new risks for employers in negotiations with employees.
[T]he strong protection afforded whistleblowers in effect creates a new subtopic in
employment law. Workers who have been demoted or terminated for any reason now
have an incentive to "cause information to be provided" concerning a securities
violation to the SEC, Congress, or "a person with supervisory authority over the
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and individuals likely bear the brunt of these costs in the form of
professional service fees and disbursements.
Opportunity costs associated with the uncertainty of a new legal
regime are speculative, and therefore difficult to quantify, since they
represent the unnecessary loss of a legal, value-enhancing transaction or
course of conduct.41 8 These costs also vary based on the nature of the
curtailed transaction or activity and the type of entities and individuals

employee," and those who are concerned about a potential demotion or termination
have an incentive to threaten such action. Litigation is likely over whether the
employee "reasonably believes" the information shows a securities law violation and
whether the action against the employee was because of the whistle blowing. But
whatever courts do, the new law obviously can give significant leverage to employees,
including in cases in which the firm has good reason to take action against the
employee. It is an open question whether the benefits of exposing fraud will outweigh
the disruptive effects of this new form of job protection.
Ribstein, supra note 22, at 43. Similarly, the attorney conduct provisions of SarbanesOxley include built-in ambiguities that introduce virtually assured positive uncertainty
costs. In particular, the ambiguity of undefined terms in the statute creates interpretive
issues that result in important uncertainties-uncertainties that give rise to planning and
dispute resolution costs, as well as transactional friction between lawyers and their
clients. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245; Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct
for Attorneys, SEC Rel. No. 33-8183, Jan. 29, 2003.
The provision for a rule requiring lawyers to "report evidence of a material violation
of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or
any agent thereof' raises... serious questions. The rule obviously inhibits
conversations between lawyers and the firm's agents at all levels. In this respect...
there is a tradeoff between the need to encourage the flow of information among the
firm's agents and the need to ensure that the information flows to the right place.
The rule also imposes new risks on lawyers, with further consequences for legal
representation of publicly traded corporations. The rule requires the lawyer to report
"evidence" of wrongdoing whether or not the lawyer concludes that such wrongdoing
has occurred. It also reaches beyond securities law violations to fiduciary breaches
and "similar" violations, whatever that means. Lawyers concerned about losing their
privilege to practice before the SEC, and thereby their livelihoods, will be inclined to
interpret these requirements liberally. The potential breadth of the requirement
increases the risks, and therefore the costs, of corporate legal representation.
Ribstein, supra note 22, at 44; see also James H. Cheek, III, The Legislative and
JudicialResponse to Recent Corporate GovernanceFailures - Will it be Effective - Part
H?, 5 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 311, 319 (2004) ("For the first time, the lawyers
are subject to reporting obligations imposed by the SEC, in effect federalizing
professional conduct standards of lawyers representing public companies. This creates a
tension in the attorney-client relationship.").
418. See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 836.
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9
that would have participated in the foregone opportunity.4 142
Yet, these
0
exist.
obviously
magnitude,
of
regardless
costs,
opportunity
Again, assuming a well defined rule, the type and amount of
negative uncertainty costs experienced as a result of new rulemaking
should not vary substantially based on the institution adopting the rule.
Any rule change is likely to result in negative uncertainty costs; the
more ambiguous and incomplete the rule is, the greater the cost in the
form of a loss of accumulated experience. However, the nature and
extent of the positive uncertainty costs and opportunity costs associated
with a change in the legal regime also apparently depend on the clarity
and comprehensiveness of the new rule 42 1 and the risk tolerance of the
various actors. The latter may be wholly unrelated to whether Congress
enacts the rule, the SEC adopts the rule, or a federal court establishes the
rule. As to the former, to the extent that any connection may be made
between the clarity and comprehensiveness of the rule and the

419. For example, it has been suggested that overall costs (including uncertainty
costs) associated with Sarbanes-Oxley may deter certain corporations from going public
or staying public. See Alvin C. Harrell, Penn Square Bank-20 Years Later:
Introduction to the Symposium, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 945, 957 (2002); John M.
Holcomb, Corporate Governance: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Related Legal Issues, and
Global Comparisons, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 175, 211-12 (2004); Stephen J.
Redner, Thinking Of Going Public? Think Twice, Then Read The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 521 (2002); Thomas M. McElroy, II, Note, In
Re Pure Resources: Providing Certainty To Attorneys Structuring Going-Private
Transactions, Or Not?, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 539 (2004); Jonathan A. Treadway,
Problems with PotentialApplication of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 to Small, Non-Public Banking Organizations, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 165, 183
(2004).
420. See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 836 ("Because it is likely to increase
uncertainty, legal change will carry a heightened risk of such opportunity costs. The net
result is a loss to society as a whole from the unwillingness of transactors to engage in
or fully exploit beneficial, legal activity, even when the very purpose of new legal
norms is to improve the legal environment for that activity."); see also Cunningham,
supra note 326, at 336 (asserting that Sarbanes-Oxley has resulted in "incalculable costs
of foregone opportunities driven by risk-aversion deepened by the culture of control");
John L. Latham, The Legislative And Judicial Response To Recent Corporate
GovernanceFailures-WillIt Be Effective?, 5 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 73, 7980 (2003) ("In terms of cost, I think the real unknown is the cost to entrepreneurialism.
Will all the focus on compliance and all of the concern about doing the wrong thing
chill corporations from pursuing potential business opportunities?").
421.
See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 832-33 (contrasting "the relative precision
of rigid rules" with "a new, open-ended standard of indefinite scope and content").
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responsible rulemaking body, it likely would be related to the level of
care and expertise exercised by the rulemaking body.4 22 More care and
more expertise may indicate greater clarity and comprehensiveness and,
therefore, lower costs. Relative care and expertise both may be assessed
through a comparative evaluation of selected facets of institutional
competence, including especially deliberativeness (as an element of
structural competence) and substantive competence.4 3 Moreover, the
care and expertise of a rulemaking body may be impacted by influences
to which it is subject and any resulting bias.424 Different capacities for
influence and resulting bias among the rulemaking bodies may result in
ability to exercise care or
heuristics that affect one rulemaking body's
425
another's.
than
more
utilize its expertise
422. See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 824. The level of care and expertise also
may depend in part on the care taken and expertise exhibited by the rule's proponent,
who or which may not be part of the adopting rulemaking body. See supra Part II.B
(relating to the assumption of a well defined rule).
423. See supra Part IV.
424. See supra Part V. The relationship between influence and bias, on the one
hand, and careful rulemaking, on the other, is not clear. Congress, for example, has
been criticized for a lack of caretaking in constitutional analysis caused by its ability to
be influenced by the public electorate. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 814
(1983) ("Legislators, influenced by the passions and exigencies of the moment, the
pressure of constituents and colleagues, and the press of business, do not always
pass sober constitutional judgment on every piece of legislation they enact"). On
the other hand, the electorate's interest in and influence over congressional
activities may help to ensure that care is taken in rulemaking.
The electorate is free to ask whether Congress is making wise and well-informed
choices. Moreover, at a time when the Supreme Court is less deferential to Congress
with respect to its fact-finding role, tougher scrutiny by the electorate may spur
Congress to carry out that role with greater care. This second observation is, in part,
a critical comment on the electorate's exercise of its influence on Congress.
Muriel Morisey Spence, What Congress Knows and Sometimes Doesn't Know, 30 U.
Similarly, the interest and influence of one
RICH. L. REv. 653, 658 (1996).
governmental actor in the rulemaking of another may help ensure that care is exercised
in the rulemaking process. Cf Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the
Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary's
Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1, 107 (2000) ("An agency that creates law today
knowing its own staff - rather than an independent judge - will interpret it tomorrow
will be less likely to bind itself through precise drafting.").
See James A. Fanto, Persuasion and Resistance: The Use of Psychology by
425.
Anglo-American Corporate GovernanceAdvocates in France, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
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C. Other Changes in Private Conduct-Development and
Administration Costs
As a result of rule changes, regulated actors may have to alter the
way they conduct their businesses, both internally and in their
contractual dealings with others.4 26 For example, they may need to
create new business forms or change their business practices.42 7 They
also may need to alter established understandings with suppliers,
dealers, customers, and others with whom they do business.428

L. 1041, 1092-93 (2002); Pritchard, supra note 339, at 1079-80.
426. See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 841. These types of costs also may be
borne by federal governmental agencies. See id. at 852.
427.
See id. at 837-42. Numerous provisions of Sarbanes Oxley, including some of
those already mentioned in connection with other types of legal transition costs,
occasion an easily identifiable need for new documents and processes. For example,
the changed filing requirements for insider beneficial ownership reports beg for an
adjusted internal corporate compliance process. See Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP & Affiliates, SEC Issues Final Rules Under Section 16(a), at 4-5 (August
28, 2002) at http://www.skadden.com/content/publications/839library.pdf. Similarly,
the whistleblower protections call for new internal corporate guidelines in connection
with employee terminations. See supra note 417 and accompanying text. Other
provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley that create the need for new forms and practices include,
among other reforms: the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
and related auditing changes; the requirements for management reports on internal
controls and chief executive officer and chief financial officer certifications; and, for
some corporations, the changes to audit committee composition and operations. See
Beecher-Monas, supra note 39, at 144 n. 11; Brown, supra note 56, at 370; John D.
"Jay" Cornet, Bank Governance: An Independent Director's Perspective, 7 N.C.
BANKING INST. 1, 7 (2003); Stephan Landsman, Death of an Accountant: The Jury
Convicts Arthur Andersen of Obstruction of Justice, 78 Cmt.-KENT L. REv. 1203, 1237
(2003); Perry E. Wallace, Accounting, Auditing and Audit Committees After Enron, et
al.: Governing Outside the Box Without Stepping Off the Edge in the Modern Economy,
43 WASHBURN L.J. 91, 105-07 (2003).
428. See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 842-45. For example, the audit committee
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley affect auditor contracts with their public company clients.
The Act, in essence, requires that accounting firms contract for their services not with
management, but with the audit committees of the boards of directors of the
companies they propose to audit. This change in the nature of the contracting process
between auditors and audit clients is effectuated by Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley,
which stipulates that the audit committees of public companies "shall be directly
responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any
registered public accounting firm employed by the issuer ... "
Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox On Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the
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Intrafirm costs may include the expense of developing, communicating,
to do so.42 9 Each
and refining new business standards, or paying 43others
0
of these changes results in legal transition costs.
Inter-firm costs are similarly complex and involve both
development and uncertainty costs.

Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 350-351 (2003) (footnotes omitted). Also, the new federal
attorney conduct rules under Sarbanes-Oxley change the way in which securities
lawyers conduct their practices and may be changing the way their clients use their
services. See Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Climbing "Up The Ladder": CorporateCounsel
and the SEC's Reporting Requirement for Lawyers, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 511, 522-26
(2004); Suzanna Sherry, The Integrity of Law: Integrity and Reflection, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 367, 370 (2003); Timothy P. Terrell, Toward Duty-Based Lawyering?: Rethinking
the Dangersof Lawyer Civil Disobediencein the CurrentEra of Regulation, 54 ALA. L.
REV. 831,849-50 (2003).

429.

Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 838 (footnotes omitted). For example, public

companies were required to change their internal corporate compliance processes as a
result of the Sarbanes-Oxley provision accelerating the filing deadlines for insider
reports of changes of beneficial ownership. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2)(c) (Supp. 2002)
(providing that filings reporting changes in beneficial ownership must be made within
two business days of the change); Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers,
Directors and Principal Security Holders, SEC Rel. No. 34-46421, Aug. 27, 2002;
Cunningham, supra note 167, at 988 n.221; Matthew A. Melone, Are Compensatory
Stock Options Worth Reforming?, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 535, 565 n. 190 (2002/2003). Costs
in this area may be borne unevenly among firms. Some firms already may be using
forms and processes that foster compliance with the new rule. For example, many of
the reforms included in Sarbanes-Oxley reflect and build upon well known "best
practices" adopted by some public companies before its enactment. Yet, even where
this is the case, development and administration costs are not eliminated.
The legislation, in effect, codifies what were known to be the best practices of
companies in terms of avoiding ethical collapse. Because of the new specifics in the
statute, there are changes all companies will be required to make, even those firms
following the best practices that already implemented the statutory changes.
Marianne M. Jennings, A Primeron Enron: Lessons From A Perfect Storm of Financial
Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL. W. L. REV.

163, 252 (2003); cf Groskaufmanis, supra note 428, at 512 ("For in-house counsel, the
fundamental challenge is deciding how to adjust practices to the new rules.").
430. See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 837; see also Kimble Charles Cannon,
Augmenting the Duties of Directors to Protect Minority Shareholders in the Context of
Going-PrivateTransactions: The Casefor ObligatingDirectors to Express a Valuation
Opinion in Unilateral Tender Offers After Siliconix, Aquila and Pure Resources, 2003
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 191, 205 (2003); Holcomb, supra note 419, at 217.
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The net effect of this impairment of established contractual networks
is the imposition of private adjustment costs. First, like intraparty
forms, the initial development of interparty formulations involves
significant internal transaction costs. These include the resource
costs of time, effort, and the like expended in developing, testing,
and revising a standardized term. In addition, there will be learning
costs associated with accumulating and disseminating knowledge
about the term's intended meaning.
Moreover, because final control over interpretation and enforcement
resides with the state, there are serious exogenous development risks.
These flow from the fact that the precise effect of innovative terms
will remain unclear-and latent errors undetected-until formal
innovators of
judicial interpretation. In the interim, therefore,
43 1
contract terms will bear the costs of the uncertainty.

In large part, development and administration costs will fluctuate
based on the extent to which the new regime differs from the old; the
more significant the deviation, the greater the cost. However, the nature
and extent of the development and administration costs embedded in the
expenses associated with these changes in private conduct also will vary
based on the same factors identified with respect to uncertainty costs in
general-namely, differences in the clarity and comprehensiveness of
the new rule, which may reflect the relative degree of care and expertise
of that rulemaking body, as well as its relative impartiality. 43 2 From a
comparative standpoint, then, institutional choice should include an
assessment of the development and administrative costs associated with
the potentially differing care, expertise, and impartiality of the various
alternative rulemaking bodies. This assessment may be made based on a
comparative evaluation of the structural and substantive competence and
impartiality of the various rulemaking bodies.
D. Making Mistakes-ErrorCosts
A fourth and final set of costs that may arise out of legal change are
termed "error costs. ' ' 4 33 These costs arise from mistakes in both the
expression and use of the new rule. 43 4 The costs associated with rule
formulation emanate from a variety of well known and documented

431.
432.
433.
434.

Id. at 844-45 (footnotes omitted).
See supra notes 421-425 and accompanying text,
See Van Alstine, supranote 392, at 845.
See id.
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drafting defects.
Law-makers are neither omniscient nor perfectly prescient, and
language itself can be a blunt instrument for articulating specific
directives intended for general application. Because of this, legal
norms are subject to the commonplace formulation errors of
unintended vagueness or ambiguity,43 5incompleteness, overbreadth,
and (more destructive) inconsistency.

435. Id. at 845-46 (footnotes omitted). Each of these defects is present in SarbanesOxley. See generally Paredes, supra note 23, at 526 ("In the haste to pass the bill, it
appears as though the potential costs of the measures were not given due consideration
and the drafting was, at the very least, clumsy in many instances."). Undefined terms
and poorly defined terms contribute to the ambiguities embedded in the statute. See
supra note 290 and accompanying text. In describing two of these definitional issues in
the attorney conduct provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, one legal scholar notes:
The Act itself... is vague. It calls upon the SEC to promulgate rules calling upon
attorneys to "report evidence of a material violation of securities laws or breach of
fiduciary duty or similar violation" by the company or agency thereof. The term
"material" has repeatedly raised the specter of vagueness, causing litigation-a
problem compounded by the use of the phrase "similar violation."
Egar Guttman, Opening Address, The Evolving Legal andEthical Role of the Corporate
Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Keynote Address, 52 AM. U. L. REv.

639, 642. Overly generalized provisions add to the error costs created by SarbanesOxley. See Bowman, supra note 148, at 411 (commenting on the general sentencing
directives in Sarbanes-Oxley). Moreover, certain provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley are
incomplete. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 399, at 1028 (regarding the lack of a
provision regarding audit practice studies); Benov, supra note 19, at 443 ("From the
drafting of Sarbanes-Oxley to the SEC's rules, the United States has failed to make
concessions to foreign companies"). Parts of the statute are faulted for their
overbreadth. See Cowart, supra note 149, at 315 n.87 (relating to Sarbanes-Oxley §
402); Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law

After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 516 (2002) ("[T]he basic officer certification
provision may prove too draconian."). Actual and potential inconsistencies in
Sarbanes-Oxley also are notable. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act: FederalizingNorms for Officer, Lawyer, and Accountant Behavior, 76 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 897, 943 (2002) (noting inconsistencies as to the length of time that public
company auditors must retain work papers); Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The
Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To
Restructure The Board Of Directors, 53 DuKE L.J. 517, 545 (2003) (noting that

management's lack of knowledge of the work of qualified legal compliance committees
"is... inconsistent with the requirement of Sarbanes-Oxley that the issuer's chief
executive officer and chief financial officer affirmatively certify their familiarity with
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These costs may include unnecessary expenses incurred by a firm
or individual based on a misunderstanding of the new rule43 6 and public
and private costs associated with an increased need for dispute
resolution. 437 Attendant to these costs are any related professional fees
and disbursements. These costs are compounded to the extent that the
initial drafting errors are not corrected in a single legislative,
administrative, or judicial action, which is a frequently recurrent state of
facts in U.S. rulemaking.4 3 8
Interpretive errors create similar inefficiencies and waste. 439 These

costs arise not from errors in interpretation made by private parties, but
rather from errors in interpretation made by administrative agencies and
4 40

courts.

Even when lawmakers adopt legal norms that (reasonably)
accurately signal their intent, courts or administrative authorities
may erroneously interpret them. Such interpretive error in effect
imposes a new content on a legal rule, indeed one that is at odds with
its true content. Mistakes in interpretation, like those in formulation,
can be corrected. Subsequent judicial review, for example, can
reverse a misguided decision by a lower court, or overturn a court's
own improvident judgments. On issues of statutory law, legislatures
also retain the power to correct faulty interpretive decisions, even by

the issuer's internal controls and any deficiencies in those controls"); Seligman, supra,
at 516 (noting various duplicative requirements). See generally Christopher Wyant,
Executive Certification Requirements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Case for
CriminalizingExecutive Recklessness, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 561, 567 (2003) ("From a
practical standpoint, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is difficult to understand because of
inconsistencies that were most likely caused by the haste with which it was drafted. The
certification provisions are exemplary in this regard.").
436. See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 847 ("Formulations later discovered to be
erroneous can lead private actors to make wasteful investments.").
437. See id.
438. See id. at 846.
439. See, e.g., Cowart, supra note 149, at 314 ("Absent Congressional amendments,
SOX's ambiguities will have to be resolved through litigation.").
440. Given the formulation errors embedded in Sarbanes-Oxley, errors in
interpretation are inevitable. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
What Came After, 15 FED. SENT. R. 231 (2003) ("Whatever congressional motives may
have been, the hastily drafted structure and imprecise language of Sarbanes-Oxley's
criminal sections opened the door to creative interpretation.").
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441

As with formulation errors, both initial interpretive errors and
subsequent corrective actions come with a resultant cost. From the time
that the rule is misinterpreted until the time that all misinterpretations
have been definitively and finally corrected, private interests and public
bodies will incur expenses in complying with the changing rule
interpretations and adjudicating their claims relating to the
misinterpretations and reinterpretations.44 2 Moreover, regulated actors
may misinterpret a new rule to such a great extent that they believe they
are not among those regulated by it. 443 This, too, has cost implications,
both in terms of lost investments-expenses that would not have been
incurred if the firm or individual had known that the rule was applicable,
increased compliance costs (potentially including penalties or interest
that compliance would have avoided), and dispute resolution expenses
(to challenge the misinterpretation or correction), on the one hand, and
social costs associated with noncompliance, on the other hand. 444 "The
consequence is that transactors have not adjusted their contracting
practices to take advantage of the benefits and avoid the hazards of these
44 5
changes in the law.
These error costs are highly significant to comparative institutional
analysis. Rules are adopted and interpreted in a legally binding fashion
by rulemaking bodies. Accordingly, each time a rule is adopted by a
rulemaking body, whether as an initial foray into a new regulatory area
or as an enhancement or correction of a preexisting rule, an institutional
choice must be made. An ex ante assessment of error costs therefore
becomes central to institutional analysis, providing yet more information
Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 847-48 (footnote omitted). For example, the
441.
sentencing guidelines provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley led to a quick reversal by the U.S.
Department of Justice of recently announced policy, despite an apparent lack of express
statutory justification. See Bowman, supra note 148, at 418-19 ("[T]he Department of
Justice hoped to harness congressional concern about serious corporate crime to compel
the passage of guidelines provisions that had at best a strained connection to the
language and purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.").
442. See id. at 848-49 (noting and describing these costs).
443. See id. at 849.
444. Cf id. at 849-50 (noting increases in unlawful activity and the encouragement
of undesirable conduct).
445. Id. at 850 (footnote omitted).
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on the relative value of Congress, the SEC, and the federal courts as
federal rulemakers. These costs, like those related to other legal
transition costs, vary with the type of rule and type of provision in which
the error is made, the nature of the error (formulation or interpretive;
ambiguity, incompleteness, overbreadth, or inconsistency, etc.), and the
number of errors. This means that careful consideration and drafting by
the rulemaking party can minimize or negate these error costs. 44 6 A
comparative evaluation of institutional competence (both structural and
substantive) and impartiality again may offer information about the
relative capacity of each rulemaking body to engage in this careful
consideration and drafting.

VII.

APPLYING THE MODEL

This article proposes an institutional choice framework for use by
the proponent of a well defined federal corporate governance initiative.
The model includes four elements: comparative institutional capacity;
comparative institutional competence (structural and substantive);
comparative institutional impartiality (influence and bias); and transition
legal costs. Each of these elements allows for a comparative analysis.
A rule proponent then can use the results of these parallel comparative
analyses to determine which federal rulemaking body or bodies may best
serve the proponent's interest in getting the desired rule adopted and
implemented.
This Part illustrates the use of the rule-centered model proposed in
this article. Specifically, this Part does three things. First, it highlights
some of the overall characteristics of the proposed framework that are
important to an understanding of the practical application of its
elements. Then, it explains the manner in which a rule proponent may
engage the four elements of the suggested framework to choose the right

446. This is an articulated objective of Professor Van Alstine's transition legal costs
model: better legislative drafting ex ante. See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 859. He
notes, in pertinent part, that
lawmakers can seek to internalize transition costs ex ante. The ready point here is that
increased care in choice and articulation can prospectively mitigate much of the
learning, uncertainty, and kindred costs of new legal norms .... A more enlightened
awareness of the tangible costs of undisciplined legal reform should give increased
impetus to the perennial calls for more responsible legislative drafting.
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vehicle for the adoption and implementation of a specific rule of
corporate governance at the federal level. Finally, it employs the
proposed model in a comparative analysis of Congress, the SEC, and the
federal courts as possible rulemaking bodies regarding the adoption and
implementation of two specific exemplar rules.
A. Attributes of the Model
Before the analysis proceeds, it is important to highlight a few
things about the analytical construct set forth in this article and
employed in this Part. First, use of the model does not necessarily lead
to a single definitive outcome. That is not its objective. It is intended to
be a flexible tool that allows for the introduction of many different
inputs and the exercise of individual judgment.44 v As the model is
employed over time, rule proponents will capture more information that
will enable them to better use the model to achieve their objectives.
Next, although the rule-centered framework is not simple, it also is
not unduly complicated. The framework appears complex because it
employs a comparative analysis of legal, political, and economic
observations about multifaceted institutions."4 However, on closer
inspection, the construct is not as complex as it looks. 4 49 The model uses

447. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 472 ("Any analytical framework, however, must
remain... flexible.").
448. As Professor Komesar notes,
Comparative institutional analysis is very difficult. Institutions are large, complex,
and hard to delimit. More importantly, comparing institutions requires identifying
parallels across institutions in some acceptable, understandable, and useable fashion.
Any adequate analysis must be able to pick up variations in institutional ability across
the wide and varied landscape of law and public policy.
KOMESAR,

supra note 2, at 7.

449. The analysis is not, however, "sparse," as Professor Komesar would advise.
A simple and sparse analytic framework provides a necessary organizing device.
Legal scholars tend to make laundry lists of often overlapping considerations and
compile vast citations involving the largest possible accumulation of literatures.
Effective analysis requires us to eliminate the overlap in factors, focus our reading,
and, most important, critically appraise and integrate additions and changes to the
analysis itself. A simple and sparse framework provides the only sensible means of
attacking these tasks.
Komesar, supra note 388, at 471. Simplicity and sparseness, however, may be in the
eye of the beholder. The perceived simplicity and sparseness of Professor Komesar's
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a comparative analysis of four simple categorical elements (each with
distinct component parts) and, in the process, allows for a greater depth
of analysis than a model that focuses on a single-institutional analysis or
on an individualized, discreet legal, political, or economic solution. 450
Finally, use of the proposed model involves making tradeoff
decisions. The various elements of the model necessarily invoke and
" ' To enhance consistency in this type of
compete with each other.45
decisionmaking, the suggested framework refocuses the rule proponent
on the nature and content of the rule itself as a principled basis for
making these tradeoff decisions. This forces those employing the model
not only to engage in detailed, substantive rule construction and

description ab initio, but also (having done that detailed construction

work) to refocus on the substantive basis for the rule itself when making
the important procedural decisions regarding institutional choice.4 52
framework comes from its unifying principle-a participant-centered approach to
comparative institutional choice. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 4. In his model
In
"institutional behavior depends on the dynamics of institutional participation ....
turn, institutional participation is dependent on the benefits and costs of participation.
The analysis focuses principally on the distribution of benefits and on the costs of
organization and information." Komesar, supra note 388, at 471. As may be apparent
from this description, Professor Komesar's model is not bereft of descriptive analyses
of issues relating to the same components of institutional choice included in the
framework here proposed: power, authority, and jurisdiction; institutional competence;
and decisonmaking influence and bias. He weaves these analyses through his unifying
economic analysis, however, rather than viewing them as alternative analytical
components, concluding that an economic analysis of institutions adequately explains,
and effectively proxies for, legal and political factors. See Komesar, supra note 388, at
472.
450. See KOMESAR, supra note 2, at 6-7 (decrying single-institutional analyses and
promoting comparative institutional analyses); cf Komesar, supra note 388, at 470
("No doubt economics focuses on only a few variables and paints an incomplete picture
of the world. But any attempt to analyze complex law and public policy must inevitably
abstract significantly. Simplicity is both powerful and dangerous. How much and what
to focus on is the art of analysis.").
451.
See infra Part VII.C.
452. A detriment of this approach is that a rule proponent using the proposed model
to make institutional choices can fashion a proposed rule and its detailed description in
a goal-directed manner. For example, if a rule proponent is a legislator who desires to
enhance his or her reputation in Congress through the congressional enactment and
implementation of the rule, the proponent could construct the detailed rule description
in a manner that ordains Congress as the appropriate rulemaking body. Under these
circumstances, the proposed framework becomes no more than a tool for the legislator's
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B. Engaging the Elements of the Framework
The existence of four independent elements of institutional choice
in the proposed model raises questions about analytical processing.
Specifically, consideration of the elements in the construct must be
properly sequenced and consistently undertaken.
453

1. Sequencing the Elements

In terms of sequencing, it is essential that the proponent evaluate
institutional capacity first. This element of the model is a threshold
consideration. If a potential rulemaking body does not have the requisite
power, authority, or jurisdiction over a proposed rule of corporate
governance, its participation in the adoption and implementation of that
proposed rule is precluded. Congress, the SEC, and the federal courts
all have some capacity to make federal corporate governance rules, but
the nature and extent of that capacity differ based on the substantive
contents of a specific proposed rule.454
The descriptions of the nature and extent of the institutional
capacity of Congress, the SEC, and the federal courts, respectively, in
Part III of this article demonstrate the significant influence of Congress
on legislative, regulatory, and judicial rulemaking in the area of
corporate governance.45 5 Congress's power in the area of corporate
personal aggrandizement. This particular exploitation of the suggested analysis is
difficult to spot and impossible to prevent. The potential for misuse of the model in this
manner argues for both the critical review of proposed rule descriptions and the
employment of other institutional choice models by other actual or potential rule
proponents and rule makers.
The order of analysis recommended in this part may be artificially formalistic,
453.
given the interaction of the various elements of the framework. However, ordering
enhances the ease of application of the framework and enables a more efficient review
and critique of the results of the applied analysis.
454. See supra Part III.
455. In this regard, one scholar observes that
[t]he structure of the Constitution and traditional concepts of agency law form the
basis for the view that Congress controls allocation of decisionmaking between
administrative agencies and the judiciary. The constitutional structure does not
provide expressly for administrative agencies. Congress creates administrative
agencies and thereby controls the extent of their jurisdiction. Under the traditional
view, administrative agency power is founded on a delegation of power by the
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governance generally is acknowledged to be broad; Congress enacts
legislative solutions under its power to make laws governing matters of
interstate commerce.4 56 Regulatory rulemaking power over corporate
governance matters is exercised by the SEC under statutory authority
granted by Congress.4 57 The federal courts make corporate governance
rules through the adjudication of cases and controversies arising under
federal laws enacted by Congress, including those that have delegated
authority to the SEC.45 8 Congress's pervasive power in the area of
corporate governance gives it459 a central role in shaping corporate
governance at the federal level.
Having determined institutional capacity, the proponent of a
proposed rule of corporate governance next should consider the
competence of the competing rulemaking bodies on a comparative basis.
This element of the model is important and foundational because the
proponent must have some knowledge of the structural and substantive
competence of each rulemaking body in order to assess a proposed rule
using the remaining elements of the model. For example, in assessing
influence and bias as part of an analysis of impartiality, a rule proponent
must have an understanding of the nature of the deliberative process of

legislature. That is, Congress delegates to an administrative agency its Article I
authority to legislate; from this delegation the agency derives its authority to engage
Under the constitutional structure, Congress has extensive
in rulemaking ....
authority over jurisdiction of the federal courts. In addition, Congress has the

authority under the necessary and proper clause to establish special, non-Article 11I
courts and presumably to establish administrative agencies to adjudicate. Furthermore,

Congress apparently has the authority to make administrative agencies the exclusive
decisionmakers, even on issues of law, by precluding judicial review of agency

decisions.
Maranville, supra note 120, at 523-24 (footnotes omitted).
456. See supra Part III.A.
457. See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.C.
458.
459. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 61, at 3-4 (summarizing congressional power in
corporate lawmaking); id. at 7-8 (referencing "Congress's constitutional ability to
intercede directly and to shift corporate law making authority among the various
players"). As a corporate governance law enacted by Congress under the Commerce
Clause, Sarbanes-Oxley expressly invokes SEC corporate governance rulemaking and
expands the involvement of the federal judiciary in corporate governance by creating
new federal causes of action and lengthening important statutes of limitations in
connection with federal securities fraud claims. See Kim, supra note 359, at 236-37;
Lucci, supra note 98, at 231-33.
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each rulemaking body and the role of the participants in that process, as
well as the representativeness and accessibility of each rulemaking body,
all of which are part of a structural competence assessment.4 6 ° Similarly,
a rulemaking body's lack of substantive competence makes various legal
transition costs, including especially error costs, that may result from
(among other things) the drafting of ambiguous and incomplete rules,46 1
more probable.
As for the remaining two elements in the institutional choice model
proposed in this article, a rule proponent may be well advised to
undertake the assessment of impartiality before assessing transition
costs. Knowledge of the potential for influence and bias in the
rulemaking process (as components of an impartiality analysis), like the
assessment of substantive competence, is likely to influence the
calculation of legal transition costs. 4 62 For example, influence or bias
may impact the drafting of a rule, resulting in error costs emanating
from ambiguities, incompleteness, or overbreadth related to the
influence or bias.46 3
2. ConsistentApplication of the FourElements
Moreover, the elements of the model, once sequenced, should be
applied in a manner that is consistent from case to case and rule to rule.
This level of consistency most readily can be achieved by use of a
checklist (of sorts) of items to review and consider within each element.
The description of each element of the model included in this article
provides the basis for this checklist. A summary of the key points is set
forth below in this Part.
Perhaps the least troublesome area for consistent analysis is the
threshold element of institutional capacity. Since Congress has the
power to make laws governing interstate commerce, and interstate
commerce is defined from time to time by decisional law,4 64 the
460. See supra Parts IV.A.1., IV.B. 1., and IV.C. 1.
461.
See supra Part VI.D.
462. See supra Part VI.
463.
See supra Part VI.D.
464. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553-575 (outlining the
court's jurisprudence and interpretation of congressional power under the commerce
clause).
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assessment of Congress's power must be undertaken in accordance with
the model then accepted in that body of decisional law. Although the
methodology may be different from time to time and from case to case,
the doctrine of stare decisis acts to keep the output of the methodology
consistent.465 Similarly, in most cases, questions about SEC authority
and federal court jurisdiction are resolved by resort to federal statutory
law and, where there is a question about the scope of the content of that
federal statutory law, the related decisional law of the federal courts
(especially the U.S. Supreme Court).
In analyzing institutional competence on a comparative basis, a rule
proponent first looks at the structural competence of each rulemaking
body by assessing the need for deliberativeness, representativeness, and
accessibility in connection with the adoption and implementation of the
proponent's desired rule.46 6 In assessing deliberativeness, the rule
proponent considers on a comparative basis the rulemaking process and
environment, including whether rulemaking in each institution is or can
In assessing
be comprehensive and prospective in nature.467
representativeness, the proponent considers the nature and extent of each
rulemaking body's accountability to the public and others connected to
the public, the political and partisan character of the rulemaking process
that arises, in part, from and relates to the degree of representativeness
of the rulemaking body. 468 Finally, the proponent's comparative
assessment of accessibility focuses on the relative abilities of the public

465. See id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Stare decisis operates with great
force in counseling us not to call in question the essential principles now in place
respecting the congressional power to regulate transactions of a commercial nature.");
supra Part III.A. (discussing congressional power over corporate governance).
466. The rule proponent's motivations for undertaking this detailed assessment (and,
in fact, in using the last three elements of the overall model suggested in this article)
may be both personal and public-minded (or altruistic). On a personal level, the
proponent's assessment helps ensure adoption of the well defined corporate governance
rule in the proponent's desired form and with the proponent's desired content. Publicminded motivations may include, for example, concerns about the institutionalization of
the rule, including its ability to influence public conduct, its longevity, and its
implementation costs.
467. See, e.g., supra notes 132 & 133 and accompanying text (regarding the
comprehensive and prospective nature of congressional rulemaking).
468. See, e.g., supra notes 142-147 and accompanying text (describing these aspects
of congressional representativeness).
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and others to have input on the deliberative process. 46 9 Then, after this
assessment of structural competence, the proponent assesses substantive
competence by evaluating the comparative levels of expertiseknowledge based on experience-of the various rulemaking bodies.470
The proponent's impartiality analysis consists of a comparative
assessment of the various influences to which each rulemaking body is
subject and any resulting or other institutional biases. Forces of
influence may include other government actors, nongovernmental
actors, individual citizens, minoritarian special interests, or majoritarian
power.47'
To complete the requisite analysis, a rule proponent comparatively
evaluates the existence and magnitude of each of the four types of legal
transition costs that may be caused by the proposed rule, an evaluation
that reflects and reinforces earlier assessments of institutional
competence and bias.47 2 In analyzing potential learning costs on a
comparative basis, the proponent focuses on the possibility that the
choice of rulemaking body (because of its relative ability to make clear,
comprehensive rules through deliberative, expert, impartial rulemaking)
will impact the costs associated with learning about the new legal
regime represented by the proposed rule forwarded by the proponent.473
The proponent also must assess relative positive uncertainty costs
associated with adoption of the proposed rule by each alternative
rulemaking body.474 This involves an evaluation of the comparative
costs that may be associated with legal uncertainty created by a lack of
clarity and comprehensiveness in the establishment of the proposed rule.
Clarity and comprehensiveness (and, therefore, positive uncertainty
469. See, e.g., supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text (identifying accessibility
attributes of Congress).
470. See Parts IV.A.2., IV.B.2., and IV.C.2 (discussing how rulemaking bodies,
especially the SEC, may have a greater degree of specific fact-based expertise over
Congress due to experience over time with specific rules).
471.
See supra Part V (discussing the influences and biases that have been attributed
to the various rulemaking bodies).
472. See supra Part VI (analyzing and assessing the various transition costs on a
comparative basis).
473. See supra Part VI.A. (regarding the learning costs associated with the adoption
of a new rule).
474. See supra Part VI.B. (outlining the ramifications of positive and negative
uncertainty costs).
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cost) may vary as among the different rulemaking bodies based on their
relative competence or impartiality.47 5 Moreover, relative competence
or impartiality may impact the nature and extent of development and
administration costs because the costs associated with changes in the
way regulated actors conduct their respective businesses increase with
legal uncertainty.47 6 The proponent also must assess those development
and administration costs on a comparative basis. Finally (and perhaps
most significantly), the proponent analyzes the comparative error costs
associated with congressional, SEC, and federal judicial action on the
proposed rule. These error costs emanate from both the formulation and
interpretation of the proposed rule and also may depend on the
comparative institutional competence or impartiality of the different
rulemaking bodies.4 77
By systematically following each of these described analytical steps
for each element in the model, rule proponents may achieve a
consistency in institutional choice decisionmaking. This does not mean
that different proponents of the same rule will agree on the results of
their independent analyses of the different elements of the model.
However, by identifying and agreeing on these elements and the manner
in which they are employed in the context of a specific rulemaking
proposal, the scope of debate is narrowed and institutional choice
decisionmaking and critique therefore can be more focused. This focus
is a primary objective of the model. A standardized model for
comparative institutional analysis in federal corporate governance
rulemaking will enable rule proponents to gain experience from repeated
use of the framework that should both (1) enhance their prospects for
success in making institutional choice decisions and (2) allow for the
enhancement and adjustment of the model.
C. Two Specific Examples of ComparativeAnalysis Using the Model
At various points, this article has used ex post observations about
Sarbanes-Oxley to illustrate the elements of the author's proposed
analytical framework. Because the framework suggested in this article,

475.
See supra Part VI.B.
476. See supra Part VI.C. (discussing the implications that a rule change may have
on businesses).
477. See supra Part VI.D. (defining error costs).
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however, is intended to be used for ex ante comparative institutional
analyses of federal corporate governance proposals, this Part provides an
ex ante analysis of two proposed federal corporate governance initiatives
using exemplar rules.
1. Prohibitionon CorporateLoans to Executives
As an initial example, this Part employs the well defined corporate
governance rule described in Table A, as set forth in Part II.B. 478 As the
reader may recall, the corporate governance rule described in Table A
involves the prohibition of corporate loans to officers and directors.
Table A is repeated below, for ease of reference. All attributes of the
proposed rule that are referenced in the analysis undertaken in this Part
are from Table A, unless otherwise noted.

478. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (citing an example taken from
Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley).
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Table A-Detailed Description of Proposed Corporate Governance
Rule-Executive Loan Prohibitions
Prohibit public company loans to executive
officers and directors

Rule Concept
Rule Objective
r

ied

io

Prevent recurrence of high dollar-value and
other abusive, undisclosed corporate funding of
insider investments in public companies
Render it unlawful for a public company to
extend, maintain, arrange, or renew a personal
loan to a corporate officer or director
Public company issuers, directly or indirectly,
certain
specified
than
(under
other
circumstances) insured depository institutions
479

Timing

and consumer credit firmS
Effective for transactions completed after the
date of effectiveness (i.e., rule of prospective
application); pre-existing personal loans by the
public company are grandfathered in, unless and
until they are renewed or the terms are
materially modified

How Action is Taken

Other Details

N/A (rule constitutes a conduct proscription)
Employ a rules-based (rather than a standardsbased) approach to protecting investors from
insider opportunism; promote the integrity of
U.S. capital markets by increasing corporate
responsibility for insider transactions that
impact the subject corporation or the market for
its securities; assume the risk of preventing
efficient transactions in order to achieve the rule
objective

Although Congress already has adopted a rule with these attributes
in Sarbanes-Oxley, this Part evaluates the rule on an ex ante basis (as if
it had not yet been adopted), both to illustrate the model and to assess
whether Congress made the right institutional choice decisions in

479.

See supra note 48 (explaining the specific exceptions).
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enacting the rule as it did.
a. Institutional Capacity
In the analysis of institutional choice for our proposed executive
loan prohibition rule, we turn first to issues of institutional capacity.
The outcome of this first stage of the analysis is clear: Congress must
take some action to make the proposed rule legally binding. In the
absence of Congress's enactment of specific statutory authority for the
SEC to regulate the substance of loan transactions between and among a
corporation and its constituents, there is no existing federal law
affording the SEC that authority. 480 The SEC does, however, have rules
that cover the mandatory disclosure of the existence and terms of these
loans under specified circumstances. 4811 With no federal law establishing
SEC authority or federal court jurisdiction in this area, the SEC and the
federal courts are not empowered to act on the proposed executive loan
prohibition rule. Only Congress has the power, under the Commerce
Clause, to pass legislation that establishes the proposed rule.48 2
Having determined that only Congress can take action, the question
then becomes: what action? At a minimum, Congress must enact the
rule concept, defining in a basic way the conduct to be proscribed and
the prescribed actors, as those matters are set forth in Table A. This
minimal legislative content would be enough to convey clear authority
over the rest of the rulemaking process to the SEC and establish
jurisdiction in the federal courts.48 3 However, to determine how much of
Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley now provides that authority, within the
480.
parameters set out in that provision. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (Supp. 2002). For
purposes of the analysis presented in this Part, however, we ignore the existence of
Section 4,02.
481.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.402, 229.404(a), 229.404(c) (2004) (requiring disclosure
of executive compensation arrangements and certain indebtedness and other
transactions between a public company and, among others, its directors and executive
officers, respectively).
482. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (outlining Congress's seemingly
unfettered control over the regulation of corporate governance).
483. If Congress desired to delegate authority to the SEC, for example, it could rely
on the broad, catch-all authority previously delegated to the SEC in the 1934 Act, see
supra notes 90-97, or it could expressly delegate authority to the SEC in the new
legislation, as was done in Sarbanes-Oxley. See, e.g., supra notes 100-106 and
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the required rulemaking beyond that minimum Congress should do, we
must push forward and analyze, on a comparative basis, the competence,
impartiality, and transition legal costs associated with congressional
action, as compared to action by the SEC or the federal courts. As
earlier referenced, this process involves tradeoffs and counterbalances
among these elements of institutional choice.
b. Institutional Competence
Deliberativeness is likely to be important to a proponent of our
proposed executive loan prohibition rule because the rule is new and
controversial (potentially politically charged) and the definitional issues
are many and complex (requiring significant diverse inputs).484 These
attributes of the rule seem well suited to legislative action.48 5 Moreover,
the proposed executive loan prohibition rule is intended to be
comprehensive in scope (targeting all public companies and their
officers and directors) and prospective, acknowledged attributes of
Congress and the SEC-the two most deliberate federal corporate
governance rulemaking bodies.48 6 Rule making in the federal courts is

accompanying text (setting forth examples of this express delegation in SarbanesOxley). Were Congress to do the latter, the rule might read as follows:
It shall be unlawful for an issuer of any security that is registered pursuant to Section
12, acting directly or indirectly, to extend, maintain, arrange, or renew a personal loan
to an officer or director in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
If Congress is to delegate authority to the SEC in either manner, then in order for the
proposed timing for the rule (applicability as of the date of adoption of the rule) to be
realistic, Congress and the SEC would have to work together in fashioning the rule.
This approach would allow the SEC to use its expertise to adopt appropriate initial rules
under the new statutory provision that effectuate the detailed substance of the rule.
484. In these respects, the desire for deliberativeness always must be weighed
against the probability that the deliberative process will result in some alterations to the
original proposed rule. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. It is worth noting
at this juncture that Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley, from which this example is derived,
first was cast by its proponents in the Senate as a disclosure rule, not a rule proscribing
conduct. See supra note 290.
485.
See supra note 128. But see supra note 149 and accompanying text (regarding
politically driven rule proposals).
486. See supra notes 132 & 133 and accompanying text.
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case-specific4 87 and, while often retrospective, may be prospective,
retrospective, or both. 48 8 The information provided in Table A does not
indicate that there are time pressures that would prevent the initiation of
a deliberative rulemaking process.4 8 9
Both Congress and the SEC are deliberative rulemaking bodies.4 9 °
Moreover, as
The federal courts are not highly deliberative.4 91
evidenced in Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress may be less deliberative when
driven by a seemingly majoritarian political force, given its high level of
representativeness and accessibility. 492 Accordingly, we must assess, in
the current political environment, whether we can expect true
deliberation from Congress. Although the public interest in corporate
governance reforms continues, the "perfect storm" that existed in the
wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals 493 does not currently exist.
Accordingly, Congress now is likely to be more deliberative than it was
when it enacted Sarbanes-Oxley. Because the SEC is not directly
representative of or accountable to the public, 494 it may be less
susceptible to majoritarian and interest group influences.49 5
Congress is the only directly representative federal rulemaking
body, accountable in a direct way to the public at large through, among
other things, the election process; SEC commissioners and federal
judges are appointed officials that are not accountable to the general
masses (although each may enjoy some accountability to other
government branches or segments of the population). Based on the
nature and content of proposed executive loan prohibition rule,
487. See supra notes 245 & 246. It may be quite difficult to adopt and implement a
comprehensive scheme of executive loan regulation, including all of the desired
definitional content and desired exceptions for various types of credit transactions,
through litigation brought by a particular plaintiff or group of plaintiffs.
488. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
489. See supra notes 127 & 128 and accompanying text (regarding the control of
Congress over its agenda and operations and the potential for slow progress in
congressional rulemaking).
490. See supra Parts IV.A. 1. and IV.B. 1.
491. See supra Part IV.C. 1.
492. See supra notes 326 & 327 and accompanying text (relating to the majoritarian

influence in the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley).
493. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
494. See supranotes 182-194 and accompanying text.
495.

See Macey, supra note 361, at 913-14; supranote 361 and accompanying text.
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representativeness and accountability may not be important.
Establishment of the rule involves the consideration and resolution of
reasonably technical legal concepts (even as among corporate
governance rules) involving the interactions between public companies
and their officers and directors. These legal concepts include defining
what a "loan" is and how the exception involving insured depository
institutions and consumer credit firms will be defined. The proposed
executive loan prohibition rule also is intended to be narrowly crafted as
a rule, rather than a more broadly defined standard.49 6 Given these facts,
outcome-determinative politics and open partisan debate on these
technical definitional questions are not likely to be helpful to targeted
Moreover, at some level of definitional content,
rulemaking.
representation of the "assembly"4 91 7 may not be an essential or productive
component of the rulemaking process, and independence of viewpoint
(as well as expertise) becomes more important. The SEC and the federal
courts (at best indirectly representative rulemaking bodies) are less
and each is
political and partisan in their rulemaking than is Congress,
498
characterized by greater independence than is Congress.
Congress also is the most accessible federal rulemaking body,
followed by the SEC, and then the federal courts.4 99 Because of the
focused substantive nature of the proposed executive loan prohibition
rule (a narrow class of proscribed conduct relating to a narrow class of
prescribed actors), there is not an obvious need for an open public
rulemaking process, as long as the opportunity for input is available to
interested members of the public. Although many members of the
general public likely are interested in the concept and objective of the
proposed executive loan prohibition rule (and may desire to express to
the rule makers their views on these aspects of the measure), smaller,
more specialized groups of people are likely to be interested in the more
detailed aspects of the rule proposal. The congressional rulemaking
process may be too open, but could be workable in this context if
properly managed. The SEC rulemaking process seems somewhat better
suited to a rule with these characteristics. The federal courts, while
496. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74, 92-93 (2000)
(making observations about the interrelationships among rules, standards, and
comparative institutional choice).
497. See supranote 143 and accompanying text.
498. See Cunningham, supra note 167.
499. See supraParts IV.A.l., IV.B.1. and IV.C.l.
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competent at fashioning narrow rule proposals, do not afford sufficient
institutionalized avenues for public input.
In the area of substantive competence, congressional expertise is
uneven as across its membership and uncertain overall. 0 0 There is no
indication that Congress has a widespread or certain expertise in
corporate governance50 1 or (despite in many interactions with financial
institution regulation) loan transactions 0 2 or the confluence of the two.
This is troubling in light of the importance of expertise in mitigating or
avoiding legal transition costs associated with a rule change as marked
as this,50 3 especially uncertainty costs (including those associated with
development and administrative costs) and error costs.50 4 Given that the
change in the rule will be significant for many public companies (since
they are likely organized in Delaware and likely use Delaware's
permissive executive loan rules in the absence of the proposed executive
loan prohibition rule),50 5 the relative lack of expertise of Congress is
problematic.
The SEC has some expertise in matters of corporate governance
and in executive loan transactions. 0 6 Although the SEC's executive
500. See supra Part IV.A.2.
501. See id
See Abraham B. Putney, Note, Rules, Standards, And Suitability: Finding The
502.
Correct Approach To Predatory Lending, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 2101, 2139 n.239
(2003) ("The extension of the Federal Reserve Board's ... power to regulate predatory
loans can be accomplished without adding the element of suitability. It may very well
be that Congress lacks either the time or expertise to enact a comprehensive system to
address all of the necessary issues.").
503.
In fact the loan prohibition rule conflicts with preexisting law on the subject.
See Roe, supra note 18, at 633 (noting, with respect to Section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley,
that "Delaware's express rule was, and is, to the contrary: 'Any corporation may lend
money to... any officer of the corporation... whenever, in the judgment of the
directors, such loan ... may reasonably be expected to benefit the corporation."'); Kim,
supra note 359, 249 (noting, with respect to loans prohibited by Section 402 of
Sarbanes-Oxley, that "[t]his kind of loan was permissible under Delaware corporate
law, for example, which allowed corporations to make loans to officers and directors if
the board of directors decides that such assistance will benefit the corporation. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as a federal law, will supersede Delaware's approval of personal
loans to executives.").
504. See supra Parts VI.B. and VI.D.
See supra note 503.
505.
506. See sources cited supra note 481 (various disclosure rules relating to executive
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loan expertise relates to disclosure rather than substantive regulation, the
promulgation and approval of disclosure rules over the years has
provided the SEC with important experience and knowledge of the
nature of these transactions.50 7 In addition to providing better guidance
to regulated entities and individuals, this expertise should reduce legal
transition costs in connection with the adoption of the proposed
executive loan prohibition rule. Absent unique experiential wisdom on
the part of an individual member of the federal judiciary, the singlejudge, general jurisdiction environment of the federal district courts is
less expert than Congress and the SEC as to both corporate governance
matters and loan transactions.50 8 Even the Circuit Courts of Appeals and

the Supreme Court cannot match the SEC's expertise in the combined
area of corporate governance and executive loan transactions.

9

c. Institutional Impartiality
As a highly deliberative, representative, accessible rulemaking

body, Congress is subject to significant public influence.

Public

companies can be expected to lobby hard against the proposed executive

loan prohibition rule because their existing compensation structures,
including in particular equity incentive arrangements, have relied in
various ways on director and officer loans. 10 Investors, likely to be a

weaker force, may be expected to argue in favor of the provision or a
similarly protective alternative.5 1' To the extent that the debate becomes

compensation, equity ownership, and transactions with the issuer). It is worth repeating
here that the SEC's deemed expertise in corporate governance is apparently contextual
and must be assessed based on a specific articulation of the nature and genesis of the
proposed rule. See supra Part IV.B.2.
507.
Cf Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers: Every
Business Now a Bank?, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 237, 249-50 (1988) (discussing the effect of
SEC regulation on executive loan transactions).
See supranotes 283-285 and accompanying text.
508.
509.
See sources cited supra notes 284 & 285.
510. See Melone, supra note 429, at 540-41; Roe, supra note 18, at 633. See
generally Kathryn Stewart Lehman, Executive Compensation Following the SarbanesOxley Act of2002, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 2115 (2003); Power, supranote 290, at 924-37.
See Morrissey, supra note 35, at 846-47 (noting, with respect to Section 402 of
511.
Sarbanes-Oxley, "[o]verall, this seems like a welcome measure that will help ensure
that shareholders do not become personal bankers for their officers and directors").
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politically partisan (as congressional debates may),51 2 experience
dictates that many Republicans will align themselves with the probusiness interests and many Democrats to align themselves with the
non-corporate investor groups. 5 1 3 These standard alignments may be
disrupted by the strength of a majoritarian influence, should one develop
(as it did in the case of Sarbanes-Oxley). However, this development is
not likely in the current environment, absent a new catalyst in the form
of corporate fraud or some other crisis of public trust akin to that which
preceded Sarbanes-Oxley. 514
The SEC's points of access for the public are somewhat more
limited, reducing the opportunity for public influence. 5 These factors,
however, should be balanced against the possibility that the SEC may be
subject to bias in the form of "agency capture., 51 6 Institutions and
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
512.
513.
See William S. Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got
Taken for Trillions by CorporateInsiders-TheRise of the New CorporateKleptocracy,
8 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 69, 84 n.42 (2002); Frances Fox Piven, Globalization,
American Politics, and Welfare Policy, 577 ANNALS 26, 29 (2001). One scholar
observed the following in the context of Sarbanes-Oxley:
On the political side, the White House and the House of Representatives were
The President and the dominant elements of the
controlled by Republicans.
congressional Republican Party were unapologetically supportive of big business and
identified in the public mind with the interests of corporate America. Congressional
Democrats, being somewhat less allied to large corporate interests, perceived a
potential chink in the political armor of an administration that had sought since
September 11 to keep the nation's attention focused on terrorism and national
security. Thus, beginning in early 2002, congressional Democrats were in full cry
against corporate malefactors. Congressional Republicans, too, responded to the
wave of corporate scandal, but far more cautiously, expressing reluctance to interfere
in markets and concern that congressional "overreaction" might be worse than no
action at all.
Bowman, supra note 148, at 393.
514. Numerous commentators have noted the majoritarian catalyst for SarbanesOxley. See Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REv. 835, 841 n.22
(2004); Charles F. Hart, Interpreting the Heightened pleading of the Scienter
Requirement in Private SecuritiesFraudLitigation: The Tenth CircuitTakes the Middle
Ground, 80 DENY. U. L. REv. 577, 577 n.3 (2003); Lessons from Enron, supra note 128,
at 685-686 (comments of William Ide); Patricia A. McCoy, Realigning Auditors'
Initiatives, 35 CONN. L. REv. 989, 1005 (2003); Berg, supra note 289, at 1872-1873;
Recine, supra note 128, at 1546.
515. See supra notes 356 & 357.
516. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
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individuals that are regulated by the SEC are not deterred by limited
points of public access and are able to make their views clearly known
to the regulators that "serve" them.5 17 Accordingly, the SEC is subject
to the same forceful pro-business, public company influence to which
Congress is subject in these circumstances.5 18 Partisan influence
concerns may be somewhat less apparent at the SEC than in Congress,
but may well exist.5 19
The federal courts are subject to the least influence overall, and
there is nothing in the proposed executive loan prohibition rule that
indicates any specialized avenue of influence might be available or
exercised in this case. There is no evidence, for example, that another
branch of government or a group of influential individuals has the
inclination to use informal contacts to influence the judiciary as to the
content or objective of the proposed executive loan prohibition rule.
Absent the existence of these informal influences, bribery, or individual
bias, the federal courts are the most impartial federal rulemaking body
for the proposed executive loan prohibition rule.
d. Legal Transition Costs
Establishment of the proposed executive loan prohibition rule by
the SEC is likely to create the fewest legal transition costs. This is
because of the SEC's relative substantive competence and relative
impartiality. In fact, the SEC's substantive competence in matters
relevant to the proposed executive loan prohibition rule and its
impartiality in the context of establishment of the proposed rule exceed
those of Congress.52 ° Moreover, its substantive competence exceeds
that of the federal courts. 52 1 Although the impartiality of the federal
courts exceeds that of both Congress and the SEC, impartiality may be a
weaker predictor of learning costs, positive uncertainty costs,
development and administration costs, and error costs than expertise.52 2
517.
518.
519.

See supra note 361.
See id.
See supra note 348.

520.
521.

See supra Parts VII.C. 1.b. and c.
See supra Part VII.C. 1.b.

522.

See supra Part VI; see also supra notes 424 & 425 and accompanying text

(regarding the uncertain relationship between impartiality and caretaking in rulemaking
that underlies this conclusion).
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We may assume, based on the SEC's relative rule-centered expertise and
impartiality, that the SEC would draft the most clear, complete,
comprehensive statement of the rule. If we make that assumption,
costs, development and
learning costs, positive uncertainty
administrative costs, and error costs all should be lower if the SEC is the
chosen rulemaking body than they would be if Congress or the federal
courts were to be the rulemaking body.
There are, however, some offsetting cost concerns. Slow evolution
toward the proposed executive loan prohibition rule-which is possible
through all of the federal rulemaking bodies but an essential component
of rulemaking in the federal courts-may decrease, or at least
incrementalize, learning costs to some extent.5 23 However, one must
include in the analysis the fact that Congress must take a threshold
action on the proposed executive loan prohibition rule, in any case. In
light of the significant change brought about by the legislative core of
the proposed executive loan prohibition rule, any cost reduction
associated with incremental change is more than offset by the
uncertainty costs (including those embedded in development and
administrative costs) and error created by the lack of a comprehensive,
detailed rule and the higher level of non-expert judicial involvement.
Also, the potential transition legal cost savings associated with SEC
rulemaking may be offset in part by learning cost increases associated
with the engagement of two rulemaking bodies in the establishment of
the proposed executive loan prohibition rule.524
In sum, then, the SEC is the substantial or virtual equivalent of
Congress in many elements of the comparative institutional analysis of
the proposed executive loan prohibition rule, except that the SEC may
be somewhat less accessible to public input, less subject to influence and
bias, and credited with a higher level of expertise. These factors, in
particular the SEC's enhanced, more certain expertise in matters at the
intersection of corporate governance and corporate loans to executives,
make the SEC a better institutional choice than Congress for adoption of
the substantive details of the proposed executive loan prohibition rule.
The impartiality of the federal courts does not apparently outweigh these

523. See Van Alstine, supra note 392, at 798-99 (describing the benefits and
detriments of a common law approach to rulemaking).
524. See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
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important factors.
Based on this analysis, Congress should legislate a "bare bones"
rule along the lines earlier described,5 25 and expressly delegate to the
SEC the task of detailed rulemaking under the APA. The SEC then
should engage in deliberative, expert rulemaking to define terms and
exceptions in pertinent detail, leaving as few known interpretive issues
as possible for rulemaking in the federal courts.
2. Independent DirectorDuty of Care
Table B below describes a second well-conceptualized federal
corporate governance rule for review under the four-part comparative
institutional analysis suggested in this article, a federal duty of care
applicable to independent directors of public corporations.526
525. See supra note 483 and accompanying text.
526.
This example is derived from In re Michael Marchese, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) P 75,424 (Apr. 24, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/3447732.htm (last modified Apr. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Marchese] and was inspired by
recently published observations of Professor Larry Cata Backer on that case. See Larry
Cata Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate
Monitoring after Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 327, 420-23 (2004); see also
Joseph T. Walsh, The FiduciaryFoundation of Corporate Law, 27 IOWA J. CORP. L.
333, 339-40 (arguing for an expansion of the existing duty of disclosure of corporate
directors). In using this rule as an example, the author is not suggesting that its
enactment would be advisable or desirable. One might question, for example, why this
monitoring duty of care, and the resulting liability for breach, should be imposed only
on independent directors only-or on independent directors at all. See, e.g., Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALl Corporate Governance Project, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1034, 1058 (1993) ("The trouble is that one can tell two radically
different stories about independent directors. The faithful monitor story posits that
independent directors assiduously carry out their oversight obligations. In contrast, the
rubberstamp story claims that they are little more than management puppets."); Mark J.
Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of CorporateLaw, 57 SMU L. Rev. 353, 385
(2004) ("[I]ndependent directors lack the incentives and resources to discharge their
duties. Yet many of the reforms noted above merely seek to increase the number and
clout of the independent directors without altering their incentives or resources."). One
also might ask why the duty is necessary, or even desirable, as an adjunct to existing
law and regulation, in particular in light of monitoring duties imposed on all directors
by state law and in light of the Marchese case, supra, and others like it. For example,
independent directors who sign SEC filings may be liable as primary violators under §
10(b). See, e.g., Newby v. Lay, 258 F. Supp. 2d 576, 587 (S.D. Tex. 2003); AUSA Life
Ins. Co. v. Dwyer, 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Brown, supra note 56,
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Table B-Detailed Description of Proposed Corporate Governance
Rule-Independent Director Duty of Care

Rule Concept

Rule Objective

Required or Proscribed
Action

Prescribed Actors

Timing

Establish a monitoring duty of care owed by
an independent director of a public company
to its stockholders with respect to the accuracy
and completeness of the company's public
disclosure documents
Encourage an independent director of a
public-company issuer to inquire as to the
accuracy and completeness of the information
included by the issuer in required public
disclosure documents; clarify that an
independent director of a public company
must do more than merely resign and report
possible inaccuracies or incompleteness in
company disclosure documents
Require each independent director of a public
company to review and make diligent inquiry
into the accuracy and completeness of each
report or statement required to be filed with
the SEC by the public company
Independent 527 directors of public companies
(i.e., issuers with a class of securities
registered under Section 12(b) or Section
12(g) of the 1934 Act)
Effective for filings made after (a) the date of
adoption of the rule or (b) a date certain
specified in the rule as adopted

at 365 n.315. The rule proponent would have the burden of adequately addressing these
questions in making the proposal, and would be charged with supporting the rule in
response to these and other potential challenges. The substantive failings of any
particular rule are not directly relevant to the efficacy of the institutional choice
framework presented in this article.
527. Under the proposed rule, "independence" is determined based on the
requirements of Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)
(Supp. 2002).
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An independent director of a public company
must conduct his review and inquiry of the
company's public disclosure documents in a
manner that is not reckless; 528 the burden of
proof in a legal action challenging the
independent director's standard of care would
be on the director
Reinforce a culture of compliance within
public companies as an adjunct to SarbanesOxley and SEC reporting obligations; promote
the integrity of U.S. capital markets by
increasing the responsibility of public
company independent directors for required
disclosures under the federal securities laws;
supplement duties applicable to independent
directors of public companies under
applicable state corporate law

How Action is Taken

Other Details

This second exemplar rule, relating to the establishment of a
monitoring duty of care for independent directors, has attributes that are
significantly different from those of the management loan prohibition
proposal. The remainder of this Part is devoted to an analysis of this
second rule proposal using the comparative institutional analysis
proposed in this article.
a.

Institutional Capacity

Congress has the constitutional power under the Commerce Clause
to legislatively enact the proposed independent director duty of care
rule. 52 9 However, Congress has not yet directly exercised that power
and, therefore, has not afforded the SEC and the federal courts specific
authority to establish a monitoring duty of care relating to SEC filings
528. For this purpose, recklessness consists of highly
involving an extreme departure from standards of ordinary care
or obvious danger of misleading stockholders. See Hoffman
F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 1999). See generally Sunstrand Corp.
553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977), quoting Franke v.
Development Authority, 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okl. 1976).
529. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.

unreasonable conduct
and presenting a known
v. Comshare, Inc., 183
v. Sun Chemical Corp.,
Midwestern Oklahoma
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for all or any part of the board of directors of a public company.
Accordingly, any authority supporting current SEC or federal court
capacity in this area must come from a nonspecific congressional
conferral in the provisions of one of the federal securities acts.
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act ("Section 10(b)")53 ° is a source for
the relevant SEC rulemaking authority, and both Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 under the 1934 Act ("Rule l0b-5")531 are sources of federal court
subject matter jurisdiction. These antifraud provisions generally protect
investors from materially false and misleading disclosures, including
those made in reports and statements required to be filed under the 1934

Act. 532 This law and rule impose duties on corporate managers that may
not be imposed on them under state corporation laws. 533 Among other

things, Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are the bases for insider trading
liability under the "disclose or abstain" rule, 534 a judge-made rule that
imposes on corporate insiders a duty to abstain from trading in the

530. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). In relevant part, Section 10(b) provides that it is
unlawful for one to use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. .. , any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004). Rule 1Ob-5, adopted by the SEC under the
531.
authority expressly conveyed to it under Section 10(b), makes it
unlawful for any person,... [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud...
[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or ... [t]o engage in any act, practice or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
532. See sources cited supra note 526; see also DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION IN A NUTSHELL § 20 (7th ed. 2002) ("The provisions
of... Rule 1Ob-5 ... are applicable to any statement, in the form of a report, press
release or other document, made by any issuer.").
533.
See McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F. 2d 824, 834 (3d Cir. 1961)
("Section 10(b) imposes broad fiduciary duties on management vis-a-vis the
corporation and its individual stockholders. As implemented by Rule lOb-5 and Section
29(b), Section 10(b) provides stockholders with a potent weapon for enforcement of
many fiduciary duties."); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 n. 13 (1961).
534. See Jesse M. Fried, Insider Abstention, 113 YALE L.J. 455, 456 (2003) ("The
primary mechanism for regulating insider trading is the duty to 'disclose or abstain,'
which arises under Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.").
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corporation's securities unless all material information has been publicly
disclosed and disseminated. 3 5 Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 also
underlie more specific SEC insider trading rules of recent vintage. 3 6
The proposed independent director duty of care rule could rest on
the same legislative and regulatory foundation. Like the duty imposed
on insiders through the "disclose or abstain" rule, the monitoring duty
proposed for inclusion in the independent director duty of care rule is
correlative to the antifraud provisions of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Specifically, conduct violating the proposed independent director duty
of care may be deemed to constitute a practice that operates as a fraud or
deceit on purchasers of the corporation's securities and may result in
material misrepresentations or omissions in the issuer's SEC filings. 37
With this in mind, the conception of the proposed independent director
duty of care rule takes into account the state
of mind required for
53 8
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.
Counterbalancing these sources of authority for the proposed
independent director duty of care rule are the U.S. Supreme Court's
decisions in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank53 9 and Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green,5 40 both of which arguably narrow the substantive
scope of Section 10(b) as it may be applied to actions taken by
535.
See 40 S.E.C. at 910-13 (describing the basis for insider trading liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
536. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b5-l, 240.10b5-2.
537. See 40 S.E.C. at 913 (describing the relationship of insider trading duties to
Rule lOb-5).
538. Specifically, scienter is a required element of a cause of action brought under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Scienter generally is acknowledged to exist when
proscribed conduct is reckless. Cf Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206-14
(1976). The proposed independent director duty of care rule incorporates a recklessness
standard. Cf Marchese, supra note 526 ("Marchese violated and caused Chancellor's
violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lob-5 thereunder when he
signed Chancellor's 1998 Form 10-KSB. He was reckless in not knowing that it
contained materially misleading statements.").
539. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (holding unavailable a private action for aider and
abettor liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5). Public enforcement of aider and
abettor liability is available by statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2000); SEC v. Fehn, 97
F.3d 1276, 1282-84 (9th Cir. 1996); Scachitti v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19391 (N.D. Ill., 1999).
540. 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that a mere breach of fiduciary duty under state
corporate law, taken alone, is insufficient to support a finding of liability under Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
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independent directors. Moreover, in an earlier case not involving the
securities laws, the Court indicated that federal law incursions into
corporate governance must be express.5 4 1 Yet, none of these cases
directly undercuts the argument that the SEC and the federal courts have
the capacity to institute the proposed independent director duty of care
rule. Central Bank fundamentally is a case about implied private rights
of action against actors whose conduct is not directly proscribed by
statute; the actors at issue in that case are not primary violators of the
underlying statutory law. In contrast, the proposed independent director
duty of care rule, like the insider trading "disclose or abstain" duty,
governs the conduct of actors that are directly regulated under Rule lOb5.542 In addition, the Supreme Court indicated that the insider trading
"disclose or abstain" duty can be applied in a manner harmonious with
the rule in Santa Fe if a breach of fiduciary duty is accompanied by
deception, manipulation, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure-some
statutory basis for liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 4 3
Liability for a breach of the independent director duty of care rule also
would rest on statutory grounds for liability (in that the duty is
specifically directed to the prevention of fraudulent and deceptive SEC
filings) and, therefore, should be deemed to be consistent with the rule in
Santa Fe.
Other statutory support for SEC authority and federal court
jurisdiction over the independent director duty of care rule also exists.
For example, it is important to note that both issuers and their
controlling persons may be held liable for violations of Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5. 544 Independent directors may be deemed to be
controlling persons in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley era, an era in which they

541. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) ("Corporations are creatures of state
law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that,
except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with
respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.").
542. See, e.g., Marchese, supra note 526 ("By signing Chancellor's 1998 Form 10KSB with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity, Respondent Marchese violated and
caused Chancellor to violate Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5
thereunder, which prohibit untrue statements or omissions of material fact.").
543. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
544. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).
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hold more statutorily ordained authority.145 Section 301 of SarbanesOxley, for instance, charges the audit committee of an issuer (consisting
solely of independent directors) with specific oversight obligations
relating to work performed for the issuer by its accountants and certain
Based upon the foregoing,
internal audit-related matters.54 6
congressional action should not be necessary to adoption of the
independent director duty of care rule.
b. Institutional Competence
There is significantly less need for deliberativeness in the adoption
of the proposed independent director duty of care rule than there is in the
adoption of the proposed executive loan prohibition rule. Unlike the
proposed executive loan prohibition rule, the proposed independent
director duty of care rule is neither entirely new nor controversial.
Much of the terminology used in the rule (e.g., the contours of the
independent director definition and the recklessness standard) has been
defined by and set forth in preexisting statutory law, regulatory
rulemaking, or federal decisional law. In fact, the overall concept of
independent director monitoring may now be considered normative
(even if not legally mandated) in the public company context.5 47
Although somewhat comprehensive in its reach (applying to all
independent directors of public companies), the rule has a narrow focus
(ensuring the accuracy and completeness of the company's public
disclosure documents) that easily could lend itself to less deliberative,
more case-specific rulemaking. Given these circumstances, there is not

545. See id.
546. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(2) (Supp. 2002); Backer, supra note 526, at 365-69;
Ribstein, supra note 22, at 11-12.
547. Even before Sarbanes-Oxley, Professor Donald Langevoort noted that the norm
favoring independent director monitoring may be or become well entrenched.
The cautionary note to all of this is that trends do tend to take on lives of their own.
Once there is a norm-based consensus in favor of a supermajority of independent
directors, it takes courage to break ranks. This is especially so once such structures
become enshrined in codes of best practices and other visible forms of endorsement.
Firms may be reluctant to send a signal that investors might construe as managerial
rent-seeking.
Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of CorporateBoards: Law, Norms, and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 832
(2001).
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an apparent need to engage in a deliberative process to adopt the
proposed independent director duty of care rule; the proposed rule
clarifies the nature and extent of independent director liability for
inadequate review of public filings, codifying, to some extent, existing
law. 548 The one place where an element of deliberativeness may be
helpful (although perhaps not necessary) is in the determination of
whether codification of the proposed rule in this form is necessary or
advisable.5 49 However, each of the potential rulemaking bodies
routinely makes decisions of this kind.
Because deliberativeness is not critically important to the adoption
of the proposed independent director duty of care rule, the representative
character of the rulemaking body also is relatively unimportant.
Representativeness tends to support deliberativeness.5 50 In addition,
since a significant amount of the definitional content (including the
meanings of independence and recklessness) needed for the proposed
rule is available in existing law and regulation (the foundation for which
included representative deliberation), absent any controversy over use of
the existing definitions in this new context, there is no need for renewed
political or partisan debate over that content. Congress, the SEC, and
the federal courts (in and under Sarbanes-Oxley, as well as in prior
corporate governance rulemaking) already have determined, by isolating
certain roles for independent directors, that independent directors are
"watchdogs"--or responsible monitors-in the overall U.S. corporate
governance structure for public companies.55 Moreover, there exists no
548. See Marchese, supra note 526 (indicating the independent directors have a duty
of care like that set forth in the proposed rule).
549. See supra note 526 (noting that the rule proponent must make this case).
550. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
551.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-l(m), 7245 (Supp. 2002); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S.
471, 485 (1979); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 277
(2d Cir. 1986; Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson, Managerialism,Legal
Ethics, And Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 299, 305-06 (2004);
Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive
Compensation, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 301, 302 (1995); H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate
Director'sCompliance Oversight Responsibility in the Post CaremarkEra, 26 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 63 (2001); Roberta S. Karmel, The Independent CorporateBoard: A Means
to What End?, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 534, 545 (1984); Roberta S. Karmel, An
InternationalPerspective:Is it Time for a FederalCorporationLaw?, 57 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 55, 59-61 (1991); Roberta S. Karmel, Qualitative Standards for "Qualified
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obvious political objective to legislate this proposal at this time (in
contrast to the political environment that existed when Sarbanes-Oxley
was enacted back in 2002, for example). 2
Similarly, the accessibility of the potential rulemaking bodies is
seemingly insignificant in the adoption of the proposed independent
director duty of care rule, except, perhaps, as it may allow for variations
in the level of influence that may be exercised. The public at large is
unlikely to have a significant desire to participate in debate about the
necessity for, or desirability or contents of, the proposed rule. Many, in
fact, may assume that a specific duty of this kind already exists. As with
the proposed executive loan prohibition rule, the proposed independent
director duty of care rule governs a relatively narrow class of conduct
engaged in by a narrow class of actors. Moreover, it is improbable that
general public involvement is necessary to ensure an intelligent
discourse on the contents of the proposed independent director duty of
care rule. The concepts of director independence and reckless conduct
reflected in the proposed rule are key substantive contents of the rule,
and while they are not highly technical concepts, the details involved in
defining these concepts tend to be somewhat legalistic (i.e., outside the
expertise of the general public).553

Securities": SEC Regulation of Voting Rights, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 809, 829 (1987);
Loewenstein, supra note 526, at 352; Brett H. McDonnell, SOX Appeals, 2004 MICH.
ST. L. REv. 505, 507 (2004); Harvey L. Pitt, et al., Promises Made, PromisesKept: The
PracticalImplications of the Private Securities LitigationReform Act of 1995, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 845, 872 (1996); Schwartz, supra note 39, at 559, 572.
552. One noted scholar described the political environment in which Congress
approved Sarbanes-Oxley in the manner set forth below.
By July 2002, the list of publicly held companies with major accounting scandals had
broadened to include Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco, Global Crossing, Qwest,
Xerox, Rite Aid, ImClone, and Merck, among others. Lists of these fallen high-fliers
in reports and newspapers often ended with a statement that other additional,
unnamed, examples also existed. As stock prices continued to be buffeted by the
steady source of bad news, both President Bush and the Republican-controlled House
of Representatives recognized that the mood of America, with respect to corporate
governance, had changed radically. An immediate legislative response was viewed as
essential.
Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 Hous. L.
REV. 1, 45 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
553. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of
Directors: The Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 91,
115-16 (1997) (noting various legal sources of "eligibility criteria for independent
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However, the expertise of each federal rulemaking body may be
important to a rule proponent in assessing the competence of Congress,
the SEC, and the federal courts as potential adopters of the proposed
independent director duty of care rule. Importantly, under the authority
afforded to it under the 1934 Act, the SEC has defined the nature and
content of the various periodic reports, schedules, and statements that
55 4
must be filed by public company issuers under that Act.
Congressional and federal court knowledge of and experience with the
substantive and procedural requirements associated with these filings 5is5
more limited and derives from the SEC's foundational expertise.
Knowledge of this system of public filings may be useful with respect to
the portion of the proposed rule that specifies the documents as to which
each independent director has and must exercise his or her prescribed
duty of care.
The SEC (and, under its supervision, the stock exchanges and
NASDAQ) also has experience with and specialized knowledge about
5 56
definitional questions relating to independent director status.
directors"); Jennifer Kulynych, Intent to Deceive. Mental State and Scienter in the New
Uniform FederalDefinition of Scientific Misconduct, 1998 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 2, 115
(1998) (noting that "with the judicious use of legal terminology misconduct can be
defined so as to make clear that recklessness and gross negligence are culpable mental
states").
554. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000) (requiring issuers of securities registered under
Section 12 of the 1934 Act to file periodic reports as required or prescribed by the
SEC); Gregory S. Porter, What Did You Know And When Did You Know It?: Public
Company DisclosureAnd The Mythical Duties To CorrectAnd Update, 68 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2199, 2199 (2000) ("The express disclosure requirements for publicly traded
companies are a jumble of statutes, rules, forms, and schedules promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission... and the interpretive gloss on these express
disclosure requirements provided by the Commission.").
555. Congress implicitly acknowledged this expertise in its delegation of the
executive annual and quarterly report certification requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley. See
15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (Supp. 2002).
556. See William 0. Fisher, Where Were the Counselors?Reflections on Advice Not
Given and the Role of Attorneys in the Accounting Crisis, 39 GONZ. L. Rnv. 29, 96
n. 163 (2003/2004) (noting SEC approval of New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ
listing standards that, among other things, set forth the criteria for independent director
status); Bryan Ford, In Whose Interest: An Examination of the Duties of Directors and
Officers in Control Contests, 26 ARIz. ST. L.J. 91, 119 n.162 (1994) (noting that "[t]he
SEC definition of independent directors of public corporations excludes present
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However, Congress (working with the SEC, the stock exchanges, and
NASDAQ) recently also has considered and taken action in this area in
connection with its enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, potentially creating a
relatively current base of experiential knowledge.557 Given the speed
with which Congress ultimately moved in approving Sarbanes-Oxley,
however, its expertise in the area of independent director qualifications,
which likely would be a product (at least in part) of its institutional
deliberativeness, may be less extensive than we otherwise might expect.
The federal courts are not as experienced as the SEC and Congress when
it comes to definitional questions relating to independent director

status.558
However, courts generally, and federal courts in particular, have
significant expertise both in fashioning standards of care applicable to

specific actors and in determining whether and how regulated actors
have met or violated an applicable standard of care. More specifically,

the federal courts have determined how to define recklessness in the
context of the securities laws.5 59 The expertise of Congress and the SEC
in this area is less certain and undoubtedly would derive from standards
adopted by the federal courts. Moreover, the federal courts are
experienced with regulating the conduct of corporate officers and

directors (including independent directors), through their regulation of
employees of the company and its affiliates, former employees, relatives of executive
officers, creditors, suppliers, customers, retained attorneys, investment bankers, and
control persons").
557.

See supra note 527.

558. Courts are, however, experienced in defining statutory terms that have a
common meaning. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 23 C.I.T. 679, 689
(1999); J. D. Richardson Co. V. United States, 18 Cust. Ct. 109, 117 (1947); RobinsonGoodman Co. v. U.S., 17 C.C.P.A. 149, 165 (1929); Great Western Mercantile Co.
V. United States, 25 Cust. Ct. 126, 133 (1950); United States v. Ben Felsenthal &
Co., 16 Ct. Cust. 15, 17 (1928). Other, more specialized, terms also may have
significant judicial content. For example, the Supreme Court has supplied significant
definitional content to the term "security" for purposes of the 1933 Act and the 1934
Act. See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, A Sense of a Security: An Empirical Study, 25
IOWA J. CORP. L. 307 (2000); J. Christian Nahr, What Is a "Security"forPurposes of
the U.S. Federal Securities Laws? An Analysis of Foreign Equity Interests, 17 AM. U.
INT'L L. REv. 723, 727-48 (2002).
559. See supra note 528. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for Reckless
Misrepresentationsand Omissions Under Section 10(b) of The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 59 U. CiN. L. REV. 667 (1991) (describing the various court-imposed

"standards" of recklessness).
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insider trading under Rule lOb-5. 560 This area of expertise includes
familiarity with the fiduciary duties of corporate insiders, the current
cornerstone of insider trading regulation under Rule 1Ob-5.5 6'
c.

Institutional Impartiality

In essence, the proposed independent director duty of care rule
creates a new duty by which independent directors are bound in serving
a public corporation. Neither the executive branch nor a competitive
institutional actor is likely to exert much influence over Congress, the
SEC, or the federal courts with respect to the proposed independent
director duty of care rule. To many of these institutional players, the
proposed rule is a necessary, logical, or desirable adjunct to existing
federal and state corporate governance rules; others may view the
proposed rule as a clarification of existing rules. Given that Congress,
the SEC, and the federal courts each have had experience with
rulemaking or interpretation regarding independent director rules and
requirements,562 it is difficult to imagine any significant resistance to the
proposed independent director duty of care rule from these groups. Each
should be interested in and supportive of the attempt to clarify the duties
of independent directors.
As the body most subject to potential interest group influence,
Congress may find itself a target of lobbying efforts on behalf of both
public company management and investors. Since it already has enacted
legislation that makes independent directors corporate monitors on
certain specified matters, these influence campaigns likely would focus
on supporting or attacking the perceived expansion of those existing
monitoring responsibilities under the proposed rule. Interestingly,
however, interest groups representing both management and investor
interests in the past have supported increased independence on corporate
560. See supra notes 534 & 535 and accompanying text.
561.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path
Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud,52 SMU L. REV.
1589, 1590 (1999); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock
Markets: A BehavioralApproach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 135, 163
(2002); Marleen A. O'Connor, Toward A More Efficient Deterrence OfInsider Trading:
The Repeal OfSection 16(b), 58 FORDH-AM L. REv. 309, 319 (1989).
562. See sources cited supra note 551.
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boards. 6 3 Should corporate management and investors differ on the
independent director duty of care proposal, however, the view that
prevails in Congress may depend on which group has the larger political
or economic dog in the fight. 564
The SEC presumably would be influenced by the same interest
group actors that would attempt to influence Congress, but would be
more handicapped in their efforts by the decreased accessibility that
these actors have to the SEC. Again, there is no apparent source of
interest group support for or opposition to the director duty of care
rule.565

Finally, as among the proposed rulemaking bodies addressed in this
article, the federal courts are the least likely to be subject to influence in
acting on the independent director proposal. There always is a
possibility that a party litigant might attempt to influence the court,
through or outside the process of a case, to reach a decision for or
against the proposed rule.566 This prospect seems unlikely, however.

563. See John M. Holcomb, Corporate Governance: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Related
Legal Issues, and Global Comparisons, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 175, 186 (2004)
(noting that both the Business Roundtable and a Conference Board commission, cochaired by former Commerce Secretary Peter Peterson and John Biggs of institutional
investor TIAA-CREF, have supported independence on corporate boards, despite
differences on the expensing of stock options).
564. See Mary O'Sullivan, Corporate Governance and Globalization, 570 ANNALS
153 (2000) ("[R]ealignments in corporate governance reflect the growing economic and
political power of those who have accumulated financial assets[.]").
565. Institutionally, this should be a rule that the SEC can fully embrace. It is both
consonant with previous SEC initiatives focusing on independent directors, see supra
note 551 and accompanying text, and consistent with the SEC's primary historic
mandate to protect the public (and, in particular, the investing public). See Larry D.
Soderquist, The Role of the SEC in a ChangingMarket, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 45,
47-48 ("Traditionally, the mandate of the Commission was simply the protection of
investors and the public. Only recently did Congress add the mandate that the
Commission also consider when rulemaking whether a rule will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.").
566. Given the expenses of trials and appeals, however, litigants are significantly
more likely to try to influence each other in order to obtain a favorable settlement of
their dispute. While these settlements do not constitute rulemaking, they may create or
evidence norms that later become rules. See Keith Johnson, Deployment of Institutions
in the Securities Class Action Wars, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 627, 635 (1996) ("institutions
could seek settlements which provide for addition of independent directors to improve
board oversight capabilities").
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Overall, impartiality is not a dominant factor in the comparative
institutional analysis of the independent director duty of care rule. The
proposed independent director duty of care rule is not a rule that
apparently motivates significant, substantive institutional or interest
group participation in the rulemaking process. Perhaps the sole sources
of potential influence are individual independent directors. As the
emphasis on independent directors and growing burdens of federal and
state corporate governance structures lead to increases in the numbers of
independent directors in public companies, this group may desire,
acquire, and bring to bear its own influence base. At the moment,
however, that constituency is not well developed.5 67
d. Transition Legal Costs
Since impartiality analyses are relatively unimportant to the
proposed independent director duty of care rule, caretaking (as
supported by structural competence) and substantive competence-or
expertise-becomes most important in efforts to keep legal transition
costs relatively low. 568 The deliberative care and much of the expertise
needed to draft a comprehensive independent director duty of care rule
569
is most readily available at the SEC. The SEC is a deliberative body
and is the most familiar with the disclosure document contents and cycle
that are the subject of the independent director's duty to monitor under
the proposed rule.570 Moreover, the SEC has the longest consistent track
record in formulating and adjusting the definitional content of
independent director requirements. 57' Finally, the SEC is familiar with
and can assess the inclusion of the recklessness standard in the proposed
rule-the component of the proposed rule that names the applicable

567.
Cf Steven R. Howard, A National Association for Independent Directors Of
Investment Companies: A Supplement to Current SEC Proposals, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REv. 535, 537 (2001) (noting, with respect to the more-well-established mutual fund
independent directors, that "there are currently an estimated 17,000 independent
directors of registered investment companies in the U.S. and yet there is no professional
or industry organization to protect independent directors' interests.").
568. See supra note 422 and accompanying text.
569. See supra note 169-177 and accompanying text.
570. See supra notes 554 & 555 and accompanying text.
571.
See supra note 556 and accompanying text.
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standard of care to be exercised by independent directors under the
proposed rule. For example, the SEC has long lived under the
recklessness standard as an element of any action brought under Rule
lOb-5, including those for violation of the insider trading "disclose or
abstain" rule. 72 By using the SEC's care and expertise to codify these
areas, the rule should be well considered, clear, and comprehensive,
573
allowing for relatively low positive uncertainty and opportunity costs,
development and administrative costs, 174 and error costs. 575
However, the SEC is not most expert at defining the actual meaning
of recklessness for the purpose of the proposed independent director
duty of care. This is an area where the federal courts have been quite
active, even if they have found it difficult to settle on a single
articulation of the meaning of recklessness. 76 Given the uncertain status
of the definition of recklessness in the courts, it may increase legal
transition costs if the SEC were to define the meaning of recklessness
for purposes of the proposed independent director duty of care rule. The
potential increase in transition costs from this administrative approach
would occur as a result of the need for various federal circuits to adjust
to a new rule. However, each federal court, based on its expertise in this
area, should be able to use the existing formulation of the recklessness
standard that is applicable to similar duties under Rule 1Ob-5 in that
court. A disadvantage of this status quo judicial approach would be the
existence of more than one operative definition of recklessness
applicable to an individual independent director based on the court in
which the director is sued. Legal transition costs also may be associated
with this approach, especially positive uncertainty costs 577 and
development and administration costs. 578 On balance, however, because
these disparate definitions of recklessness may not result in significantly
different outcomes and because the federal courts are experts in this
definitional area, a judicial approach to defining recklessness should
result in fewer legal transition costs.
Accordingly, it may be best to suggest that the SEC draft and
572.
573.
574.
575.
576.
577.
578.

See supra note 559 and accompanying text.
See supra note 421 and accompanying text.
See supra note 432 and accompanying text.
See supra note 446 and accompanying text.
See supra note 559 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 413-417 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 427, 429 & 430 and accompanying text.
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promulgate the overall proposed rule, including specific drafting details
on those elements of the proposed rule that are most clearly within its
expertise, such as identification of disclosure documents that are subject
to the monitoring duty and determination and articulation of the criteria
or definition for director independence. In addition, the SEC would
indicate in its statement of the rule that recklessness violates the
applicable standard of care under the rule but would leave the detailed
articulation of that recklessness standard to interpretation in the federal
courts.57 9 Although adopting the proposed rule through this bifurcated
approach may add to learning costs (as compared to the learning costs
that nay be associated with adoption of a unified rule by a single
rulemaking body) because of the potential for increased complexity, the
need to review two separate sources of authority for the rule, and the
increased time needed to adopt the two phases of the rule,580 these
potential costs should be small as compared to the cost savings enjoyed
by using the court's expertise in defining recklessness over time and in
tandem with similar uses of the recklessness standard under Rule lOb-5.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article offers a model for comparative institutional choice
specifically for use in the context of federal corporate governance
reforms. It also, however, constitutes part of the larger academic
movement advocating comparative institutional analysis. Comparative
institutional analysis is critically important to the work of scholars and
other proponents of law reform. These rule proponents should not
suggest changes in legal rules without also suggesting the vehicle for the
suggested reforms. The determination of the appropriate rulemaking
body should be accomplished by employing some rigorous form of
In this regard, the framework
comparative institutional analysis.
included in this article is intended to endorse in full the views of
Professor Neil Komesar when he says:

579. The SEC could issue informal guidance in its promulgating or adoption release
that advises the reader (and the courts) as to how that definitional issue best may be
handled, and offer concrete examples based on common facts in jurisdictions that use
different recklessness standards.
580. See supra notes 405-406 and accompanying text.
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[U]nless we do better with the difficult issues of institutional choice,
any reforms, changes and proposals will remain illusory or cosmetic.
We will continue to cycle through the same proposals with the same
arguments. Today's policy will always have feet of clay and be
replaced by yesterday's rejected panacea, which somehow reappears
(without blemishes) as tomorrow's solution.
Attempts to fashion proposals and programs cannot stop until we
fully understand institutional choice. That understanding will be
long in coming and is more likely to occur if judges, lawyers and law
reformers seriously struggle with the subject as they make their
decisions and proposals. It is that struggle that I hope for. I want
those who make or seek to change law to seriously confront and
address institutional choice and comparison. I recognize that, to do
so, they will often have to rely on intuition and guesses. It is the
responsibility of legal academics to provide deeper understanding of
to improve the ability of those
these central issues and, therefore,
58 1
who struggle with these decisions.

That is the essential purpose of this article: to entrust to rule
proponents the elements of a proposed analytical model as a potential
means of improving their ability to engage in jurisprudential
decisionmaking and discourse in connection with federal corporate
governance reform. Without models promoting a rational basis for
institutional choice, rule proponents may as well rely on a game of
Rock, Paper, Scissors in choosing the right vehicle for federal corporate
governance initiatives.

581.

See Komesar, supranote 388, at 474.

